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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This purpose of this text or dissertation is to throw some basic light on 
a fundamental problem concerning manhood, namely the question of 
evil, its main sources, dynamics and importance for human attitudes 
and behaviour. The perspective behind the analysis itself is that of 
psychology. Somebody, or many, may feel at bit nervous by the word 
“evil” itself. It may very well be seen as too connected to religion, 
myth and even superstition. Yet those who are motivated to lose 
oneself in the subject retain a deep interest in human destructiveness, 
malevolence and hate, significant themes pointing at threatening 
prospects for mankind.    
The text is organized or divided into four main ordinary 
chapters, the three first of them organized or divided into continuous 
and numbered sections. 
A crucial point or question is of cause how to define evil itself. It 
can of cause be done both intentional, instrumental and by 
consequence. Other theorists however have stated that the concept of 
evil exclusively rests on a myth originated in the Judean-Christian 
conception of Satan and ultimate evil. This last argument presupposes 
evil itself as non-existent in the real rational world. It seems however 
a fact that most people attach certain basic meaning to the concept, 
mainly that it represents ultimately bad and terrible actions and 
behaviour directed toward common people for the purpose of bringing 
upon them ultimate pain and suffer. However, there is no room for 
essentialism here, meaning that we simply can look “inside” some 
original matter to get to know what it “really” is. Rather, a 
phenomenon gets its identity from the constituted meaning operating 
within a certain human communities and contexts loaded with 
intentionality and inter-subjective meaning.1  
1 This is drawing heavily on the later Wittgenstein, but it is not the intension to 
take the argument further at present. 
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As mentioned above, the concept of evil can be interpreted both 
instrumental and intentional, the first being the broadest of them. Here 
evil stands for behaviour and human deeds having terrifying or fatal 
consequences for subjects and people or in general, regardless of the 
intentions behind. The intentional interpretation however, links the 
concept to certain predispositions, characteristics and even strong 
motives in subjects, groups and sometimes political systems and 
nations. I will keep in mind and clear the way for both these 
perspectives for the discussion in prospect. 
This essay represents a psychological perspective on evil, but 
makes it clear that a more or less complete account of such a 
psychological view also should include a thorough understanding or 
integration of some basic social and even biological assumptions. 
However, I consider a social psychological position of significant 
importance, especially because in my opinion it represents some sort 
of coordination of knowledge and theoretical perspectives inherent in 
the subject or problem itself, the main task here being to integrate 
perspectives of a psychological as well as social and biological kind. 
Since humans are essential social creatures, the way itself to present 
knowledge concerning the human condition, must be social of some 
sort and kind, however not referring to some kind of reductionism 
where social models of explanation possess or holds monopoly. Social 
and social psychological perspectives itself represents parts of the 
whole matter regarding understanding and explanation of human evil. 
The fact that humans present, or has to represent themselves as 
humans among other humans, means that basically a social language 
is required both to explain and describe human manners and ways of 
being. This then truly represents its own way or, more correctly, level 
or standard of explanation, which makes social psychology some sort 
of significant, though not sufficient.  
More substantial, the vision itself of integrating different 
ontological and theoretical levels and objects of science for the 
purpose of manifesting or make real a full-fledged psychological 
perspective on evil, should be considered or characterized a meta-
psychological perspective.        
 The text is partially constructed as a review of existing theories 
and theorists concerning the matter of evil and logically associated 
themes such as violence, mass murder, genocide, antisocial behaviour 
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in general, aggression, hate and cruelty. However, the demands of 
making a theoretical distinction between these themes, although 
connected, is stressed. Above all, an integral perspective combining 
different scientific disciplines is aimed at.   
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PART I 
Subjectivity 
 
 
1 
 
The psychoanalytic tradition stands as one of the most comprehensive 
approaches to the understanding of mankind and its conflicts within 
society. Its consequently search for hidden motives and psychic 
forces, concealed meanings and unconscious dynamics beneath the 
surface of human behaviour is outstanding, but also controversial. The 
Freudian theory has since Freud developed into different traditions 
and concepts, from “pure” instinct- or drive psychology2 to ego-
psychology, object relations psychology, self-psychology and the 
latest tradition, inter-subjective theory or psychology. Rather than 
viewing these perspectives as competing, as however many theorists 
indeed have done, it seems to me that more benefit and success could 
be gained by understanding them as supplements rather as 
competitors. The impression is however that most theorists seem to 
recognize the overlapping and complimentary character of these 
different views. I will however point that the very fact that different 
positions within the psychoanalytic tradition itself have their basis in 
respectively instincts, drives, ego, object-relations or inter-
subjectivity, leads to distinctive perspectives regarding evil, its 
origins, content and consequences. 
 The first position is of cause Freud’s own. In Freud’s theory 
there is a gradual interest in and turn to the so called “death instinct” 
as a fundamental (and biological) rival of the previously formulated 
“life- and ego-instincts”. Freud’s general pessimism concerning the 
human condition grew over the years. His more mature reflections 
reveal a portrait of humanity most disturbing to his own times and 
anyone who wants to cling to an optimistic view of human nature. A 
2 Perhaps it comes out incorrect identifying the Freudian concept ”drive” with 
”instinct”. 
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basic assumption for Freud is, as already noted, that human beings are 
in possession of two primary drives, sex and aggression, a conclusion 
he however arrived at late in his career. In his “Civilization and Its 
Discontent”3 he enumerates the fundamental tensions between 
civilization and the individual, where the primary friction stems from 
the individual’s quest for instinctual freedom and the civilization’s 
contrary demand for conformity and instinctual repression. Freud’s 
theory is based on the notion that humans have certain characteristic 
instincts or drives that are immutable, most notably sex and the 
predisposition to violent aggression, originally towards authoritative 
figures and sexual competitors, both of which obstruct the 
gratification of the person’s instincts. The obstruction of these desires, 
imply the danger of them to be transformed to a general lust for 
aggression and destruction towards society and other people in 
general. Freud himself stated that it was no longer possible to 
overlook the ubiquity of non-erotic, or autonomous, aggressiveness 
and destructiveness in man and how deep it was rooted in the human 
psyche itself. Slowly he recognized aggression as an autonomous 
drive, disconnected to other drives in man, for example sexuality. 
After 1920 Freud’s view of the human condition became explicitly 
more pessimistic. In his earlier works, Freud had argued that sexual 
impulses, fantasies and wishes are blocked and forbidden by social 
norms or the social reality itself, thus creating a strict repression 
within the very psyche or mind. Therapeutic analysis then becomes 
necessary in helping people uncover the repression and release the 
blocked energy that, when exactly being blocked, produced neurosis. 
Eventually, however, Freud’s view of repression became less 
negative. Repression, he now believed, was in fact necessary for 
civilization to go forward and even survive. Repression represented a 
kind of social restraint that kept individuals from providing an outlet 
for their destructive instincts and impulses. This could only imply that 
“ideal” mental life does not entail an absence of repression itself, but 
instead the maintenance of a modulated repression that allows 
gratification at a certain level, while at same time preventing primitive 
sexual and aggressive impulses from taking over. Freud’s turning 
3 S. Freud (1930).”Civilization and Its Discontent”. German original: “Das 
Unbehagen in der Kultur”. 
14 
 
                                                 
towards a darker vision of instincts and drives brought a more 
appreciative attitude toward repression as social control necessary to 
protect and save the society, as well as individuals themselves. This 
perspective of the psychic dynamics was thus converging with his 
increasing emphasis on the ego as an autonomous structure in 
regulating the human psyche. It is obvious that Freud here in many 
aspects come close to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes who 
exactly emphasized the necessity of social order hypothetical 
manifested in the Sovereign, to subdue and control the highly 
egocentric and aggressive qualities of individual pursuits. 
 Freud thus moved toward the position assuming that two 
competing drives dominate the human condition, the “life instinct”: 
“Eros”, and its counterpart, the “death instinct”: “Thanatos”, 
originaly working towards annihilation. The Thanatos rarely expresses 
itself directly. Instead, it emerges in the form of outward directed 
aggressiveness and hate. Eros, on the other hand, engages in a battle 
against the urge toward self-destruction, blocking the Thanatos from 
its internal or inwards expression and helps push it outward. This 
externalizing of the aggression is thus necessary for individual 
survival. By displacing this basic self-destructive tendency outward, 
the individual’s mental “safety” is thus secured. Other people, the 
environment and social surroundings itself become the necessary 
targets to avoid the aggression and hatred being directed toward 
oneself. Aggression becomes necessary outlet for self-preservation, 
making the process itself a sort of primary psychic force or 
mechanism in man. The experience of depression serves as an 
example of people incapable of externalizing their aggression and 
instead becomes victims of it attacking the self.  
While the Thanatos has an autonomous source of energy, most 
of the time, or in real life, the Eros and Thanatos are mixed together. 
We never experience either of them in pure forms. Freud himself 
stated the two kinds of instincts or drives seldom or never appear in 
isolation, but are mixed up with each other in varying and different 
proportions and so become unrecognizable to our outward judgment. 
The statement and analysis of the Thanatos thus becomes a sort of 
acknowledgement only detectable on the epistemological abstract or 
analytical level; however still representing reality. The causes of 
Freud’s change of mind concerning the existence and role of the death 
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instinct regarding the human condition may be multifaceted. One 
factor was the experiences from World War 1 were ordinary people, 
young men, once given a uniform and a gun, being told by their 
government to go to war and shoot the enemy, went out killing each 
others in hundred of thousands and millions.  According to Freud, this 
was only possible when one assumed that man himself by nature was 
in possession of primary instincts or drives for aggression. Early as 
1915 Freud himself stated that evil could not be excluded in the 
consideration of the human condition. In 1920, when writing “Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle4 he clearly moved toward a revision of his 
original instinct theory. Yet at this point of time he was not absolutely 
convinced, but indeed became a few years later. He then stated that it 
seems as though it is necessary for us to destroy some other thing or 
person in order not to destroy ourselves – for the sake of guarding 
against the impulsion to self-destruction. Some, however, had pointed 
out that Freud even before 1914 had considered the power of 
aggression in man, even though it at that time hadn’t found its way 
into his formal or systematic theorizing, among other things because it 
was mixed up with personal feelings and experiences within himself. 
Another factor of more general character, besides the recognition of 
anti-Semitism as a powerful force operating within society, which 
made Freud state that the war only had confirmed the psychoanalytic 
understanding of aggression, not created it, was that Freud through his 
clinical work had recognized or observed a human tendency to re-
enact painful experiences from the past, among others in World War I 
veterans. If the pleasure principle was the only and ultimate 
motivation of life, why would individuals keep returning to these 
painful experiences instead of totally repressing them? There seemed 
to be a compulsion here to repeat painful experiences, witch 
contradicted the basic principle of seeking ultimate pleasure. Freud 
thus began to realize that the emphasis on the pleasure principle was 
unable to explain the experience of what seemed to be absolutely 
masochism. Freud generally noted that patients who displayed this 
compulsion did their utmost to dwell on misery and injuries. This led 
Freud to finally postulate the existence of a drive or strive towards an 
4 S. Freud (1920) “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. German original: “Jenseits 
des Lustprinzips”. 
16 
 
                                                 
earlier or original tensionless, inorganic state of affairs. As he stated 
it: “The aim of all life is death”. In all human organisms there exist 
some forms of “death wish”. This seems however, concerning the 
human organism, to contradict the idea of Eros, containing the sexual 
drives, which exist by virtue of affirming life itself, and hardly 
seeking extinction. For Freud however, this drive conditions from now 
on only represented or counted for half the picture, the other half 
being precisely its antagonism, the death instinct. The death instinct 
thus have two dimensions to it. On one hand, it has a passive tendency 
that seeks to reduce organic life to inorganic life. The other form is the 
active aggressive which can be directed inward, against oneself, or 
outward against others. In sake of preserving civilization, part of 
humanity’s natural aggressiveness must be turned back on itself where 
it originally began. This inward turn of aggressiveness is directed 
against one’s own ego, more particularly then taking the form of a 
harsh and punishing superego. This again, leads to chronic guilt, often 
manifesting itself as a need for punishment. The superego thus 
expresses aggressiveness against the ego that keeps this 
aggressiveness from moving outward. Moreover, Freud states that this 
masochistic aggressiveness is our moral, a sort of punishment, or 
more precise, an unconscious desire for punishment in the form of 
strict moral demands. The core of this aggressiveness is usually not 
directed straight to death, for example in the form of suicide, itself. It 
is more often a destruction of one’s own self-agency, expressed as an 
all-embracing feeling of guilt. Our guilt then, is largely a fear of the 
aggressive superego. 
Freud thus ends up stating that the aggressive instincts represent 
the major threat to civilization by its bare existence, but in the specific  
form of being directed outward. Freud makes it clear that 
aggressiveness is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in 
man and which constitute the greatest impediment and even threat to 
civilization. The aggressive instinct represents a derivative of the more 
basic death instinct and in viewing the life and death instincts as 
locked into an eternal or “cosmic” battle, Freud emphasizes an 
universal dualism, presenting the evolution of civilization as a struggle 
for life and death of the human species. This life and death instincts 
apply to all biological life. It is not a question of these forces simply 
occupying the human mind. Instead they are built into, influence and 
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from the start are significant parts of life and the psyche itself and in 
this way moves from strait psychology to what others would 
characterize as “metaphysics”. My opinion is, however, that Freud’s 
position is better understood as ontology, meaning making 
assumptions regarding the abstract or transcendental levels of 
knowledge, pointing to causal conditions for the case in matter. Never 
the less, Freud’s theoretical assumptions can of cause be regarded as a 
commitment to naturalism, or, evaluated as science, as some branch 
of natural science.5  Freud’s theory clearly involves a basic faith in 
the ultimate nature of things. Thus it seems that Freud moves far 
behind bare psychological assumptions and hypothesis which was the 
supposition for observing and making conclusions regarding clinical 
data. However, taking into account that the human organism slowly 
develop over a long period, this could not be exclusively explained by 
psychological processes alone because these processes itself often and 
even mainly are products of, or at least involving interacting primary 
biological processes. Psychological processes and structures mainly 
grow out of the biological equipment’s meeting and interaction with 
the social surroundings, for example stimulation, upbringing and other 
forms of socialisation, all of it making biology relevant for 
psychological understanding and structuring. On these grounds Freud 
of cause will deny that he by any way is creating some sort of myth or 
religion without any foothold in scientific reflection. 
Nevertheless, Freud viewed humanity’s inclinations to evil as 
rooted in our biology. Because we as humans are born with the Eros 
as well as the Thanatos, we are engaged in a psychological or “inner” 
civil war. But the consequence of this, in my opinion, is that it seems 
impossible to equate evil with aggression. We may be born with 
aggression, but that does not automatic makes us bad or evil, not least 
because of the mentioned psychological conflict whose outcome at 
any time is not given. Besides, being aggressive says nothing accurate 
about how this aggressiveness shows up or manifests itself in different 
subjects behaviour or attitude against others or in different milieu. 
Even explicit violence does not justify the use of the term evil sticked 
to it. Evil itself is a complicated concept covering even more 
5 But not as positivism or some type of positivistic thinking, as many tend to 
believe. 
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complicated phenomena, which I will return to and trying to clear up 
in later. But, in agreement with Freud, it is my opinion that the 
existence and manifestation of what we would characterize as evil, is 
conditioned by the inherent dispositions of aggressiveness that Freud 
talks about. Freud himself postulated that while social and 
environmental factors contributed to human destructiveness, the 
primary reality is that we basically are instinctual, or concerning our 
primary and inherent drives, dangerous to both ourselves and 
civilization. A consequence regarding this point of view could of 
cause for example be that eliminating negative social situations such 
as poverty and poor or destructive child care will hardly guarantee 
non-destructive individuals. The reason for this should be that no 
amount of social reform or social influence under any circumstance 
would be able to eliminate our biological circumstances, as long as 
aggression and violence according to Freud are “natural”, and 
therefore by consequence inevitable. That may be so, but my opinion 
is that we are not forced or doomed to interpret Freud that pessimistic. 
Our instinctual or equipment still have the status of being 
predispositions and these dispositions need to be social shaped in one 
way or another, and it is precisely this shaping or socialization that 
makes us the individuals we become and has to become to grow 
humans. The interplay between nurture and culture itself thus becomes 
central or sometimes even the crucial part concerning the possible 
manifestation of destructiveness, hate and evil. 
There is, however, a complicating matter here, concerning the 
dualism between erotic life instinct and the instinct of death or 
aggressiveness. Above it was noted that Eros and the Thanathos 
according to Freud rarely expressed themselves directly or isolated 
from each other. Prior to proposing the death instinct itself Freud had, 
however, as early as in 1905, in Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality”6  treated a postulated aggressive impulse as a component of 
the sexual instinct, an erotic mix-up on the order of sadism and 
masochism. He stated there being an intimate connection between 
cruelty and the sexual instinct – an aggressive factor in the libido, the 
process being binding a part of the innate aggression itself to the 
sexual function in the form of sadism and sometimes masochism, 
6 S. Freud. (1905). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 
19 
 
                                                 
experienced as asexual pleasure in pain, perhaps also giving way for 
other forms of sexual perversions. Freud’s assertion was that the death 
instinct manifests itself only by gaining some hold on libido, not being 
able to operate on its own ontological terms. 
     
To further note, however, it is fair to say that Freud rejected any 
perspective on human destructiveness that moved beyond the natural 
sphere. Because of that he was of cause characterised a thoroughgoing 
materialist. However, from my point of view it would be incorrect to 
see Freud’s theory as solely materialistic. The abstract postulate of the 
drive or “instinct” just make reference to the fundamental 
presuppositions for psychological processes itself and does not 
represents psychology as such. Psychology and psychological 
conflicts is something other, or, qualitatively, exactly something more 
than matter or substance. The psychic representations itself is prime 
matter for psychology as science study. Psychology is human 
experiences the one way or another, conditioned by conscious or 
unconscious forces and circumstances and cannot exist as just pure 
biological instincts. Freud’s talking about psychic conflicts as 
something going on in the subject’s psyche thus goes well beyond 
one-sided biological and instinctual thinking. When refusing to take 
human rational thought at face value, he challenged the notion that 
conscious reason is the all-important criteria of our behaviour. He has 
often been understood or interpreted as primarily an “existentialist” in 
that he radically exposed the often irrational, self-avoiding and thus 
anxiety-producing features of the human condition. Yet he has often 
been accused of confusing our “estranged” condition, with its origin in 
destructive forces and instincts, with our “essential” nature. For many 
it would be hard, not to mention impossible admitting or realizing that 
humanity should be essential destructive or evil. Many of his 
opponents regarding this case, also within the psychoanalytical camp 
itself, had a basic faith in humanity as essentially good, even though  
living under distorted conditions. In our essence, the deepest level of 
our reality, we are not estranged, neurotic or destructive. Freud 
however, viewed the essence of humanity as basically distorted, 
leading to his fundamental pessimism concerning humanity. This view 
concerning human nature consequently left him with a corresponding 
pessimism with regard to culture’s chances to free itself from 
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brutality, evil and destructiveness as such. Some significant objections 
stemming from prominent critics of Freud, was that it was necessary 
to draw up some line of demarcation between human existence and 
essence, the former referring to our estranged situation or condition, 
the latter to our true nature. Thus, our present condition, showing 
human cruelty, destructiveness, murder and evil, does not correspond 
to the essence of humanity, instead only demonstrating historical and 
repressing conditions influencing and distorting this essence, making 
it at large part unrecognizable. One point of departure is that our 
understanding and concept of estrangement or sickness necessary 
leads to a grasp of health itself, reflecting precise the opposite of 
sickness. As such, sickness is exclusively to be understood in 
reference to health, which is to be understood as a grasp of human 
essence itself. However, by stressing this point of view, as for 
example the so-called “neo-Freudians”, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney 
and others did, they were accused of neglecting or overlook some 
basic assumptions in Freud’s own theory, for example concepts of 
drive and Thanatos, and thus the whole concept of repression, itself 
and in so doing reducing and cutting him off from what really made 
him the very founder of depth psychology. 
These more optimistic views of the neo-Freudians implied that 
we are able to correct, on the basis of natural intervention, not only 
our symptoms, but our fundamental problems of estrangement. In 
other words, they basically argue for an ultimate form of self-healing 
and “inner freedom”. But Freud himself stated that it is impossible for 
us to break free, and that at least neurosis is the price of civilization 
and culture itself. The only hope is to get a position being able to live 
with in some manner, more specific being able “to love and to work”. 
The problem of estrangement itself does not call for any solution.7 We 
cannot “therapize” away our existential problems, problems that exist 
by virtue of us being humans in the first place. But therapy can help us 
come at ease with our problems, making it possible for us to live with 
them in the one way or another.  
Psychoanalysis, since Freud, has generally moved away from the 
concept of innate aggressiveness and the death instinct, in favour of  
7 In contrast to for example Marx who believed that the problem of estrangement  
and alienation could be eliminated  by revolting  social repression itself. 
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arguments claiming that aggressiveness results from need deficiency. 
The consequences of this should be that evil and destruction not 
automatically occur as a result of our biological make-up. 
Destructiveness is not a necessary part of our condition. The work of 
modern psychoanalysts like Fairbairn, Winnicott and Kohut has 
highlighted the significance of relational attachment rather than drive 
release as the crucial motivational factor for the human being. Rather 
than viewing for example the infant as innately aggressive, some of 
these theorists, but not all, believe that the object-seeking infant is 
much more concerned with human connection than Freud himself 
realized. In this view aggression becomes more of a by-product of 
psychological need frustration than is a biological urge driving us 
from the very beginning of life.  
However, all this seems to be a way of mixing up the different 
level of conceptions inherent in the psychoanalytic theory itself. The 
drive- and the relation-perspective don’t have to be considered 
contradictions. On the contrary, in my opinion the two perspectives 
rather complement than contradict each other. This they do precisely 
because they function or hold their force of explaining on different 
theoretical levels or “territories”. They simply explain different things 
significant to human essence, living and development. Being equipped 
with biological drives striving against immediate fulfilment, being 
“peaceful” or aggressive doesn’t mean that man at the same time 
should not be in possession of primary needs towards immediate and 
unconditional contact with other significant humans. In fact, the 
access to such prime relationships constitutes itself the conditions for 
fulfilment of some basic biological founded drives. However, it is 
necessary to point out that there also seems to exist a fundamental 
conflict between the fulfilment of drives towards aggression and 
destruction on the one hand and the need for positive or basic contact 
and caring on the other, meaning that at lack of fulfilment of the 
relational needs or drives sometimes have the consequence of bringing 
the impulses of aggression and destructiveness on the stage. In the end 
however, this demonstrates the necessity of bringing forth a 
calculation including two autonomous forces conquering on the same 
battlefield, thus eliminating the theoretical or rather dualistic 
conception of either or, the one or another force dominating human 
existence as such. 
22 
 
I shall return to this approach concerning the matter later in the 
text because it seems fundamental in placing human evil and 
destructiveness in the right proportional manner.                  
 
 
2 
 
Erich Fromm, was a profoundly interdisciplinary thinker and 
psychoanalyst, theoretical located within the so-called “neo-freudian” 
camp. Basically he aimed at integrating psychoanalysis with Marxist 
social theory and philosophy, as well as other social disciplines. 
Fromm seems to be both creative and insightful dealing with the topic 
of evil, his two most outstanding works concerning the matter being 
“The Heart of Man. Its Genius for Good and Evil”8 and “The 
Anatomy of Human Destructiveness”9  Here Fromm puts forward the 
fundamental question: Is humanity essentially good or evil? It is 
however from the start unclear what being “evil” really could mean. Is 
it having evil intentions or doing evil acts, or the entire combination of 
the two? But this begs for the more fundamental question: Are man 
born with, not only the capacity, but also the intention of being evil, or 
is it more of a bad habit developed through social participation?  
Fromm himself stated that man is left alone with two “strivings”, that 
for good and for evil. In other words: man are not solely good or bad, 
special acts, circumstances and cultural and political forces can be or 
call forth evil, but man is not inherited evil from the beginning. 
Fromm is less pessimistic concerning man’s capacity for the good and 
correspondingly rejecting evil. In not embezzling the destructive 
forces in man and the cruel deeds and behaviour that has often  
followed in the wake of this, it is Fromm’s belief still, that these 
forces are not primary. While they can be or become strong, does not 
automatically mean that they are dominant. Instead, it is Fromm’s 
opinion that this human destructiveness may well represent a basic 
distortion of deeper, benign inclination. This argument is crucial and 
represents a fundamental break with Freud’s basic theory of evil 
8 E. Fromm (1964). The Heart of Man. Its Genius for good and Evil. 
9 E. Fromm (1973). The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. 
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rooted in the Thanatos. Fromm’s theory is more associated with that 
of  object relations, stating that pathology is a result of the lack of 
fulfilment of basic needs. Attachment being a prime motive or need, 
can be stated as some sort of benign inclinations crucial to man. 
According to Fromm, there is no reason to believe that human cruelty 
represents eternal structures of the human condition. As already 
mentioned, this point of view not only contradicts that of Freud; in 
many ways it represents it’s totally antagonism. Freud believed our 
destructive tendencies are innate and biologically given and this is 
precisely what Fromm denies. And further: Freud more than indicated 
that we are stuck with the battle between individual happiness (read: 
satisfaction) and civilization. Fromm, from his point of view, precisely 
pointed out that we can overcome this antagonism. Freud’s position 
has often been characterized as dualistic, meaning the relentless battle 
between these two forces, the primary drives vs. civilization. This 
represents, however, some sort of fundamental mistake. Freud’s 
theory of the battle and antagonism between human drives and 
civilization are formulated as abstract10 principles concerning man’s 
fundamental condition and the different forces basically working in 
accordance of their own logical point of view. At the level of 
realization or empirical appearance however, these “independent” or 
autonomous, and consequently abstract formulated principles and 
forces, unite in precisely the different forms of good or bad behaviour 
or conduct we experience at different times. It is important to point 
out that having one’s eye fixed, or being solely stuck in an empirical 
position, inevitably leads to theoretical confusion and erroneous 
interferences, like the fundamental misunderstanding that Freud’s 
theory should represent some kind of dualism. Interpreted, or 
formulated at the empirical level, the Thanatos and other fundamental 
drives seem to represent dualism, grouped with contradicting forces 
representing civilization. But again: In my opinion, these concepts 
were never meant to represent real matters immediately experienced. 
They simply don’t “exist” as such at the level of appearance, because 
under these conditions they can only be interpreted analytically as part 
of some experienced and given totality.  In reality, it seems like it is 
10 Meaning they being real, though not in an empirical, but abstract or 
theoretical manner.   
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Fromm who ends up with dualism, pleading for the ultimate – and 
empirical given – contradiction between good and evil, where 
goodness itself being the strongest force on autonomous terms. It is 
precisely the assumption of Utopia as something real or attainable that 
gives life to dualism. 
 Back to Fromm; he basically declared that humans being 
engaged in destructive behaviour for social reasons, not just biological 
ones. For him, declaring that man’s “death wish” leads to war 
represents a clear case of psychological (and biological) reductionism. 
Instead he is convinced that wars are fought for political, social and 
economic reasons, not merely or even first of psychological and 
biological ones. However, implicit in Freud’s theory there exist an 
assumption denying that there should exist some sort of a choice or 
antagonism between psychological/biological and social causes 
regarding human evil. Instead, I think we’ll have to assume that in  
psychoanalytic theory is implicated that social forces in different ways 
shape our biological drives and make them equipped for social and 
psychological realities and in precisely that way making biology part 
of the psychological and social reality itself.  
Fromm himself identifies several reasons for direct violence, 
every single of them not necessarily functioning at the service of evil 
and destructiveness. Reactive violence for example is done in the 
service of life. While based on fear, its aim is preservation, not 
destruction.  It is defensive and necessary for survival. Then there is 
revengeful violence, which is not really defensive because the 
violence or harassment has already been done and we aim at restoring 
our self-esteem back to before the insult or injury. Fromm himself 
makes a point of psychoanalytic material demonstrating that the 
mature, productive person is less motivated by the desire for revenge 
than the neurotic person who has difficulties in living independently 
and fully and is often prone to stake his whole existence on the wish 
for revenge in some narcissistic way. Another type of violence is 
characterized as shattering of faith, often being something that 
happens at a very early and vulnerable stage in life. It stands for the 
collapse of faith in the love, goodness and fairness of the world, 
represented by parents, relatives, the belief in God, and so on. It 
doesn’t matter much what is the object for our faith. It is faith in 
aspects of life itself, the very possibility of trusting it and having 
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confidence in it that is broken. The result of this could be self-hate and 
hating life itself. Fromm also describes compensatory violence where 
destructiveness is used as a compensation for one’s own feelings of 
powerlessness. This kind of violence attempts to make up for one’s 
feeling of impotence by extensive of meaning. According to Fromm 
compensatory violence results from what he calls “unlived life”; the 
only way of feeling alive is receiving pleasure seeing others being hurt 
or killed.  Finally there is a deeply regressed form of violence Fromm 
calls “archaic bloodthirst” which involves an attempt to escape 
reason and return to brute “animal” existence. The person engaged in 
this kind of violence feels alive only by taking others life. Blood 
becomes, so to speak, the very essence of life, so killing makes one 
feel strong and superior. 
Fromm seems convinced that there are persons who “love life” 
and those who in a way “love death”. Probably the vast majority of us 
are a mixture in the one way or another. Fromm identifies those who 
love life as having a “biophilous” orientation and those who loves 
death as having a “necrophilous” inclination. Fromm believes this 
distinction in many ways is representing the greatest psychological as 
well as moral difference between people. This begs the important 
question: What is the relationship between Fromm’s concept of the 
necrophilous character and Freud’s death instinct? Freud’s view of the 
death instinct was that it aimed at destroying or abolishing all life and 
re-establish the inorganic state of things. The death instinct attempts to 
undue everything the life instincts endeavour. The battle between the 
light or life forces and the dark death forces is a recurring theme in 
legends, myths and fairytales, thus reflecting the battle going on in the 
human psyche. As already emphasized, Freud view was that both the 
life instincts and the death instinct were rooted in biology and 
therefore inevitable. But for Fromm, a death-like necrophilous 
orientation is not to be regarded as part of, or placed within the 
original biological realm. According to him, organic life is at first 
oriented towards tenaciously struggle for survival. Thus, life-instincts 
always come out primary to death instincts. He states the contradiction 
between “Eros and destruction” as the most fundamental contradiction 
which exists in man. However, they are not to be considered as two 
biologically inherent instincts fighting an eternal battle within the 
human psyche. Instead, it has to be viewed as a struggle “between the 
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primary and most fundamental tendency of life – to preserve in life – 
and its contradiction, which comes into being when man fails in his 
goal. In this view the “death instinct” is a malignant phenomenon 
which grows and takes over to the extent to which Eros does not 
unfold. The death instinct represents psychopathology and not, as in 
Freud’s view, a part of normal pathology”11 This means that life 
instinct constitute the primary force or potentiality in man, the death 
instinct thus becoming secondary. Given individual development, 
socialisation or so being optimal or satisfactory, the primary forces, 
the life instincts, will develop at the expense of death instinct and 
malignity, preventing them from becoming reality. In Fromm’s terms 
the so called death instinct is not a biological equal to the life instinct. 
Though its potential is always present or exists as a possibility, it 
grows out of a frustration of the life instinct. Thus the death instinct is 
not, or doesn’t represent a natural development in man. Instead it 
represents a form of pathology, constructed, or being a product of 
forces and processes prior to it. It is not as primary as the life instinct. 
There is no biological drive or principle itself that push the death 
instinct into existence. Instead it is the very distortion of the life 
instinct that make way for destructive and evil acts, becoming a reality 
when the proper psychological conditions are not present and Eros 
itself is frustrated. This indeed represents a major difference from 
Freud and his perspective of personality theory and development 
itself. Fromm introduces a sort of humanism that contrasts the more 
pessimistic Freudian paradigm. His humanism rests on the condition 
that given the right circumstances being present the subject has got the 
opportunity of positive personal development or growth, making 
destructiveness and evil a secondary problem. Evil itself thus seems 
stemming from pure frustrations of self-actualization. The origin of 
evil must be social conditions, not biological inclinations, rooted in 
some death instinct, toward destructiveness itself. Fromm however, 
departs from the original humanistic psychologists that more or less 
presuppose self-actualization being and automatic force or process 
attached to the very process of human development. For Fromm this 
process is more of a struggle, bringing forth impulses of regression, 
resistance to growth, self-obsession, fear and anxiety. Psychological 
11 E. Fromm (1964). The Heart of Man, p. 50. 
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humanism, on the other hand, seems to presume self-actualization and 
growth being a more or less maturing process.           
However, in my opinion, there exist some considerable 
shortcomings in Fromm’s theory. If the tendencies to cruelty and 
destruction in man are of a secondary kind, how does it come into 
consideration in the first place? Why should the reaction to frustration 
be destructiveness and perhaps cruelty and sadism on the whole? 
Unless at least some innate dispositions are presupposed, it seems 
illogical to conclude that destructiveness must become the pure and 
necessary consequences of social and psychological frustration itself. 
In my opinion this question becomes crucial for a basic understanding 
of human evil in the first place. I believe nothing can grow out of 
nothing, which means it should be able to detect some existing 
dispositions in man warranting the emergence of specific human traits 
and behaviours, they being good or bad, under specific circumstances.  
For Fromm the ultimate sign of evil means the sadistic desire to 
drain the life out of others. It could involve the destruction of both 
physical and psychological life, probably mainly the last mentioned. It 
thus means the desire to control, dominate, destroy and extinguish 
liveliness in another human. It forbids anything to grow, expand and 
live itself. Experience of joy comes from controlling and draining the 
lives from others. Although we in most cases are talking about 
excessive psychological dominance, extreme criminal forms can be 
found among for example so-called serial-killers where killing and 
physical destroying others serves no other purposes, they being 
instrumental of the one kind or another. Another syndrome in 
Fromm’s universe of evil is what he calls malignant narcissism which 
stands for an aggressive, dominating form of narcissism that turns out 
to be more than the kind of self-interest we all need in order to 
survive. It also exists as more than a simple desire for attention. This 
is basically contrasted to so-called benign narcissism which involves 
some sort of self-confidence, a pride in our own efforts and 
achievements. However, it also includes a capability of achieving a 
certain distance from our work or accomplishments, meaning for 
example being able to compare our work with that of others 
realistically and by doing so acknowledging it the same status as our 
own. However, malignant narcissism appears qualitatively different. 
Here we perceive everything we do, precisely because it comes from 
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ourselves, as wonderful and unique. All forms of extern or objective 
justification are unnecessary and in fact insulting when it is put 
forward or demanded. Fromm states that malignant narcissism thus is 
not self-limiting, but in its consequences “crudely solipsistic” and 
“xenophobic”.  
Fromm then, while dealing with the human inclination toward 
evil in the Freudian tradition, differs from him in two important ways. 
First, he denies that that this destructive inclination emerges from our 
biological nature, instead postulating it to be a secondary reaction to 
the frustration of our positive potentials and needs. But in doing so, 
and still talking of inclination, is, in my opinion, questionable. If, by 
any change, “inclination” is supposed to mean anything in the 
direction of “potential” or human quality, then it would be wrong, or 
at least inaccurate to characterize it as “secondary”. The correct term 
should be “actualized”. Second he believes that given that evil 
represents only secondary forces in man brought forth by frustration 
of our more primary positive potentials, it should be possible to heal 
and overcome these destructive inclinations. This goes hand in hand 
with Fromm’s vision of an “unalienated” humanity. A vision and 
hope which he believes can be realized. This goes definitely in another 
direction than Freud himself, whose theoretical assumptions implies 
that man are stuck with the roots and potentials for evil, simply 
because it represents essential and unavoidable parts of man himself. 
Freud thus believed that total reconciliation is never possible. What 
we have to, or could do, are making the best of a very or everlasting 
estranged world. Fromm, on the other hand, believes that our healthy 
side can and should heal the sick side, taking for granted the first 
being superior to the last, because an estranged existence cannot 
produce its own cure. This optimistic utopia has, however, been 
criticized. The question is how an alienated individual or an alienated 
mankind heal or overcome alienation himself? Fromm’s answer is, as 
we have seen, of cause that the life instinct is primary or more basic 
than death instinct that shows more of a secondary reaction to failure 
in socialisation. But, given that this socialisation has failed, whom or 
where can we address finding the resources for the healing of this 
situation? There seems to be some sort of a paradox here. As long as 
the life instincts or potentials at least has been cut off from or been 
prevented from being a part of our psychological and behavioural 
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equipment, there is nothing present to be mobilized in the service of  
healing and health. Of cause it seems possible to point at 
psychological-therapeutic processes and opportunities, but keeping in 
mind that human destruction, cruelty and evil often presents itself as 
large scale collective phenomena, individual- or even group-therapy 
would hardly do the job. At the individual level, within the realm of 
clinical psychology and psychiatry focusing private pathology, 
solutions could be made, but hardly eliminate evil as one of mankind’s 
most serious problems and challenges. But Fromm, operating from a 
position originating in both psychology and social science, influenced 
by Freud as well as Marx, assuming that human health and human 
liberation being two sides of the same, pointed out that social 
liberation by necessity being a presupposition for individual and 
psychological liberation. Thus, the whole matter turns out to be some 
sort of  political, a political project, whose most essential ingredients 
being human awareness, reason, creativity and unconditioned love. 
But again, this project, however political and collective it might be, in 
the end boils down to human experiences and behaviours of some sort, 
and the ultimate question or dilemma will always be where to get the 
resources from, being the life instinct that from the beginning has been 
prevented from establishing itself and flourishing within human 
personality itself. In other words: the project being political or human 
on more or less psychological conditions, at the starting point there 
seems to be no “unalienated” part or dimension to which we can 
appeal.  
 
 
3                                                  
 
In many respects, Melanie Klein herself constitutes a milestone in 
psychoanalytical theorizing and clinical practice. She may also be 
considered some sort of a pioneer due to her reflections over the 
causes and conditions generating human evil. Along with other “neo-
Freudians”, like Margaret Mahler, Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott 
and others, she tried to describe and explain our first experience with 
hate. In order to understand this experience, we must go back to early 
infancy. As developmental psychologists frequently points out, the 
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infant’s first experience is basically a totally positive and hopeful one, 
a hope and experience of the warmth, regularity and consistent care 
from the primary caretaker. The central need or “hoped-for” 
experience here is that of being fed. For Klein, the primary inclination 
within the infant is to associate with the caregiver, the mother with the 
breast. According to Klein’s systematically observed mother-infant 
interactions, in the beginning the mother is the breast for the infant. 
The infant’s first relationship, then, is necessary to a body part, not a 
whole person. As a consequence, all that blocks the relationship 
between the baby and the mother’s breast is perceived as alarming and 
frustrating. On these terms, regardless of how consistent, patient and 
loving the parent tries to be, the infant’s expectations, or “demands”, 
will not be satisfied or fulfilled. The inability to locate or “attain” the 
breast will thus be met with an energetic search followed with distress, 
screaming and in the end frustration and anger. Even when the mother 
then reappears, according to Klein, clinical observations has shown 
that the baby may reject the mother or in some way even attack her 
out of anger. 
 For Klein and some of the other theorists just mentioned, this 
experience in the baby leads to the first dualism encountered in the 
baby’s world, articulated in the famous theoretical “slogan” – 
connected to Klein – “the good and the bad mother”. The “good” 
mother being the one who feeds, comfort and thus satisfy the baby, 
while the “bad” mother in abandoning the baby’s need turn out to be a 
“no-show”. The baby is out of capability in reconciling these strong 
split feelings associated with each of these mothers. The baby then, 
out of survival, necessity must split off its experience of the good and 
the bad. The baby must separate and make some sort of “compartment 
wall” between these positive and negative feelings toward the mother 
in order not to “destroy” her psychologically. The bad mother, who is 
hatred, must be kept separate from the good mother who provides the 
ingredients necessary for the child’s physical and emotional survival, 
in that way keeping feelings of hate disconnected from needy, loving 
feelings. During this experience, however, the baby separates more 
than two “external” mothers. Since the baby has not yet developed a 
separate sense of self, the baby itself and the mother are merged 
together as a single unity. When the baby then divides the mother, it 
also by consequence divides itself. Hating of the “bad” breast 
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threatens to overwhelm the experience of the “good” breast. As these 
two breast objects are separated, so is the baby’s inner experience also 
separated.  Hating the breast means hating part of one’s own 
experience. The primary object is thus internalized and split between 
good and bad. In order to maintain psychic equilibrium the baby must 
expel the “bad” elements, along with the frustration and rage that 
accompany it. The baby then, for sake of its own psychic wellbeing, 
divides the world into two categories of experience: those that are 
pleasurable and provide gratification and those that are painful and 
thus frustrating. In early childhood then, the mother’s breast becomes 
the first object of both love and hate, eventually turning into general 
feelings towards other people, but actual hiding a deep rooted feeling 
within the person itself, addressing his own self-esteem. As Melanie 
Klein explains, this gives the source of human hate: “Hatred and 
aggressive feelings are aroused and he (the baby) becomes dominated 
by the impulses to destroy the very person who is the object of all his 
desires and who in his mind is linked up with everything he 
experiences – good and bad alike.”12 The point is that the split-off 
parts are expelled. After expelling these threatening feelings, they will 
later be projected onto others. Then real hate is born. The point of 
departure is that the mother/breast inevitably frustrates the baby. If, 
however, there are good reparative experiences to intervene, the 
frustration is expressed as anger and can be met with comfort. If, on 
the other hand, the mother appears cold or punitive regarding the 
angry infant, the frustration is not calmed down, but turns instead to 
anger – and then to hate. This part of the self is then expelled and 
projected onto others, mixed up with bad fantasies concerning the 
mother, often as images of her as pure evil. The logic here being that 
the aggression and hate felt by the baby is experienced as intolerable. 
Usually, however, the baby’s good experiences with the mother are 
dominant and eventually outweigh the bad experiences, making it 
possible to internalize the “good mother”. If or when it becomes 
impossible for this taking place, the infant gets stuck within the so 
called paranoid-schizoid position. Klein talked about two fundamental 
psychic structures, or positions in the baby, the paranoid-schizoid 
12 M.  Klein (1975). Love, Guilt and Reparation. In: R. E. Money-Kyrle (ed.). 
The Writings of Melanie Klein, p. 306.   
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position mentioned, and the depressive position. Later Thomas Ogden, 
inspired by Klein, added a third position, occurring previous to 
Klein’s, the so-called autistic-contiguous position. Regarding Klein, 
the baby’s bad experiences during the paranoid-schizoid period 
originated in the caregiver’s rejection, making it unable to handle its 
own aggression and thus leading to an intolerable and threatening 
anxiety which has to be expelled and projected onto others. This 
means that it has to be taken to come from the outside, generating the 
psychological defence mechanism of projective identification, 
necessarily leading to the distortion of the object, the other person, by 
placing the evil itself into him or her. The premise here being that the 
aggression and hatred, due to bad experiences, forces the child to put 
it onto others and thus making it tolerable and understandable. This 
leads to an innate acceptance of detecting the evilness in other persons 
and thus legitimating hating them, which in turn, having the 
opportunities, having all rights in doing bad things to them, even 
killing or torturing them the conditions being proper - acts being 
normally understood or interpreted as manifestations of sadism. Hate 
then is to be understood as some kind of relief, a crucial manoeuvre 
for handling one’s own aggression that has not been working through 
under normal conditions. The logical consequence of this should also, 
according to Klein, be envy, the need to destroy everything that is 
perceived as kind and good, because a recognition of something 
external as good and kind in the external world would ultimately 
destroy one’s projection of evil as exactly something coming from 
outside, from the external world and not originated in the subject 
itself.13 A crucial point here also seems to be the sadist’s desperately 
need for identifying with his victim, not reducing him or making him 
something different from himself.        
Melanie Klein basically talks about and presupposes an original 
aggression or hate inside the individual, an innate aggression that 
automatically turns to hate through the early development, but under 
specific negative or frustrating circumstances easily turns out to be 
permanent and destructive. The key-word concerning evil, however, 
13 Norwegian philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen making a thorough account and 
explanation of evil grounded in Klein’s theory and Fred Alfords supplements to 
it. See Vetlesen, 2003, 2005.      
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still seems to be aggression, but, which seems to be crucial, its 
transformation into hatred and evil, due to bad experiences and 
relationships. As both Klein and Vetlesen stress, however, aggression 
in its original habits, is natural, something a matter of necessity, and is 
not to bee understood as, or being identical to or reduced to projected 
hatred.                         
 Melanie Klein is considered the “founder” of the so called 
“object relations” school within psychoanalysis. As pointed out, the 
focus is upon relations, here the first and primary relationship the 
child experiences. It really represents some kind of a two-dimensional 
theory where an external relationship manifests itself as and inner 
structure in the single individual, here the baby. This means that 
relationships and “inner” psychic structures have to be seen or 
understood as one of an issue and not as separates. The question 
concerning hate, and in the end evil, however, will be: what must be 
considered the basic power or underlying motive generating it under 
specific circumstances. We will have to return to that question later, 
particularly stressing relational and situational factors.  
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For Klein and Alford, hatred and evil is understood as grounded in an 
ultimate dread, a fear of life itself, but for Ernest Becker this dread, on 
the contrary, is grounded in a fear of death. The key point for Becker 
is that we humans spend our lives repressing our own mortality and in 
doing so we play out a deep yearning to be heroic. This heroism is 
aimed at denying our finitude and vulnerability connected to our 
inevitable encounter with death. Becker argues that human beings are 
a unique combination of both nature and spirit. Spiritually we seem 
able to rise above our status as mere creatures, but at the same time we 
are profoundly embedded in our inevitable decaying mortality. Our 
strongest battle is precisely with and against this awareness of our 
own demise. Heroism thus seems to be a way of transcending these 
limitations of finitude. This turns out to be some sort of narcissism, a 
desire to expand our own organism, to inflate our selves to cosmic 
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proportions in order to deny the most terrifying and inevitable of all, 
our necessary limitations and final demise. The problem of real life is 
of course that we are not omnipotent and immortal.  Because of that 
we are forced to spend our time engaged in a constant repression 
concerning our own demise. According to Becker, all forms of 
heroism, conquering, being of a material or spiritual kind, are 
unconscious attempts to deny mortality, making psychological 
illusions of precisely immorality. But behind all this lies the anxiety 
for death itself. According to Becker, this anxiety is often 
overshadowed or repressed and made unconscious in order to make it 
bearable and making it possible for us to function and handling our 
daily duties.  
 Becker, referring to, among others, Kierkegaard, point at the 
human paradox that we have the capacity for a symbolic identity 
above nature, but yet we are firmly grounded in nature itself. It is 
precisely this splitting or dualism that makes our prospects for life so 
terrifying, reminding us that in the end we are doomed at loosing our 
very self.14 
 According to Becker, evil then is a by-product of our fear of 
death and our attempt to escape this reality by refusal of our own 
finitude. Basically most people, Becker claims, see death itself as the 
greatest “evil”. In religious terminology, for example Christianity, the 
originator evil, the devil, is often perceived as the symbol of death 
itself. Mortality is wicked, but ironically, in all our attempts to escape 
this greatest of all evils, we create even much more evil. This follows 
from the fact that in our desperate lust and hunt for self-perpetuation, 
we are forced to create much destructiveness out of the fact that our 
urge to expand, to conquer and gain explicit success, necessarily leads 
to suffering among others, at whose costs the very expansion and 
conquering have been made. Simply speaking, our frantic need for 
more - and more - often implies that others will have less. Thus our 
desire to transcend our mortal lives leads us toward immoral 
behaviours. Others have to “pay” for the hatred we feel while trying to 
14 Interesting, while Becker associate himself with psychoanalytic theory, he 
makes a significant departure from Freud, stating that the primary repression 
doesn’t concern sexuality, but death. And further, instead of a death instinct, 
Becker claims that we instead have a death fear.  
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escape our own mortality. Becker himself states it like this: “Each 
person nourishes his immorality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to 
which he gives his; this gives his life the only abiding significance he 
can have. No wonder men go into rage over fine points of belief: if 
your adversary wins the argument about truth, you die. Your 
immortality system has been shown to be fallible.”15This fight against 
finitude, then, will have devastating consequences on our neighbours. 
Becker believes that the refusal to accept our true condition sets up an 
ongoing pattern of destructiveness. Man wants the whole earth, but an 
earth that is really meant to be a heaven, which is impossible.  
 As a consequence of this, Becker states, or believes, that as an 
ultimate deed, killing others becomes a way of defying our own death. 
It is they, no us, who are dying, thereby confirming some sort of 
illusion of immortality. By witnessing the death of others, we 
perpetuate the illusion that we are escaping it. But not only, and 
perhaps even not first and foremost just watching others die, but by 
ourselves holding others life in our own hands, making us feel real 
masters over life and death. This seems to include a high degree of 
sadism, namely having and not at least enjoying a sense of power over 
others, and indirectly over death. This enables us to focus externally 
on the death of other as we avoid the awareness of our own demise. 
Ultimately killing others serves as a means of killing our own self-
contempt, our mortality, thus proving our immortality by exposing the 
mortality of others. This could for example explain our culture’s 
frequent preoccupations with crime and murder, tragic accidents and 
disasters and other forms of violent death, preoccupations that usually 
is considered manifestations of for example curiosity. However, 
interpreted a “Beckerian-way”, it could be considered an opportunity 
to come face-to-face with death, but instead pass on to others being 
the objects or victims. 
 Thus, our deep-rooted attempts to escape the greatest imaged 
evil for every individual – one’s own demise, becomes the source of 
the actual and real evil we inflict on others. This seems, to a certain 
extent, reasonable. By putting the fate of death onto others in order to 
expel it from ourselves, leading to the prime motive of more or less 
totally control over others, makes way for a feeling of lust which must 
15 E. Becker (1975). Escape from Evil, 64 
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be understood as nothing less than sadism. Sadism then, is to be 
considered the very essence of evil itself. Evil becomes a product of a 
Godlike, but malignant narcissism, a narcissism that maintains the 
potent illusion of oneself as ultimately good and other people as all 
bad or evil, thus disguising our real impotence concerning life and 
death. Becker’s claims concerning the universality and intensity of 
this kind of narcissism can however be criticised for rigidity and being 
exaggerated. By observation, for example, tendencies toward 
narcissism vary greatly from person to person, which makes it 
impossible to generalize to an entire population, not to mention to 
mankind itself.16 Narcissism, understood as some sort of clinical 
diagnoses, only makes sense at the level of the individual, thus 
varying here in intensity from person to person. This makes it 
impossible in operating on a level postulating universal inbuilt 
tendencies of almost constant intensity or strength. At the same time it 
does not take into account the individual’s capability to handle and 
control his own narcissism and even compensate for it by other 
psychic manoeuvres. Thus, it seems impossible to base an entire 
concept concerning such a fundamental human enterprise as evil and 
evildoing on solely philosophical or theoretical grounds, not taking 
into consideration a more practical, clinical-psychological view. 
Further, if this type of malignant narcissism and potential evildoing 
really were dominant, it would be almost impossible for man to live in 
societies and cultures based on cooperation and reciprocity with at 
least to some degree connected to elements of altruism, empathy and 
positive affections. The consequence of this is that in addition other 
forces in man as a matter of necessity is operating, balancing and 
neutralizing narcissistic urges toward domination, destruction and 
evildoing. It should be a mistake of Becker then proclaiming or 
believing that almost all our activities are an outgrowth of our fear of 
death and nature. Perhaps the whole matter is better explained as 
variations in narcissism from person to person, leading to different 
degrees regarding our intensity of this denial of death. The more 
narcissistic, the more death seems intolerable. Anyway, Becker’s 
thesis that we are all dominated by this narcissism doesn’t seem 
plausible. Bur perhaps Becker has got the point, assuming that this 
16 See: D. Evans, 1979. 
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strong and malignant narcissism is something taking place in 
particular individuals, originated in their specific or unique life-story, 
upbringing, socialization, inherent dispositions, and so on, making a 
strong case for a basic fear of death and consequently the strong 
possibility for evildoing taking place in real life. In that case, malice, 
cruelty and evildoing, based on a sadistic urge to control other people, 
motivated by a basic fear of death, is perhaps something existing, 
taking place among people, but not as universal phenomena pervading 
almost every corner of the world. The world itself could easily turn 
out to be a dreadful place, impossible for decent human life if 
Becker’s assumptions concerning the universality of such a basic 
narcissism based on a fundamental and traumatic fear of death really 
actual was the case. Psychologically, for a great many people the fear 
of death is compensated for or counteracted by our ties to our close 
relatives, our family and beloved children by whom we not only live 
for, but also accept to live through in the future, beyond our own 
physical death. As Evans sees the case, meaningful participation in 
life and positive connection with others helps in decrease of the fear 
of death. Daily life is thus not unconsciously or consciously 
dominated by an awareness of death, leading to an intense anxiety 
forcing us into control of and causing evil acts upon our fellow human 
beings. According to Evans, the inevitability of death can be faced 
with assurance and acceptance as a fact on the periphery of life, 
leaving behind any need for attempts to outmanoeuvre our own 
mortality.            
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Cognitive-behavioural therapist Aaron Beck has in late years launched 
a theory of hate and hostility based on his idea of distorted thinking as 
the source of different psychological pathologies. Rather than 
focusing on merely on particular affective states, Beck, as a cognitive 
therapist, is interested in the underlying mental processes that produce 
such feelings. Irrational or distorted thinking always precedes 
emotional disturbance, according to Beck. Clinically, the cognitive 
therapist tries to track down and identify the thought distortions 
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beneath troublesome emotions. Feelings are to be acknowledged, but 
not given the status of the final reality of the psyche. They should 
instead be seen as the consequences of specific cognitive activity. 
Beck and other cognitive therapists’ postulates concerning the priority 
or precedence of thoughts compared with emotions, can, or should be 
questioned. However, in not stressing this rather controversial subject 
at the moment, I wish to focus on Beck’s own hypothesis concerning 
some basic origins of human anger, hostility and violence. Out of this, 
it will be essential to discuss the meaning and essence of human evil 
connected to these concepts and phenomena. 
 One of the most salient features of distorted thinking seems to be 
egocentricity. Self-interest itself must be considered important or 
essential for survival, making a necessity for evaluating important and 
personal matters in terms of how it affects us. But there exists here the 
constant “danger” or inclination to “over-interpret” situations from our 
own framework. Other people’s behaviour is usually interpreted 
exclusively in reference to ourselves. Beck points out that our 
egocentricity pushes us to believe that other people interpret the 
situation in the same manner that we interpret it. The conclusions we 
make out of this are that when someone do something we dislike for 
any matter, they obviously “know” what they are doing but 
deliberately wants to hurt us, or at least apparently don’t care. Beck 
goes further from clinical psychology, asserting that such individual 
biases are also true of and can be observed in group processes. He 
uses the concept “groupism” as the collective counterpart of egoism, 
where individual interests are transformed to group interests, but in 
fact, in my opinion, not eliminating every element of individual 
motivation. Humans as group members, however, reinforce each 
others “us-them” thinking, a typical manoeuvre in keeping groups 
joint, but at the same time producing or reinforcing prejudices. Such 
collective biases may be especially difficult to see because it is 
reinforced by other group members and thus often not directly 
detected on an individual level. Strong needs for belonging and 
attachment seems to push individuals towards such dualistic 
“groupthink”.  The consequences of such stereotyping often results in 
a paranoia about the hostile intentions of others and is almost 
inevitable encouraged and reinforced as a consequence of the group’s 
self-image, depending heavily on the existence or definition of an 
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“outgroup”, upon which hostile, malicious and evil qualities may be 
projected, far behind any objective evidence of the matter.  
 Such dualistic, “either-or” thinking on collective premises may 
have been adaptive under certain circumstances in the past, but 
becomes in-functional and destructive in modern pluralistic 
societies.17 
 Beck’s chief argument is that evaluating the world egocentric, it 
be on individualistic or collective terms, is primitive and distorted 
thinking. It is typical – in the sense of being normal – in both early 
childhood development as well as earlier stages of human evolution. 
Life under these circumstances is simply perceived to dangerous to 
call for creative and rational reflection. If we are forced to believe that 
our vital interests are at stake, whether individually or collective, 
primal thinking is an automatic response. The disadvantage of this 
turns obvious in consisting of the selective reduction of data into a few 
crude categories. At this it wastes much available information. 
“Certain features of the situation are highlighted or exaggerated, and 
others are minimized or excluded from processing. Personal relevant 
details are taken out of context, the meanings tending to be excessively 
egocentric……it may be satisfactory for true life-or-death 
emergencies, but it is disruptive to the smooth functioning  of everyday 
life and to the solution of normal interpersonal problems”, in  Beck’s 
own words.18 Unfortunately, when feeling emotionally or 
psychological challenged, we tend to fall back to this old and 
primitive dualistic pattern. Even no threat is present, due to the 
particular situation, we nevertheless feel it that way psychologically. 
We are thus not capable thinking about alternatives or options to the 
conflict. Excessive anxiety has produced this hostile reaction, but for 
Beck, this anxiety has itself emerged from exaggerated, distorted 
thinking. The anxiety thus does not cause our distorted thinking. 
Instead it is this thinking that creates our anxiety. Beck then denies the 
Freudian idea of an objectless or “free-floating anxiety” causing 
various defence mechanisms, among them patterns of distorted 
17 I shall return more thoroughly to the matter in part II, investigating especially 
relational and collective causes of evil. 
18 A. Beck (1999). Prisoners of Hate. The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility 
and Violence, 73. 
40 
 
                                                 
thinking and rationalizations. If we, according to Beck, look carefully 
enough, we will find that anxiety is always based on subtle and 
distorted interpretations of life. The idea of these rigid patterns of 
thought, once functional and crucial for survival, now being obstacle 
for our personal development, may however fit well to the 
psychoanalytic notion of defence mechanisms, once necessary, later 
becoming the very problem itself.  
 The most serious danger concerning this primitive and distorted 
thinking is that in creating and relying on this kind of egocentricity, 
cut us off from the important and crucial social traits like love, 
empathy, altruism and pro-social ways of acting and living. The 
existence or presence of these social and psychological characteristics 
and qualities in individuals seems to be the necessary guarantee for 
their humane and decent behaviour toward other people or group of 
people. On the other hand, the narrowed distorted self-protected 
reasoning easily leads to mistrust and hate toward others, and as the 
worst consequence, in forcing direct brutality and cruelty, even killing 
and torture onto them. Evil then, seems to be at worst part, the result 
of certain defence mechanisms, taken to the extreme, not unlike what 
is described by for example Klein, Alford and Vetlesen. The main 
point anyway, seems to be that evil comes from within under certain 
terms, from people that in the one way or another experience 
psychological threat that is transformed outward and executed in or 
upon social world.  
 Beck believes that his theory of distorted thinking causing hate – 
and evil – is necessarily trans-cultural, pointing at some universal 
conditions in man regarding the referred relationship between 
emotions and cognitive distortions. That counts, no matter the external 
circumstances or causes might be, the same psychological 
mechanisms being involved anyway. Regarding destructive 
interpersonal action, activated cognitive distortions incite anger and 
releasing hostile behaviour. According to Beck, unwarranted personal 
attacks that arise from it being prejudice, bigotry, ethnocentrism, 
military invasion, or so on, involve the primal thinking apparatus of 
absolute categorical cognition neglecting human status of suffering or 
as victim. 
 Beck’s perspectives, of cause, open up for therapeutic treatment 
or curing of hatred, by a working through of distorted cognition itself. 
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A universal formula for hate reduction is thus possible, regardless of 
the particular social, historical, racial or gender location of the patient. 
However, Beck also recognizes the difference of quality in what he 
calls “cold calculated violence” and “hot reactive violence”, though he 
believes an, or perhaps the same underlying cognitive distortion 
occurring in each, but admitting that perhaps cold violence may not 
involve the kind of anxious reaction and display of exaggerated 
thinking involved in typical reactionary violence. One may wonder if 
lack of moral principles may be the issue in “cold” violence, rather 
than a lack of clear thinking. Beck, himself believes that “hot” reactive 
violence is much more common than the “cold” one where hate itself 
being largely a breakdown of information processing brought on by a 
bias.  
 Beck thus believes certain common psychological factors can be 
identified in all forms of antisocial behaviour, for the most part 
identifying or associating “antisocial” with hatred against one’s 
surroundings in the one way or another. The common psychological 
problem lies in the offender’s perception – or misperception – of 
oneself and one’s relation to other people, these perceptions being the 
basis for the interpretation of other people, their words, behaviours 
and intentions. The offender usually sees himself as victim, projecting 
one’s own distortions onto others or the surroundings in general, also 
seen in mere blind antisocial activities, for example vandalism. The 
cognition itself seems being that “authorities are controlling, 
disparaging and punitive, close persons are manipulative, deceitful 
and rejecting, outsiders are treacherous, self-serving and hostile - and 
nobody is to be trusted”. Because of all this, the offender himself, and 
due to a rather fragile self-esteem, then frequently interprets other’s 
behaviour as hostile, antagonistic – and even evil, shaping an inner or 
psychological need for defence and fighting back. 
 These reactive offenders according to Beck, is to be carefully 
separated from what he characterize as primary “psychopaths” who 
are quite rare. Psychopaths have to be understood as persons whose 
psychological dynamics seems mostly dominated by lust and pleasure 
when hurting controlling and dominating other people, they being 
relatives or strangers. While there however are some similarities 
between the two groups, the main point is realizing the huge 
differences among them. The reactive offenders feel vulnerable and 
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fragile, while the psychopaths on the other hand feel invulnerable and 
superior. The reactive offender sees others as hostile enemies, while 
psychopaths view others as inferior victims.  The violence of the 
reactive offender is largely a defensive manoeuvre, while on the other 
hand the violence of the psychopath is simply malicious. The 
psychopath then, seems to have acquired some sort of empathy, but is 
perverting it by using this understanding to manipulate and if possible 
hurting other people in the crudest manner.19  
 According to Beck, psychopaths have basic deficiency in their 
information processing, something that in his theory precedes the 
emotional reaction, for example the pleasure or satisfaction of the 
mere manipulation itself. Non-psychopaths on the other hand, seem 
able to process and integrate clues that would cause them to pause and 
reflect on their own behaviour. Psychopaths are aware of the rules, but 
seem incapable in integrating them for working-through, instead 
distancing from them by believing they are superior to and above 
them. Consequently the reactive offender is much easier to work with 
in therapy, because his or her beliefs about the world and other people 
can be modified over time. In psychopaths it seems almost impossible 
to work with elements the person is not willing or capable of 
integrating in his personality.  
 According to Beck, distorted cognition in the individual psyche, 
is often seen in the group’s or collective’s attitudes as well. In fact, a 
main function of the group itself  is often to build up a barrier between 
the “good-us” and the “bad-others”: “Our case is sacred; theirs are 
evil”, “we are the victims; they are the victimizers. This is classical 
political enemy making, under extreme circumstances leading to 
doctrines which consequence is that all members of the opposition is 
lumped together so that they lose their identities as unique individuals. 
And since they are all the same, they are interchangeable and hence 
disposable. We systematically strip the “others”, the opposition, of 
any human qualities for which we might have empathy or compassion. 
The “others” are thus demonized as the very embodiment of evil. The 
paradox of this projection and distorted conception of evil as the 
object of (distorted) cognitive activities is that it in fact becomes the 
19 And thus not being an empathic person, but rather the opposite. 
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very cause of evil and evildoing itself. By attacking the evil image, we 
kill real people.  
The very problem or theme of collective evil has, however, been 
object for heavy discussions in the late making room for theories of 
many kind especially more cultivated sociological ones being critical 
to psychological theories on an individualistic basis.  
There is, however, another problem connected to Beck’s view 
concerning the origins of human evil. As a strict cognitive-behavioural 
therapist he shows little affinity and interest in the supposedly 
repressed dark elements of the unconscious, it being individualistic or 
collective; that was largely presupposed in the theories of as well 
Freud and for example Fromm, Klein and Alford. But on these terms, 
Beck’s theory faces the threat of getting stuck in a “dead end street” 
regarding basically assumptions of what lies behind our strong 
psychological needs for projecting evil upon others. Beck’s answer is 
distorted cognition, but there seems to be no reason why this should 
give the final resolution to the problem. One may of cause assert that 
this is the result of some sort of learning, still it may seems like a 
mystery why procedures of automatic and reflective learning should 
ultimately lead to mass murder and other forms of extreme cruelty 
against innocent people. Focusing on basic and archaic feelings 
getting repressed or disturbed at beginning of life, thus from the very 
birth leading to distorted and twisted views or attitudes regarding both 
oneself and other people, seems like a more basic or proper way of 
explaining the primitive and strong hate constituting the terms for 
factual evildoing. However, to a large extent behaviourists and social 
theorists in general would regard psychodynamic inspired theories’ 
talking of and presupposing unobserved unconscious processes, as 
more or less empty speculation.  
After all, Beck presupposes that humans also possess and are 
capable of traits of another and lighter character then the dark sides 
dealt with up to now. We also have the capacity for altruistic and 
helping behaviour that can balance and even override hostile 
tendencies, not to mention our capabilities for rational thinking which 
makes it possible challenging and overcoming our most distorted and 
primal thinking. Qualities such as empathy, cooperation and positive 
rationality are just as intrinsic to human nature as qualities of anger, 
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hate and violence. Pro-social tendencies seem, after all, to be as 
fundamental to human nature as antisocial tendencies.  
Beck’s perspective however, originated in human reason and 
cognitive rationalisation, could, in my opinion, hardly claim to hold 
the whole truth regarding human evilness and wrongdoing. In fact, 
Beck could be accused of turning the whole problem upside down by 
making cognition and rationalisation superior to emotions and dark 
motivations in detecting the very origins of human evil and 
destruction. As pointed out dealing with for example Klein, deep 
rooted archaic feelings and emotions are in work from birth on, before 
any rational symbolization can take place, making room for projected 
hatred and cruelty when frustrated or bad handled. We also know that 
there exist perhaps some biological premises for regarding emotional 
elements superior to cognition, among other things from the fact that 
parts of the human brain containing centre for emotional impulses 
being older and deeper-seated than the parts conducting cognitive 
processes.20 Thus, some significant feature concerning Beck’s theory 
seems to be that he simply doesn’t dig deep enough in his efforts to 
come to some sort of explanation, though his ideas can count as 
partial explanation, or part of a larger multi-factual explanation or 
model.  
 
 
6                        
 
According to David Augsburger, hate cannot, that is however often 
presumed, be reduced to one single feeling or experience. Instead, hate 
has to be regarded as many different things or types, and not all forms 
being bad and destructive. Hate doesn’t grow out from a single 
motive. Instead hatred has to be regarded as far more complex and 
nuanced. In fact it is composed of a wide spectrum of reactions, from 
emotion to behaviour, prejudice and certain cultural norms and values. 
“It may be intense, focused and direct; or it may be impersonal, 
detached, instrumental and indirect”.21 “Hate is a complex series of 
20 I will return to this question in part III. 
21 D. Augsburger (2004). Hate Work. Working Through the Pain and Pleasures 
of Hate, 3.   
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negative feelings-attitudes-sets of behaviours. Yet a single word is 
largely employed to cover the whole set”.22   
All this seems reasonable, pointing up to precise a multi-factual 
understanding or concept of hate - and perhaps evil. According to 
Augsburger, our “hate-language” does not adequately convey the 
varieties of the underlying emotions and motives. He describes hate as 
a “family” of emotions, rather than a singular feeling. Augsburger, 
like Klein, presupposes a psychological development regarding 
emotions, shifting from strict dualistic either-or thinking towards a 
tolerance for ambiguity to an empathic ability to at the same time 
seeing humanness in those we hate. With maturity and greater 
developmental achievement, we eventually begin to experience 
elements of empathy in which the hatred object or object-part does not 
seem alien to ourselves. This gives us the ability of experiencing other 
persons, not as solely divided parts of love or hate, but as whole 
individuals with their good as well as bad qualities, which in turn 
makes it possible to differentiate the actor from the act. This 
differentiation, then, makes it possible for us – not to eliminate hate as 
such, but to make a clear distinction between hating the evil act, while 
at the same time not hating the evil-doer or other persons on more 
general terms. Augsburger, however, admits this in general to be a 
notoriously difficult task. This becomes especially true because a 
person’s particular destructive act easily snowballs into a damaging 
pattern of behaviour that seems cemented to, or integrated in the 
structure of the personality as such, which in turn appears to express 
the full range of personhood. When certain patterns of behaviour seem 
such deep rooted in personality, it would be nearly impossible to 
separate act from person. This is particularly true if the primary 
orientation or mission of a person’s life has served destruction and 
chaos. 
Augsburger himself makes a strong case that hate is both 
inevitable and essential. The issue thus is not getting rid of our hate. 
Instead it is hating the right thing that becomes crucial, the question 
being: What deserves our hate? Ausburger’s answer is that there exist 
mature kinds of hatred which is directed at injustice itself. 
Ausburger’s perspective thus, is to separate hate from evil, stating that 
22 Ibid., 3. 
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hate can exist in the service of the good. Such benign hate is then of 
cause contrasted to malevolent hate, or evil. Healthy hate then, is 
hatred against evil. It is thus both healthy and necessarily to hate as 
well as to love. Augsburger says we cannot love without also 
experiencing hate. When experiencing that all we hold for truth, 
kindness and justice being violated, we can’t refrain from hating the 
violator. This hate is in fact what makes it possible for us to fight 
against injustice. A love of fairness assumes a disdain for unfairness. 
Usually, however, our hate is not solely directed against the evil act 
itself, but first and foremost against persons, which most often 
represents the basis of evil or malevolent hatred itself. This also 
represents the kind of hate that manifests itself in highly dualistic, 
black-or-white categories. Our hatred is targeted at specific persons or 
group, with no shades of nuance represent. The other(s) are one 
hundred percent evil, while we at the same thing are the good. Such 
dualistic hate does not acknowledge the personhood of the hated 
object. It is more considered a “thing”, indicating a complete 
identification of the person with the evil act. 
Augsburger identifies three types of hate that is operative within 
this dualistic framework. The first is simple hatred in which we merely 
feel a strong dislike for something. The second type of hatred is 
spiteful hatred which refers to a deep resentment toward someone who 
has hurt us, the enclosing feeling or belief here being that a deep 
injustice has be done against us by that very person or group. The 
third type is malicious hatred, which involves a strong lust for 
revenge. This is a revenge aimed at hurting the other person. 
According to Augsburger, all three of these forms of hatred are built 
upon the inability to distinguish the perpetrator from the injury. They 
may all be understandable and are forms that everyone inevitable 
experiences in daily life. Augsburger recognizes that the black-and-
white stereotypes that underlie these types of hatred are both universal 
and unavoidable. These negative stereotypes against individuals, 
however, view every individual through the derogatory lens aimed at 
the entire group the person is supposed to belong to. Such negative 
stereotypes seem unwilling to be modified by objective data or 
contradictory evidence contrasting the false ideas underlying the 
stereotype(s). These categories of thought in rigid stereotypes are of 
cause emotionally charged rather than intellectually guided. To a great 
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extent, they are held because they make life more convenient by 
turning complexity into easy-to-identify categories. This is, however, 
to be seen as common and “normal” reactions hunting every human 
being through daily experiences now and again.  
As mentioned, however, Augsburger believes there being types 
of hate that are justified by the circumstances itself, namely “just” or 
“moral” hate directed against evil, or evil acts itself. This type of hate 
is characterized by principally disconnecting offender from offence, in 
the sense of seeing the person as more than the destructive behaviour.  
Such moral hatred focuses primarily on the immoral act committed by 
the person, but still is not always ready to separate person from deed. 
Augsburger states that moral hatred at first may seem essentially 
impersonal since it focuses on the lack of morality in the other’s 
action. But the person’s evil behaviour, public acts and private choices 
get enmeshed in beliefs, personhood and character of the person. It 
seems difficult to separate hating of the malignant from respecting the 
benign. The very danger of moral hatred itself is that it in fact may 
blind us to the real humane and decent elements within others, it often 
being hidden behind the acts itself. The temptation of raising moral 
judgment against the person as such lurks behind all evaluations of 
this kind. The moral problem itself can according to Augsburger be 
formulated as this: Is the person more or no more than the worst act 
committed? 
According to Augsburger, in the continuum of and affirming 
moral hatred, lies what he calls “just” hatred, aiming at defending the 
rights of the victim, but also seeking for the justice that respects the 
personhood of everyone involved, including the perpetrator. “Just” 
hatred, then, is supposed to be grounded in a passion for universal 
fairness, the target of hate being injustice itself. In “just” hatred we 
hate hate. Because of that it has to be perceived as synonymous with 
love and thus be considered as precisely the opposite of evil. It really 
represents a revolt and fight against the very existence of evil itself. 
As Augsburger points out, “just” hatred implicates that we go beyond 
or get rid of ethnocentrism in condemning injustice done by one’s 
own group as well as others.: “Just hate recognizes that we must face 
not only the other group’s evil but our own as well. It realizes that 
there is no reconciliation between groups until people talk about their 
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own ethic group’s crimes as honestly as they point out those of 
others”.23 
The central problem connected to this, according to Augsburger, 
is our tendency to see our own actions through the lens of our 
intentions, and not always in the light of the factual consequences of 
our deeds. We always feel we mean well and therefore our actions 
can’t be that bad after all. Yet we rarely extend to others the same 
courtesy. When seeing our own actions as based on the higher ground 
of good intentions, no such good intentions are usually attributed to 
the expected “evil” actions of others. Of cause, it is possible to 
experience several levels of hate simultaneously. One does not have to 
categorize others in exclusion-inclusion. Augsburger, however, states 
that hate is inevitable and therefore the point is not wasting our time 
getting rid of hate, but to hate the right thing. 
The next point of departure of cause is reflecting upon reasons 
for hate. The question regarding Augsburger’s answers to this is, 
however: Is he digging deep enough? Of cause, one immediately 
reason mentioned by him, is that our biological equipment simply 
makes us hate. From this point of view, hate exists as essential part of 
our humanness as such. Hostility is seen as a built-in, necessary aspect 
of our evolutionary survival, making for example prejudice an 
inevitable outgrowth of self-interest. Perhaps these tendencies are 
genetically passed on to future generations as a way of guaranteeing 
survival. The further argument her could be that we have an essential 
and deep need to classify and categorize our surroundings and life 
itself for the purpose of our own survival, meaning that we should  not 
be able to make it without such conceptual schemes.24 
Another explanation mentioned is that we possibly the way or 
another is socialized to hate. In some way we all – individuals, 
societies and cultures – have to learn who is, or could come to be our 
enemies, urging to destroy us, given the opportunities or the right (or 
wrong) circumstances being present. In a little less dramatic way, 
Augsburger states: “Our world is confusingly diverse, and one must 
learn labels and construct stereotypes in order to pattern and manage 
our interactions and relationships. Our need to simplify the 
23 Ibid., 12 
24 I shall return to this subject during part III. 
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complexity of human community leads us to construct prejudices as 
manageable patterns of perception, definition, and interaction. 
Although these offer the desired efficiency, they have an inevitable 
and unfortunate dark side. They create bigotry and multiply negative 
prejudices, which alienate us from each other”.25  
Augsburger also considers the possibility of our hatred simply 
being grounded in moral flaw. Feeling insecure, threaten or being 
attacked by anxiety, we can be mislead by immoral ways to react with 
hostility toward any threat to our security.  
The capacity for and even necessity of hating, pointed at by 
Augsburger, is also stressed by Richard Galston26, describing different 
groups of people with different capacities to hate. Galton asserts that 
when being passively unable to hate, we are usually incapacitated to 
fight against injustice, this perspective being in accordance with 
Augsburger’s view.  
So after all, perhaps Augsburger is digging deep enough in 
explaining the origins of hate and eventually evil. His approach seems 
comprehensive and multifaceted compared with other theories and 
does not rely on one singular element of explanation. In this way it 
seems fair to characterize it as genuine eclectic. 
 Still, while Augsburger might be right on his own terms, the 
whole story seems not yet been told. To get a fully grasp of the total 
dynamics of human evil, we must move further beyond individual-
psychological perspectives while incorporating social and other 
“individualistic” perspectives, namely biological, in a more deep-
digging analysis.                                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
25 Ibid. 33. Although Augsburger suggests it being the result of some sort of 
socialization, it could immediately be considered a psychological explanation. 
However, as I shall be pointing at later, it also becomes significant in the further, 
while discussing social, and even biological causes of prejudices and hatred. 
26 R. Galston (1987). The Longest Pleasure. A Psychoanalytic Study of Hatred. 
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PART II 
Relations 
 
 
1 
 
Taking about a “social” dimension of evil, should at least involve two 
or more, however related scientific disciplines, like social psychology 
and sociology, but perhaps also including disciplines like 
anthropology and history. However, focusing on the social dimensions 
of evil, in my opinion does not exclude individual perspectives, like 
“inner” psychological forces, motives and conflicts dealt with in part 
I. Rather, the concept of this dissertation is precisely that of 
integrating several perspectives and dimensions into a more fully 
understanding of all psychological factor operating in the creating and 
maintenance of human evil. In my model or perspective, several 
psychological dimensions and factors simultaneous contribute creating 
the matter, in precisely the way that social and social psychological 
factor being dependent on subjective psychological elements and vice 
versa. Also add to this model the element or dimension of biology, 
parts of it being important for the creation of some significant 
psychological conditions and processes.27  
 Social psychology, however, seems to represent a significant 
starting point in its own right identifying evildoing, especially 
identified as for example mass hate, large scale murder and even 
genocide. History of twentieth century has told us that the urge to do 
harm to innocent people combined with political power and authority, 
has had a tremendous and horrifying effect concerning the presence 
and bringing into effect the very nightmare of terror and evil. The key 
question here to be asked seems to be: How does it come that not just 
disturbed individuals, but rather adjusted and kind people under 
certain circumstances could be brought into situations taking part in 
27 What I especially have in mind is gene-, neuropsychological and evolutionary 
biology, and I will return to these matters in the next part (III).     
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big scale murder of innocent people; men, women and children? This 
very approach itself seems disturbing.  
 Some leading developmental line regarding perspectives in 
recent years has been to move behind individual views, toward a look 
a different situations involving individuals’ social life. Some 
significant claims have been made, like: A social situation can be so 
powerful that it overshadows genetics, previous ethical standards, 
prior learning or any dispositional factors associated with a 
“personality”. Put simply, the social context can pressure people into 
doing a lot of things they normally would not, saying that evil is 
usually not performed by “monsters” from whom we can feel safely 
disconnected. Instead more often results from a growing erosion of 
moral standards is due to some situational, social, cultural or/and 
political circumstances inflicting ordinary people no different than you 
and me. This is often related or referred to the so called social 
psychological term or concept “the fundamental attribution error”, 
saying that mental distortion regarding conclusion is frequently made 
when we believe that all the persons’ behaviour is due to, or comes 
from within the subject itself rather than being triggered by outside 
and situational factors. The fundamental attribution error thus assumes 
that all our behaviour is “endogenous”, arising from “within”, rather 
than being situational provoked. This error overly making 
psychological, or some would add, biological, what are in fact a social 
matter. This is explained by social psychologists by saying we humans 
have a natural tendency to attribute all destructive  to internal 
dispositions - particularly connected to people different from 
ourselves. Social psychologists however, states that this represents a 
rather naïve belief that only “bad” people or personalities are doing 
bad things. From a social psychological point of view, evil is far more 
subtle than plain instinctual or dispositional theories have tried to 
convince us of. Instead, it looks more like an outside-in affair in which 
people are corrupted by a social context that pushes them toward 
greater and greater malevolence. This social psychological position 
does not necessarily argue for social and environmental determinism, 
instead stressing the “influence” factor itself as being the key to the 
understanding evil behaviour. Many social psychologists point out 
that evil occurs as a rather slow diffuse process brought on largely by 
social pressure of different kinds. 
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 This clearly contrasts individualistic, especially psychoanalytical 
perspectives of evil, the latter presupposing unconscious forces and 
factors as the main source of evildoing, saying that individuals 
conscious self-reports can’t be taken face value regarding the matter. 
Instead deeper conflicts and hidden meanings are working behind 
rather flattering individual self-reports. Social psychological research, 
on the other hand, takes individuals self-reports at face value, refusing 
to look for underlying psychological factors. Social psychologists for 
example are frequently stressing or reporting that rather inflated and 
excessive self-esteem is part of most destructive people’s manner. 
They do this on the basis of self-reports and responses to 
questionnaires of subjects who has been involved in evildoing. The 
basis considering this kind of research of course contrasts that of 
digging for hidden forces and motives behind the subject’s own 
consciousness. Such an empiricism regarding the epistemology and 
corresponding way of doing research, often dominate social 
psychological science.28  
 However, my opinion is that focusing on empirical detected 
behaviour, self-reports and corresponding data, does not exclude data 
on another level or by different conceptual frames. On the contrary, 
such fundamental different conceptions have to be regarded 
supplements to each other, rather than antagonists. In getting a more 
fully concept of evil itself, it seems reasonable or even necessarily to 
stress both the “inner” and “outer” dimension of human psychic life.29 
 
 
 
 
2 
28 This of cause makes associations to the theoretical controversial known as 
“The fundamental attribution error”, and is in the psychology of personality 
known as “Person-interaction interaction” or the question of “Consistency vs. 
situation”. However, the concept of “person” and “personality” will have to be 
far broader defined then by solely psychoanalytical terms.      
29 As I make efforts to demonstrate in the following, there exist in fact two 
significant dimensions connected to man’s “inner” life, namely the biological in 
addition to the pure psychological. 
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From a social psychological point of view, there exists quite a few 
significant and well known investigations that have thrown light on 
some crucial aspects of evildoing itself and which has been considered 
as breaking new ground in the understanding of what parameters make 
large scale destructive behaviour possible. The works of Stanley 
Milgram and Philip Zimbardo here seems to be two of the most 
prominent. Both of these fundamental social psychological thinkers 
strongly favour a situational rather than dispositional perspective 
regarding the sources and contingencies of human destructiveness. 
 Stanley Milgram’s concern was examining the role of 
conformity and obedience connected to human’s capacity for 
destructive behaviour. The background for his study, or experiment, 
was the experience of World War II concerning the willingness and 
non-resistance of common people in following Hitler and participating 
in mass murder. One of the questions Milgram asked himself was 
whether this had to be considered a character flaw of the German 
people, or a common trait in man itself. The technical matters and 
experimental design in Milgram’s study is well known and will not be 
commented on in this text. It is however, well worth noticing that in 
Milgram’s original experiment two-third of the subjects obeyed the 
experimenter up to a point believing they gave shocks of 450 volts, in 
spite of the “learner’s” screams and protests and from the fact that the 
“teacher” or subject was in no way threatened and forced. Neither was 
he promised rewards, for example offered a large sum of money. The 
subjects simply obeyed the experiment leader’s professional authority. 
The whole point of the experiment then, seems to be that the subjects 
indeed had a choice, but precisely chose to obey the leader for 
apparently technical, scientific and objective reasons. However, 
hearing the leader sometimes stating that the test had to be done for 
scientific purposes and that the subjects had “no choice”, but to go on 
giving shocks, was enough for the majority to reassess or conceal the 
fact of choice and continuing the experimental “shock process”. Out 
of this, some would probably assert that the subjects in the experiment 
did not want to believe they in fact had a choice. Instead they 
preferred to stay or act in accordance to what was expected from the 
context of the situation or arrangement. To start believing or realizing 
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they were responsible for their own decisions would perhaps have 
forced them into moral calculations and responsibility on very short 
notice, something that they in fact would prefer to avoid. In situations 
like this one would often prefer to accept the authority figure’s words 
saying that they had no choice. Milgram himself seemed surprised 
finding authority that easy to elicit; much easier than he thought it 
would be. Conversely, disobedience did not come easy. His 
conclusion was, among other things, that ordinary people, in what 
they believed was just doing their job, and without any particular 
hostility against others or from their past, could easily be brought into 
a situation where they became agents in a terrible scenario of 
destructive acts against innocent people. Out of this Milgram also 
concluded that by no means a repressive nazi-regime was demanded 
for the purpose of finding “willing executioners” like guards for 
concentration camps and even administraters of torture, if they were 
told by some superior authority that the evil things they were asked to 
do was right, moral or just “necessary”. It could as well happen in 
liberal America. In fact, the Milgram experiment may seems to point 
at some basically denial and indifference in most of us, denials 
pointing at a hidden reservoir of un-neutralized aggression urging to 
get manifested under the “right” (or wrong) circumstances. Or may be 
the main issue or problem is man’s desire or inclination for group 
participation as the basis of the intent of confirming his own identity 
as social subject. 
 Milgram’s experiment has been linked to philosopher Hannah 
Arendt’s famous study of Adolf Eichmann and the concept of “The 
Banality of Evil”, referring to Arendt’s emphasis on the rather 
banality concerning Eichmann’s evil regarding his bureaucratic 
manner of killing of thousands of people in the concentration camps 
during the Second World War. The core of Arendt’s idea was 
precisely that quite ordinary people could be brought into a position of 
doing extraordinary brutal and terrible thing on a large scale, when 
social and political norms and pressures made tolerance for this 
possible. The trouble with Eichmann, Arendt stated, was that he didn’t 
appear as a monster different from ordinary people, but, on the 
contrary, that so many were like him. He appeared as å person 
“terrifying” normal, with no direct sadistic or perverted traits of 
character. Arendt made the comment that “from the viewpoint of our 
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legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this 
normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put 
together”.30 By claiming they are “just following orders” individuals 
can be put to engage in almost unimaginable destructive acts of 
obedience. The profile of Eichmann, together with Milgram’s study 
seemed like a powerful refutation of the earlier dominant theory 
saying that evil resides within human beings as a basic disposition. In 
other words, it clearly seemed minimizing the power of personality 
concerning destructive behaviour. The individual’s disposition is thus 
overshadowed by one’s circumstances. Destructive obedience does 
not results from beforehand destructive personality tendencies, like 
sadism, cruelty or other intra-psychic features. Instead it emerges as a 
result of powerful coercive forces that propel and even escalate human 
choices and corresponding behaviour. Like many, also anonymous 
commentators, has stated: “Perhaps there rests an Eichmann inside all 
of us, waiting for the right, perhaps accidental situation or factors to 
release its destructive potential”.31 
 Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, relying on the conclusions made 
out of Milgrams study, makes the point that it demonstrates that 
human cruelty largely is social determined and not originated in the 
psyche as some pathological structures and processes. Bauman takes 
Milgrams study and conclusions face value in asserting that it in a 
nutshell proved that inhumanity and cruelty has to do with, or are 
originated in social relations. With referring to the frequently pointed 
out fact that the Holocaust was carried out on the basis of carefully 
30 H. Arendt (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
276.  
31 This statement and the logic behind this, grounded in Milgram’s study as well 
as Arendt’s philosophy, may however seem oversimplified  as far as it is taken 
face value in pretending to give a fully and exclusive explanation regarding the 
subject of human evil. In Part I, I gave an account of subjective factors and 
theories concerning the matter. The chief thesis of this dissertation is that both 
personal, situational and even biological factors by necessity may be present in 
contributing to the actual manifestation of evil behaviour. A significant point 
regarding the statement including Eichmann, cited above, is precisely that it 
presupposes something of a “destructive potential” in man, in other words, a 
dispositional factor. I will return to this controversy in the concluding part, or 
Synthesis.      
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planning and a high degree of technical rationalisation, Bauman’s 
main thesis is precisely that a highly rationalized and well organised 
society form the basis of producing inhumanity on a large scale. 
 However, Bauman’s argumentation here seems some sort of 
short-circuited. First, why should a highly rationalized society 
automatically turn into a state of horror, producing mass-murder and 
Holocausts? A quite different question seems to be that terror regimes 
itself may develop highly rational procedures to handle their mass-
murder the most effective way. But Bauman’s conclusion here seems 
to mix up causes and effects. At least his reasoning her seems pure 
“external” by method, meaning he is automatically trying to link 
together two factors that from the part of departure are not logical or 
casual connected, just presupposing that they are. Secondly, Bauman 
seems to operate on dualistic premises by the way he presents his 
alternatives for explaining the executioners doing evil, being either 
those who possess sadistic personal traits or quite normal persons who 
has become victims under specific circumstances. Bauman also 
stresses the well known argument of how distance to the victim lay 
the ground for directing cruelty toward him or her and document this 
precisely with the Milgram experiments were the test-administrator 
serves the function of both and external authority and intermediary 
making the distance itself.  
 Bauman’s theory of evil seems throughout social or sociological. 
However, surprisingly, he rejects any idea referring to the possibility 
of a genuine moral, counteracting evildoing, rooted in social 
conditions. The capability of moral itself, and thus the only effective 
barrier against evil and cruelty, lies not in socialization of any kind, 
but had to be found in the genuine “moral impulse” embedded in 
every single human from the start. Societal norms or the socialisation 
process itself at large scale only serves as manipulator of this moral 
impulse or ability. Baumann here explicit refers to philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas who essentially stresses a philosophy or ethic of 
responsibility, be a responsibility directed at “the other”, a genuine 
and essential capability structured in every human being from the 
beginning and thus making the only prime and true fundament for 
human morality and inter-subjective relationships as such. In fact, 
Bauman, in building his whole concept of moral on Levinas’ idea of 
subjective and inter-subjective responsibility and commitment, again 
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seems to move into the logic of dualism. Responsibility directed at 
“the other” understood as a universal human capability can on these 
terms only be understood or interpreted as a human potential, allowed 
to take place under certain circumstances. Or else we would all be 
responsible, all the time and under every circumstance. Then we’ll 
have to focus on circumstances themselves, which necessarily have to 
mean combining human and social, or societal, conditions, or 
possibilities. Bauman however, doesn’t seem to follow this logic in 
rejecting any possibility for a human universal moral, as a buffer 
against evildoing, grounded, at least partly, in socialization itself. By 
choosing one single basic reason regarding the possibility of moral, he 
thus has to face dualism, the “either-or”, that turn out to be right or 
wrong.  
 Concerning Milgram and his rather provoking points of view, a 
basic question seems to be regarding some sort of a tension between 
personal choice and social influence.  Exactly, what is then this 
relationship between individual choice and the social context? Are 
there in fact some mixed influence connecting human autonomy and 
circumstantial influence, or does the influence go one-sided, the one 
or another way?32 There is however one significant point. Milgram 
reports that the participants often felt very distressed about what they 
were doing during the experiment, but nevertheless continued 
fulfilling the tasks. According to Milgram, at least one of the 
participants was “rapidly approaching a nervous breakdown”33 during 
the procedure. What should this tell us? Perhaps the most important 
fact associated with this observation is that there might be a 
significant difference regarding the attitude and status of Milgram’s 
participants compared with guards of the Nazi camps. The 
participant’s dissonance and stress of the participants in fact seems to 
represent an important element in what may separate Milgram’s own 
study from certain Nazi activities. Indeed, some significant part of the 
Nazi guards own attitudes and convictions was exactly that they 
32 This, by itself, represents a significant problem within as well social 
psychology as psychology of personality, perhaps demonstrating that these two 
separate disciplines within the one and the same science are in need of some 
sorts of closer connections or theoretical ties to each other in order to produce 
models of explanations concerning human behaviour. 
33 S. Milgram (1963), 375 – 77. 
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believed they were performing a “good deed” or task relieving the 
world of “Jewish vermin” or other “untermenschen”. In other words: 
The Nazi willingness to unflinchingly eradicate Jewish and other 
people may need an explanation beyond that of Milgram’s obedient 
shockers. Out of the extension of this, an adequate clarification of the 
fact of and reason why nearly 35 percent of Milgram’s participants did 
not go all the way along the procedure in their shock infliction, has 
perhaps not been made. Instead, an intense focus has been placed on 
the majority willing to use maximal force and shock during the 
experiment. Perhaps not surprisingly, concerning the fact that these 
results on the behalf of the majority turned out to be astonishing, 
pointing in precise the opposite direction of what was predicted by 
experts, a band of prominent psychiatrists. Nevertheless, a minority of 
35 percent itself represents a heavy argument for being caution 
regarding definite conclusions of what cause humans doing evil acts 
on each other. Then, pointing at the famous and often referred and 
already pointed at theoretical controversy between dispositional and 
situational forces determining human behaviour, could the case be 
that the reason explaining why so many refused following the leader’s 
instructions and demands of giving maximal chocks simply had to do 
with the fact that the forces and demands stemming from the 
authoritative situation itself perhaps appeared not to be that powerful 
and absolute after all? Is the case after all, in spite of the powerful 
results stemming from the experiments and observations in the 
“situation tradition”, like the Milgram experiment, at least to a certain 
degree, a matter of human character? 34 Nevertheless, the results from 
the Milgram study, no matter how strong the tendency run in favour of 
situation influence, yet makes it difficult to generalize exclusively in 
one direction. Instead it cast doubt upon its ability to conclude on the 
behalf of the human condition. 
 Concerning the further discussion of the Milgram study, let us 
consider some facts underlying it. First, the subjects in the experiment 
did not want, nor had any intensions of hurting their “victims”. So this 
certainly does not confirm the Holocaust idea. The SS officers or 
guards in the camps did not act out of the premise that the 
34 It should of cause be noted that the study itself is ethically problematic and 
thus hard to replicate.  
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administrator or leader (Himmler or Hitler) made his request for the 
best interest of say the Jewish people, the way Milgram convinced his 
subjects during the experiment. The subjects acted out of the belief 
that they were participating in a genuine scientific experiment based 
on totally voluntariness of all the participants, which must have been 
perfectly clear was not  the case with respect to the victims in the 
camps. Of course the Jews and other prisoners could not be perceived 
as social peers as did the participants in the experiment. The whole 
point with camps and the process of extermination itself was precisely 
that the objects or victims should become victims of dehumanization. 
The conceptualisation of the link between the Milgram study and the 
Holocaust also tends to minimize the dehumanizing anti-Jewish 
element that clearly represented a motive power for the Nazi killings 
itself. Some assert, but others have denied that the Holocaust 
represents a historically unique and unrepeatable event that cannot be 
duplicated in a lab or in real life. Nevertheless, a significant, if not 
decisive premise, regarding the Holocaust was the radical and 
consistently dehumanization of the Jewish people, including every 
subject of suspected Jewish origin. Clearly, the Nazis did not see the 
Jews as persons. This reduction of personhood allowed them to 
murder and maltreat, even children and babies, without any moral 
reflection or feeling of remorse. Here of course we walk into a mine 
field or difficult mix of sadism and duty, the last referring to bare 
willingness of following order. However, I’m not going to stress this 
further for the moment, but find it necessary to point to the fact that 
some sort of ideological dehumanization seems crucial for the 
execution of planned mass murder on a large scale. The main point 
here, however, is to demonstrate or at least give some indication of 
possible significant differences regarding the conditions underlying 
the Milgram study compared with the Holocaust. This again points at 
some significant, but often overlooked facts, namely that all situations 
involving some sort of harassment done against innocent people are 
not necessarily identical. The forces and causes involved in the 
Holocaust may, at least in some respect, be of another kind than what 
motivated or made the terms for the human reactions in the Milgram 
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experiments, despite superficial similarities of some kind, first and 
foremost regarding some empirical results.35  
 The problem concerning the identification of the forces behind 
the Holocaust with those in certain social psychological experiments, 
creating situations of a more artificial kind, is that it runs into the 
danger of reducing human beings as stripped of their own will, solely 
becoming weak-willed objects for pure external forces. On the 
contrary, when including human motives as an autonomous factor or 
instance of power in itself, we would probably end up finding that the 
motives for participating and acting in the Milgram experiment be 
considered quite different from those of the camp guards, not to 
mention the SS leaders of the camps. However, the possibility that 
some of the participants in the Milgram study could actively have 
enjoyed and felt some sadistic pleasure in doing what they believed 
were giving the objects electric shocks, can not be ruled out, despite 
the fact, as mentioned above, that many felt distressed by participating 
in giving shocks. But this possible fact again turns our attention to 
some significant personal dispositions. Could it be the case that some 
people, but not everybody, under certain circumstances, regardless of 
reports of their daily life being normal, filled with love and positive 
affections towards their families and friends, could feel some pleasure 
in controlling and hurting strange but innocent individuals? If that 
being the case, then we are dealing with, not exclusively external, 
social or situational forces, but primary a combination of personal and 
situational variables. Not to neglect the power of the situation itself, 
but here we are confronted with a rather mixed up and more 
complicated picture regarding the famous comparison between the 
Milgram study and the Holocaust. First: Personal, or psychological 
factors and forces always have to be considered. Second: The bare 
situations or contexts framing the individuals’ behaviour, motives, or 
whatever, can or should not be considered identical or copies of each 
other. It is, after all, impossible to consider equal a setting involving 
35 This clearly, in my opinion, raises some fundamental question regarding the 
level of explanation embedded in fundamental psychological spheres, like 
personal and social psychology. Here I see a clear conflict, namely to what 
extent is it possible, exclusively using social psychological concepts and 
theories to explain human behaviour and motives. I will return to this in my 
conclusion.  
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interaction between volunteers, principally being free agents, with a 
situation hallmarked of a relationship between guardians and slaves.36  
 Another point however, touching some ethical issues, is that the 
exclusive emphasis on situation, neglecting the importance of the 
individuals own choices from the one situation to the other, has the 
ultimate consequence of eliminating the subject as a free and 
responsible creature or agent, the very foundation of our legality and 
judicial system.37  
 An interesting point of view has earlier been introduced by 
Langdon Gilkey38 which in many respects move in the same direction 
as my own criticism of the “pure” situation argument. Gilkey’s 
conviction is that for example extreme situations, by itself does not 
make persons behave “wicked”. The situation itself is however 
important, namely in activating or revealing something that is already 
present or at least exists as some potential. The situation doesn’t create 
something totally new, but holds the ability to intensify and expose 
natural inclinations, meaning some traits of personality. This seems 
fair. Apparently he is at odds with Milgram’s one-sided emphasis on 
the power of the situation to turn ordinary, normal and decent people 
into destructive creatures. However, in my opinion there is no need for 
a total dismissal of the situation perspective itself. The fact here 
seems, and this stands as one of my main points, that man doesn’t 
solely live in situations, but as much across situations. This, in my 
opinion, gives us basic explanations or knowledge of the fact that in 
every (extreme) situation influencing man, one will always find the 
single subjects not responding in the usual manner, for example 
resisting demands of following cruel and inhuman given orders.        
 
 
 
36 My basic idea, which I shall return to in Part IV, is precisely that we must 
consider different factors simultaneously operating at different levels, in order to 
understand such a complex phenomena as human evil, as a casual as well as a 
definition matter.  
37 The ”legal” argument or alibi of obedience to the superior, of cause has to be 
considered some genuine situational one. 
38 L. Gilkey (1966). 
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Almost as famous as the Milgram study, stands Philip Zimbardo’s 
prison study at the Standford University. It is quite different designed 
compared with the Milgram study, but points in the same direction 
meta-theoretically, that is explaining the destructive behaviours of the 
participants out of situation factors and circumstances. Zimbardo 
refuses to include the variable of basic motivational factors, but 
sometimes talks of “good people doing bad things”. This could be 
interpreted in such a way that personality has no influence on the 
subject’s behaviour in extreme situations involving one person’s 
power over the other(s).39  
The characteristics of the Zimbardo study, compared with that of 
Milgram, was of course that the former to greater extent was designed 
and carried out in a manner close up to a real situation. No wonder 
then, the experiment collapsed after only 6 days - although was 
planned to last for two weeks - mainly because very quickly 
disturbing personal traits came to the surface by those characters 
occupying the role of prison guard during the experiment. The logic of 
this, of course, turns out to be: Man himself must be considered the 
container of evil at starting point, but these traits of character are 
usually hidden and repressed, however are admitted entrance or 
brought to surface due to specific circumstances and situations. 
Notice, however, this argument logically means that some “inner” or 
psychological quality has to be included. Even if the variable of 
situation itself is considered “total”, meaning its effects pull through 
in every case, the dimension of personality could not be ruled out. The 
very factor of situation has to operate on “something” to manifest 
itself, and that “something”, taking for granted the situational effect 
39 This provoked many believing social psychology itself being guilty of 
trivializing evil. At least one seems close to denying the existence of “evil” 
itself. As a matter of fact, this position is held by many, for example 
philosophers, who points at the concept of evil as primary not a scientific one, 
but instead created by theology and different moral systems. I shall however, 
argue for the position that the concept of evil itself can or should refer to real 
phenomena and thus there being good prospects for it attaining scientific status.   
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being “complete”, has to be some common or universal conditions 
associated with human personality as such. However, we experience 
the power of situation, being it over all strong, doesn’t seems to hold 
total domination over mind and personality, giving room for more 
differentiated responses to situational influence. In any case, 
personality has to be considered or included, the important part being 
the investigation of which factors is significant or vital in activating 
and arousing aggressive and evil impulses and acting in man under 
certain circumstances. Of course we are not talking of evil individuals 
then, rather situations holding the qualities of making evil manifest. 
During this text, however, I hope to demonstrate that the task of 
making evil understandable and manageable is far that simple. Man 
himself should not be considered a somewhat bare responder of 
external stimuli. Psychological factors of individual character as well 
as biology, has to be included.  
Regarding the Zimbardo experiment, it has often, like the  
Milgram study, been associated with the Arendt phrase “the banality 
of evil”, mainly because it apparently shows how easy it could be  
committing cruel acts, even systematic and on a large scale. This 
conclusion, however, seems dependent of one taking the situation 
doctrine for granted, not say as absolute. As psychologist Arthur 
Miller has stated40, whether one takes a situational or dispositional 
view, we usually find what we are looking for. Simply, you don’t look 
for the same things, don’t ask the same questions and consequently 
end up with different answers. The solution to this should be getting 
into a position enabling us to look for different things and ask different 
questions at the same time, thus enabling us getting at some sort of a 
multiple answer or explanation.   
Zimbardo’s first explanation to the immediate results of the 
experiment was that when humans are given the opportunity to hide in 
the anonymity of a crowd, they lose all restrains and neglect ethical 
norms which they has shown respect in normal life. People in a mob 
change into a lawless herd of animals, lacking control, decency and 
pity. This makes it reasonable talking about some sort of a “collective 
evil” inevitable appearing under certain circumstances. The individual 
may be moral for himself or left alone, but not in a public crowd. The 
40 A. G. Miller (2004), 193 – 239. 
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conclusion would easily be that man’s moral foundation being at least 
a vulnerable one, at worst being built on sand. The traditional and by 
far most comfortable perspective, which most of us prefer believing 
in, is that evil are committed by specific evil-minded persons far 
different from ourselves. But is the whole picture really that simple? Is 
it impossible to detect any further signs concerning the group to be 
able to predict its members turning into violent and cruel characters? 
In 2001 British social psychologists Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander 
Haslam repeated Zimbardo’s experiment.41 Their conclusion was that 
the behaviour of a group is not settled from the start by the very 
organization of different individuals becoming a group. Instead the 
key factor determining the group’s way of behaviour depends on the 
members’ expectations of the social roles they were going to play. If 
they believe they are expected to exhibit authoritarian conduct, at least 
different grades of abuse and harassment are likely to occur. Zimbardo 
himself, for example, encouraged those playing the guards to behave 
“threateningly”. The key to which way a group’s individuals act 
seems to be their preconditioned beliefs about what they ought to do. 
Thus, it seems that it is not the group category itself that shapes 
inhuman behaviour. From history it is well known that massive group 
constellations have made the vehicle for great progress towards social 
progress and humanity, for example mass demonstrations and actions 
originated in the labour movement and charity organisations. 
However, recent history has taught us how dictators of the worst kind 
has used masses and group mentality for destructive causes, precisely 
by inducing certain destructive norms and encouraging the 
discharging of destructive attitudes of different kinds toward outsiders 
or non-members of the group.  
Group dynamics and mass movements thus by itself become 
fascinating, specially related to what kind of extremes to which it 
seems able to push people. Group norms seem capable in inducing 
gruesome acts as well as self-sacrificing behaviour covering heroic 
deeds like risking one’s own life for the rescue of strangers to suicide 
bombers acting for the sake of a “higher” collective goal or ideal. Still 
we are confronted with the problem that not every members of a 
group, at least not at large scale, like whole populations, ethnic 
41 S. A. Haslam & S. D. Reicher (2005) 
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groups, and so on, react in exactly the same way. In fact, individual 
differences occur and sometimes not infrequently.  Zimbardo himself 
states: “We are not born with tendencies toward good or evil but with 
mental templates to do either”.42 This perspective, however, stresses 
what stands for me as the very point, namely that man in fact 
possesses the “inner” capacities of doing precisely the good as well as 
evil. Because of that, I’ll draw the opposite conclusion from 
Zimbardo, namely that inner dispositions counts a lot, depending on 
each individual’s personality and mind. Zimbardo himself admits that 
murderers, for instance, hardly share the same pathological 
background as the average man. Contrary however, this of cause 
differs from the very context and logic behind Zimbardo’s own study 
showing how the extremity itself creates, or provokes evil. 
Zimbardo’s focus, then, is not on cold blooded murderers, but on 
common people whose presumed hidden psychological conflicts are 
activated or permitted come to the surface in the anonymity of a 
group. Nevertheless, this forces us to include the dispositional 
dimension itself, in fact pointing in the direction of psychodynamic 
theory and concepts. Given that we all, deep down, hide or bear the 
urge to do evil or at least follow our bare drives and instincts, this 
forces us to move away from the “us”- them” approach  that radically 
separates “good” and “evil” individuals. But this implicates some sort 
of determinism, not just from the fact that some certain “inner” 
dispositions is taken for granted, but out of the very premises of the 
situation perspective as well. Concerning Zimbardo, this seems to 
implicate a kind of a contradiction as far as he concludes that evil 
behaviour entirely seems to grow out of specific situations, but at the 
same time makes this factor or condition crucial for the very 
appearance of the phenomena. It seems reasonable to assess situations 
at least to a certain degree being a factor appearing more or less by 
coincidence, or in other words: being of a non-determinate kind. On 
the other hand, postulating the strong and almost decisive influence of 
the very factor of situation makes room for nothing else than 
determinism regarding causality and explanation.  That kind of mono-
causality seems to exclude the flexibility, interplay and mutuality 
found in most multi-factorial models of explanation. Zimbardo’s 
42 P. Zimbardo (2004), 26 
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perspective can thus be described as in a way moving from 
“situational influence” to “situational determination”. However, when 
he focuses on minorities and individuals resisting or managing to raise 
above pressures and group norms towards evildoing, in some respect 
he nevertheless turns things upside down by reintroducing the realm 
of internal dispositions or “traits”. But why should he hold any desire 
for focusing on dispositional factors like personal “heroism”43 given 
the way he calls individualistic resistance to destructive group norms 
and behaviours, when already stated personal dispositions not being a 
primary factor concerning behaviour? If such dispositions are not part 
of destructive behaviour, how could they be part of “heroic”?  
After all then, Zimbardo’s concept concerning the origins of evil 
behaviour seems to suffer from some serious shortcomings and 
contradictions. His very language of causality and determinism seems 
inconsistently fused to a language of personal freedom. Perhaps this 
points toward some fundamental incompatible assumptions about the 
very human condition. And why should he, after all, operate out of 
some “either-or” assumption? Perhaps a better or more mature 
strategy would have been making a logic distinction between 
dispositional factors and “trigger” effects, in the next round combining 
them into one general view concerning analysis and method? 
However, in a flight away from disposition, overstating the influence 
of situation, Zimbardo ends up in some sort of determination. Then he 
seems being in need of smuggling freedom back by talking of the 
heroic behaviour of resistance outdoing the power of situation and 
group pressure. If our interior realm is a source and even key factor in 
why we don’t choose evil, then it also seems to be a factoring why we 
do. 
Concerning Zimbardo’s apparently dualistic either-or model in 
the examination of group-evil, psychologists Henri Tajfel and John C. 
Turner later developed a more sophisticated model, incorporating the 
self in the concept of group itself, ending up with a “social identity 
theory”. The point seems to be that the belonging to a group creates 
some sort of a “we feeling” in the individual, a sense of a “collective 
self”. The more a person engages in a collective, the stronger he 
identifies with it and the more he or she accepts the group’s values 
43 Zimbardo, 2004. 
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and norms. According to this model, however, individuals are not 
swept away by group norms itself, but “choose”, out of selfish 
motives, to perceive, think, feel and act in certain common ways in 
accordance with the specific norms enforced. Group norms thus in a 
way become a selfish matter, connected to one’s own identity. The 
conclusion made out of this could be that group behaviour does not 
occur independently or out of itself, due to the situation alone, but are 
brought into action out of certain motives and needs associated with 
the individual’s own self-system or identity. 
Zimbardo, however, makes further affords to save his situation 
doctrine, among other things by escaping the problem of personal or 
dispositional sadism.44 In a discussion of torturers and executioners 
he first points out that this category are mostly considered the very 
example of evildoing due to dispositional and individual causes. But 
Zimbardo stresses the fact that in organizing torture, say done by a 
certain regime or nation for the cause of getting hand of vital 
information, they carefully select out (eliminate) sadistic persons or 
others with assumed psychological pathology, simply because these 
seem less controllable and thus not fit for the job of producing 
information for the authorities. So after all, those doing the torture job 
for say a government, turns out to be quite normal characters which by 
certain circumstances just ended up in the specific situation where 
they by different indoctrinations, group processes and perhaps 
ideological convictions were made fit for their work. Much the same 
goes for say terrorists and suicide bombers, usually considered as the 
typical executioner of “pure evil” on dispositional or personal terms. 
A further study concerning the individuals behind these cruel deeds, 
however, turns out demonstrating that they seemed quite normal in 
every respect, while initially expected to be poor, desperate, social 
isolated, illiterate people without any hope and future; in other words 
true deviators.  
Zimbardo’s at least indirect argument here is that true evildoers, 
who commit evil deeds for its own sake, and out of his or hers 
personal dispositions doesn’t exist – in that way saving his “situation 
thesis” giving no room for personality as casual factor. But this 
argumentation, in my opinion, seems incoherent and even illogical. 
44 See P. G. Zimbardo (2004). 
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First: Zimbardo’s concept of personality, stressing the factor of 
disposition to do something, is basically empirical, simply because it 
is constructed solely for the sake of capturing categorized behaviour 
of a certain kind. An alternative theoretical or structural perspective 
on personality on the other hand, could have made the opportunity of 
explaining evildoing as the result of a combination or “union” of 
personal and situational conditions operating together. Second, and 
this turns out the most important: identifying or pointing at the worst 
examples of evilness carried out by presumed sick persons, then 
stating that in fact that even these misdeeds are committed by normal 
people like you and me, doesn’t eliminate the category of 
dispositional evil itself. Surely, evildoers who commit or carry with 
them their lust to do evil out of pure individual sadism, regardless of 
different situations, exist, the whole point simply being they belong to 
another category than Zimbardo’s torturers and suicide bombers, 
given his empirical analysis regarding these are correct. Zimbardo’s 
strategy of turning down, or at least hushing up the dispositional 
hypothesis regarding evil by eliminating certain adopted categories on 
empirical terms thus fails, simply because it (the strategy) gives no 
room for grasping a totality on instead theoretical terms. 
Philosophically, Zimbardo’s strategy is to be associated with the 
principle of induction, criticized among others by Karl Popper.45                                   
 
 
4                      
 
Social psychologist Roy Baumeister seems convinced that one 
primary reason for human evil is the breakdown of inner controls and 
self-regulation, a breakdown, however often justified by certain 
cultural beliefs. Consequently, it becomes necessary to study evil from 
the perspective of perpetrators. Through the eyes of victims and 
spectators, the perpetrator’s acts looks completely purposeful and 
intentionally vicious according to Baumeister, basically an act of 
moral breakdown. Baumeister himself, however, goes for bracketing 
moral judgements for the sake of psychological understanding. But 
45 In recent years however, Zimbardo himself has asserted that he never was 
denying the existence of genuine evil individuals or characters. 
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according to him, this doesn’t mean that that the case for mortality is 
permanently abandoned. The issue, according to him, is to commit to 
descriptive understanding before one resumes a moral attitude toward 
the behaviour in question. From the view of perpetrators, the vicious 
act is not automatically experienced as one of evil. Contrary, they 
often believe their acts are completely justified. Baumeister himself 
emphasizes that we often prefer or have a strong tendency towards 
regarding evil in some one-sided black-or-white manner, mainly 
because this allows us to separate ourselves completely from foul, 
destructive individuals, from the incarnations of evil itself. The whole 
point here lies in making those characters totally unlike ourselves in 
every respect. We simply cannot tolerate evil to be ordinary. Because 
of that we want evil become a question of pure moral; terrible deeds 
the executioner himself experience as evil because that come to be his 
one and only motive. Evil should immediately announce itself as evil, 
thus making a clear and unquestionable barrier against or own 
normality. Should evil appear in features we may recognize in 
ourselves, it would become deeply disturbing. Baumeister, however, 
states that evil could often come clothed as a “good thing” and that the 
perpetrators of evil often appear as ordinary, well-meaning human 
beings with their own motives, reasons and rationalizations. For 
Baumeister then, if we’ll make it possible to reach at an understanding 
of what evil really is, it seems of particular interest to hear what the 
perpetrators themselves could perhaps tell about their activities and 
motives. This however, is no easy task. Baumeister stresses that 
perpetrators often see themselves as victims; victims of relatives, 
neighbours, authorities and their own fate, for instance. According to 
this he stresses the necessity of a strategy facing the victims, namely 
sympathizing with their part of the story, but in fact without taking the 
victims account as the total, objective truth, particularly when it comes 
to understanding the motives and way of thinking of the perpetrator. 
Baumeister points at victim’s themselves often are in need of making 
their own explanations of what has been done to them and the 
supposed motives behind. What Baumeister wishes to clear up, is that 
there might be nuances in the execution of so called evil. The motives 
behind could be of a different kind, even a reaction to harm and 
injustice previously done to the perpetrator himself. Baumeister has no 
wish in defending immoral and evil acts, but sees the necessity in 
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pointing at the fact that it often could be wrong or even impossible to 
separate pure evil from non-evil. Perhaps in most cases reality may lie 
somewhere in between. However, victims and non-victims may have a 
strong tendency and need for dividing the whole matter of evilness 
and evil vs. kindness into large black-and white categories, what he 
characterizes as “the myth of pure evil”, perhaps  mostly for the 
reason of protecting ourselves psychologically? Furthermore, this 
position has the consequence of perpetuating evil. It becomes in a way 
unchangeable, leaving us with nothing to do to prevent it, except 
tracking down and locking up presumed evil and sadistic individuals, 
and thus being in danger of overlooking both social and individual 
variable circumstances that may cause evil behaviour, but at the same 
time could be prevented if we become aware of it. Indeed, thorough 
evil persons exist, referring to people who out of their very nature 
wishes to harm, hurt and destroy other people, but these people after 
all are rather few, not operating at large scale. Baumeister asserts that 
most evil is committed by common people living ordinary lives, as 
history has shown us. Because of that, it seems impossible to draw an 
absolute line between evil and non-evil persons, an ontological 
demarcation identifying “pure evil”. Evil then mostly appears when 
ordinary people are confronted with or being mixed up in situations of 
a certain kind. This undermines an old and traditionally myth, namely 
that evil itself must be understood as the result and manifestation of 
and inborn sadistic lust to hurt and destroy other people.46 Baumeister, 
however, admits that this myth of pure evil remains popular, even 
though there is a mountain of evidence against it, simply because it is 
more convenient to believe in it. Evil then, always belong to or is 
identified with the “others”, not ourselves or our own group. 
 How, then, does Baumeister account for real destructive 
behaviour? He suggests several different roots of such evil, one 
category being greed, lust, and ambition. Motivation like this involves 
for example instrumental violence, not violence for its own sake. In 
fact regarding this, if violence could be avoided in reaching one’s 
goal, this will be preferred. Violence here seems to be just a casual by-
46 I have no intention here of discussing the argument that evil itself solely has 
its roots in religious mythology of the ultimately evil, namely Satan, and thus 
cannot be said to refer to any real or scientific concept or explanations. 
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product of the prime goal being material gain of some sort, not terror 
itself. On the other hand, perpetrators like this seem willing to go to 
unfortunate ends to get what he or she wants, but not to do evil for 
evil’s own sake.47  
A second category for Baumeister is egotism and revenge. 
Threats to self-esteem often provoke a need for revenge, often 
manifested as forms of aggression and violence. This should however, 
according to Baumeister, not be understood as products of low self-
esteem. The point is not low, or for that matter high self-esteem, but a 
shaky and unstable one. More correctly, however, the greatest danger 
is represented by those with a combination of high and shaky self-
esteem. Baumeister indicates that persons who have a high opinion 
regarding themselves but do not have this view confirmed by 
outsiders, has shown as much more inclined to be violent. The 
explanation of this should be that individuals with an inflated, but 
unrealistic self-esteem will naturally encounter more threats to their 
egos, resulting in a more aggressive and negatively self-asserting 
behaviour towards others and his environment. An unstable egotism 
thus becomes the most dangerous. According to Baumeister, research 
has confirmed his thesis.48 
Another root of evil identified by Baumeister has to do with 
what he categorizes as “true believers and idealists”. These are 
people willing or disposed to committing the worst acts towards 
innocent people following some “higher” ideals or in the name of 
some “holy sake”, that being of a religious or political kind. 
Obviously, group norms will be of crucial importance for this kind of 
“idealistic” evil. In fact the perception of evil is here reversed in that 
the evil doer himself, for example a terrorist, often believes he or she 
in fact is eliminating evil itself, destroying those who are in opposition 
with what is thought of as the “highest truth”, that being “God”, some 
political ideal, system, and so on.49  
47 Let me add, however, that trying to avoid violence should not be understood 
as some sort of concern for the victim’s welfare. Rather, in most cases the 
motive seems to be the perpetrator’s fear of the worse consequences of hurting 
or destroying the victim, as long as this motive is not basic from the start.  
48 For example research on bullying by Dan Olweus. 
49 Below,in the concluding part, I shall further return to the problem of terrorists 
as evildoers. 
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The final root of evil according to Baumeister is sadism, which 
should be understood or interpreted as violence for its own sake, as its 
own objective, in contrast to for example greed and lust where 
aggression occurs as mere instrumental. In the opinion, sadism often 
stands as the very manifestation of evil itself, namely the motive and 
need for hurting others. Here evil seems to be explained by individual 
pleasure. In Baumeister’s opinion sadistic evil is rare, a rather 
marginal phenomena. Nevertheless it is real. Baumeister points out 
that it somewhat seems like the dynamics of addiction. It develops 
some sort of a tolerance for a certain level of pain infliction which 
gradually needs more and more to produce the desired effect on the 
sadist. 
Baumeisters main thesis is that evil is a many-sided matter and 
not to be understood by some single-cause theory. He wants to move 
away from the black-and-white thinking implicated in the “myth of 
pure evil”. In doing this, it also becomes necessary to listen, not only 
to the victims of evil, but also to the perpetrators. But in doing this, he 
in my opinion, moves away or distances himself from a pure social 
and situationalist understanding or concept of evil, instead including 
individual and dispositional factors at different levels. Among other 
things, he doesn’t make affords of escaping the matter of individual 
sadism, like in my opinion, for example Zimbardo does. As far as 
Baumeister is described a social psychologist, I would consider his 
position most valuable, particularly because he seems to incorporate 
or add individual psychological element to his social perspectives.  
 
 
5 
 
The rather specific sort of “provoking” question or assertion, raised by 
social psychological research and theory, was that human evil not that 
much had its origin in isolated cruel individuals different from 
ourselves, but instead seemed to be a product of common and 
“normal” people’s behaviour in certain situations. The alarming 
message to get out of this then, is: given the “right” (or “wrong”) 
circumstances, we can all be brought into a situation which both 
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prompts and motivates us to commit evils acts on both a large and 
small scale.  
Of special interest here is of course modern research in group 
psychology, especially studies on how people behave and change their 
attitudes through group-behaviour compared with acting on pure 
individualistic terms, and attitudes of certain groups against other 
“out-groups” and their members. Muzafer Sherif, Stanley Milgram, 
Philip Zimbardo and others are responsible of classical studies within 
this tradition. Milgram and Zimbardo have been thoroughly discussed 
above. Sherif himself did studies on conflicts between groups in a 
summer camp for boys; or aggressive attitudes and behaviour among 
the boys. (The Robber’s Cave Experiment). The main question from 
start was why conflicts between groups come into being. Here, as in 
experiments of the same kind, the initial procedure was to select out 
individuals with personal problems of any kind, for the purpose of 
cultivating the bare effects of group-interaction. Also, factors like the 
existence of former or established acquaintance among the boys was 
ruled out. A key factor was inducing both a cooperating and 
competitive atmosphere between the groups. The results from these 
experiments indicated how easily inter group conflicts arise and a 
discriminative and aggressive attitude toward out-group is established. 
Subsequent studies have, as indicated, mainly confirmed these results. 
However, to what degree could it, out of these classic studies and 
certain philosophical perspectives, like the Hanna Arendt postulate of 
“the banality of evil”, be concluded that they in fact showed or 
confirmed the same state of matter?  At first sight they seem pointing 
at some basic and general terms concerning behaviour in types of 
situations where power, authority and obedience are at stake. 
However, a closer look at these experiments and views separately, in 
my opinion reveals some significant differences. In Zimbardo’s prison 
study, the subject of aggression initiated in group relations was in 
focus. In the Milgram study, however, aggression hardly represents 
the problem. Instead, the study seems to manifest the all over 
importance of obedience and authority. The Sherif study, on the other 
hand, stressed the importance of competition in initiating aggression 
between members of different groups. Arendt’s concept concerns 
disengagement and thoughtlessness when confronted with large scale 
evil and mass-murder at distance. 
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However, the general significance of group membership is not to 
be neglected. Later studies, to present day, seem to have empirically 
confirmed main conclusions drawn from the classic studies. Recently, 
the concept of “xenophobia”50 has become significant. The concept of 
xenophobia seems linked to or logical connected to the well known 
social psychological concepts of stereotypy, prejudice and 
discrimination. For example, Tajfels and Turners theory of “social 
identity” proved helpful in analyzing and for the understanding of how 
the phenomena of prejudices developed. The theory is partly based on 
our tendency or desire to think highly of ourselves. For the sake of this 
we join different social groups identified as “in-groups”. These could 
be of political, religious, ethnical, national and immediate social kind. 
Then, we tend to think more highly of people in our in-groups than of 
members of strange groups, named “out-groups”, a belief based 
primary on group identity. In addition, a person, or group member, 
tends to experience others in the in-group as similar to oneself, and 
above all, superior to members of other out-groups, concerning for 
example intelligence, kindness, trustworthiness, and so on. The most 
significant point however, is that membership of a specific group 
enables one to perceive their fellow members in a more differentiated 
and nuanced way than foreigners from other groups, in other words: 
more as individuals and humans occupying their own value. Once this 
division of groups, based on one’s own memberships, has been made, 
the inferences and projections begin to occur. Different experiments 
have clearly demonstrated this type of “group logic”, and have further 
demonstrated how easily - and quickly - this ended up in hostile and 
aggressive attitudes and behaviour against members of foreign, but 
often competing groups. The logical consequences of the premises 
stated in the “social identity theory”, seems to be that man are made or 
“constructed” for such social bias by the way we tend to or are “forced 
to” categorize our surroundings.51 On certain circumstances, our 
tendency to discriminate between our own in-groups and strangers in 
50 Derived from the Greek word for stranger and is to be interpreted as or 
associated with fear of and hostility against strange people precipitated as 
“dangerous” in the one way or another.   
51 However, perhaps this should be characterized as a “tendency”, however basic 
it might be, and not “destiny”; which opens up for the possibility of a more 
fundamental alteration of such human tendencies.    
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out-groups can turn into, not just conflicts, but bare hate and serious 
violence. A rather disturbing matter is the apparently accidental 
circumstances by which xenophobia or xenophobic feelings are put 
into action. A couple of public school experiments in the USA pointed 
at the seemingly logical arbitrariness underlying the process itself, the 
most famous of these experiments being the so-called “The Wave” on 
the initiative of teacher Ron Jones in California in the late 1960s. The 
design of the experiment was dividing the students into two competing 
groups, each representing their own ideology and symbols. Almost 
immediate, competition, confrontation and aggression arose. Perhaps 
this could be partly explained by the fact that it was precisely the 
competition between ideologies that was the point of departure. A few 
years later, however, a teacher in Iowa, Jane Elliott, made a somewhat 
corresponding experiment that perhaps in an even more convincing 
way demonstrated how quickly group distinctions are made. She 
simply divided her class into two groups: those with blue eyes and 
those with brown or green eyes. The brown-eyed group then received 
privileges and treats, while the blue-eyed students were denied 
rewards and told they were inferior. Within short time, the previous 
harmonious classroom had been transformed into two hostile camps, 
full of mutual fear and resentment. In 1998 the “Implicit Association 
Test” (IAT) was introduced by Anthony G. Greenwald and his 
colleges of the University of Washington.52 This was considered the 
most prominent method for measuring implicit biases in sorting social 
stimuli into particular categories. Empirical extract from the test 
showed an apparently implicit and strong tendency to associate 
positive words an characteristics to members of our own in-groups, for 
example our ethnic group, and a corresponding tendency to associate 
lesser positive or negative words to members of  other out-groups. A 
famous study by Ross Hammond and Robert Axelrod53 showed a clear 
tendency towards choosing cooperation with members of their own 
ethnic or “colour” group in fulfilling a task, regardless of subjective 
qualities more relevant for the task solving, by members of other 
ethnic groups. This was true both for whites and for example blacks. 
There seems to be a clear tendency to discriminate between people of 
52 A. G. Greenwald, et. al., 1998.  
53 Hammond & Axelrod, 2006.   
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different colours, probably due to a misconception and selective 
misperception deeply buried in our psyche. Studies have further 
shown that at the age of 3 most children already attribute significance 
to skin colour. Recently, brain imaging studies suggest that even 
adults, who claim not to be racists, register skin colour automatically 
and unconsciously.54   
In sum, this tendency to immediately subordinate individuals 
under broader categories and dividing these categories into “in-
groups” and “out-groups” seems more fundamental than just being a 
product of social circumstances, culture or learning. Especially this 
kind of misperception that is drawn along ethnic and racial lines may 
lay the ground or run the risk for further conflicts and even large scale 
evil like mass-murder and genocide. 
 
 
      6  
  
However, despite this focus on biological parameters55, the whole 
point is not moving toward a tendency or conclusion presupposing 
mono-causality. Contrary, my position is rather multi-factorial in 
understanding such a complex phenomena as human evil. In this 
picture, psychological, social and in fact also biological factors has to 
be consider autonomous tendencies interplaying in “creating” or 
constituting the very or real phenomena experienced. The intention 
behind this model is, on my part, avoiding methodological 
reductionism. However, several authors seem not have taken this 
problem or matter into consideration, the result being the dead end 
street of dualism. For example, as mentioned above56, the referred 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman seems like ending up in this position. 
Bauman himself leaves no room for any moral counteracting against, 
54 Which in fact point at a perhaps closer relationship, and perhaps a neglected 
link, between social and biological parameters concerning the matters of 
discrimination, aggression, evil, etc, and in my eyes thus has to become the 
object for further investigations. I will therefore return to the significance of 
biology in the next section or part.  
55 To which I shall return in part III. 
56 p. 51 – 53. 
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or the representation of a bulwark against human evil and genocide, 
originated in for example social structures or circumstances itself. 
According to him, a saving moral are solely originated in what he 
calls a “moral impulse” inside man himself, drawing heavily on moral 
philosophers Emmanuel Levinas. His position represents an ethics of 
“human proximity” and “responsibility”, where the foundation of 
human moral is laid in the close relationship between humans, built 
upon mutual obligation. In Bauman’s eyes, no social arrangement, 
structure or good intention could guarantee for a common moral as a 
secure buffer against human and institutional evil. On the contrary, 
social organisation and socialization seems more likely to do harm to 
the inherent and original moral impulse itself. However, in my 
opinion, the problem with Bauman is that he seems fixed to a mere 
abstract account of Human, neglecting the superior fact that humans 
from the start are embedded in the social itself. The logical 
consequence of this should of course be that social conditions become 
crucial and even deterministic for weather the inherent moral impulse 
could be brought into work. This impulse of course represents some 
sort of a potential, however being in need of nurture from life itself, 
that being social realities, to get into business. So the moral impulse, 
even considered as a fixed universal instinct, demands an identical or 
corresponding social impulse to be put in action, and thus becoming 
object for experience as well as detection through social praxis. 
 A prominent theory possibly capable of transcending this dualism 
is, in my opinion, Freud’s psychoanalysis, dealt with in the first 
section. Basically, this theory deals with “inner” psychic forces and 
conflicts making the ground for human manners and behaviour, that 
being of a moral, evil or another kind. However, I shall assert that 
Freud’s theory presupposes a somewhat dialectic connection between 
the “inner” psyche and the “outer” world, the subject’s social milieu. 
For example, the concept of “internalization”, apparently covering or 
referring to a process of interaction and social influence, but at the 
same time has to be interpreted a an “inner” process of building some 
significant psychic structure in the individual. The crucial matter here 
is precisely that these processes cannot be understood as logical 
separate processes, at least not as real dynamic matters, except on their 
abstract and analytic level. Instead, these “inner” and “outer” 
processes have to be regarded or understood dependant of each other, 
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or parts of each other, referring to one and the same process or 
phenomenon. Consequently, it would be impossible to rule out social 
or interaction factors when dealing with fundamental phenomena like 
personal and social moral and their qualifications, simply because the 
presupposition for the (development and actualization) of the inner or 
personal moral “impulse” or capacity being the social process of 
learning and interaction and vice versa. Actualizing a positive moral, 
or activating the somewhat inherent moral impulse in man, requires a 
certain moralistic social milieu capable of reinforcing these inherent 
capacities in each individual. If one accept the psychodynamic 
assumption of “internalization” as a key factor in explaining the 
process and possibility of socialization, one has to conclude that in 
making socialization successful, not only becomes the process of 
internalization crucial itself, but also what exactly is being 
internalized. In other words, not just the structural capacity itself, but 
also the content of internalization should be of signification. This 
content of cause has to be of a social, cultural or sometimes even of a 
historical kind. Of cause, growing up in a social milieu guarantee for 
socialization and internalization anyway, granted a normal 
development could take place within the individual. The problem 
however, concerning the actualization of moral vs. evil, especially in 
the case of large scale evil executed by authorities in power and 
totalitarian regimes and governments, is that destructive norms, rules 
and ideals are put into power; norms that under the influence of 
propaganda and other mechanisms of socialization could be 
internalized and accepted by the public and average man as the “right” 
moral, consequently leading to the accept of for example mass murder 
and ethnic cleaning being moral acts itself.  
 This, in my opinion, indicates that Bauman’s theory regarding the 
conditions of moral actualization as a significant way of preventing 
evil must be fundamentally wrong. Surely, moral actualisation itself 
stands as the only significant way of preventing evildoing, but 
unfortunately not the way Bauman himself recommend, reducing the 
whole matter to “inner” impulses and by same exercise ruling out 
social or societal moral. Bauman’s view here, however, has to be 
understood in the light of, or in connection with his deeply pessimistic 
perspectives on Modernity and its evolution, a matter not to be 
stressed further here. 
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 In sum, Bauman seems to neglect the inevitable connection, or 
more correct, dialectic relationship between the psyche and the social, 
making a, so to speak, dualistic manoeuvre in logical isolating them 
from each other. He thus becomes incapable in telling us how to 
organize the society so that evil and genocide could be prevented. 
 On the other hand, out of this it must be concluded that it seems 
rather impossible to consider Freud an exclusively individual 
psychological theorist, manly out of my demonstration of the 
indispensable tie between psyche and the social inherent in his theory. 
In fact, Freud’s theory stands, for different reasons, some essential 
features mentioned here, as multi-dimensional, incorporating, or rather 
presupposing both inner dynamic and social relational elements in his 
concept as such. 
   Social elements or the social dimension itself thus becomes 
crucial in understanding human evil as well as moral, however not by 
neglecting, but instead including the influence of psychological and 
biological factors as well. The latter will become the topic of next 
section. The challenge here will be to demonstrate why biological 
factors relevant for understanding social interaction connected to evil 
as well as moral should not be considered as “pure” biology in a rather 
deterministic or one-dimensional manner.                           
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PART III 
Biology 
 
 
1 
 
In recent years biology again has been hot stuff regarding explanations 
of psychological and even social phenomena. However, biological 
explanations always run the risk of scientific reductionism, tending to 
be absolute and deterministic. In that perspective, biology becomes 
some sort of destination, leaving no room for alternatives and radical 
change. My point of view or position here, however, and I assume 
several other theorists’ as well, is a more flexible one, presupposing 
that biological factors and determinants interplay with others of a 
psychological and social kind.  
 Biological and social perspectives and explanations, after all, 
perhaps don’t turn out that antagonistic to each other as it may seem. 
Remember the phenomena of xenophobia, prejudice, stereotypes and 
perceptual biases regarding our non-neutral and selective 
categorisation of people and groups discussed in the previous section. 
Significant studies suggest that these phenomena, all rough social in 
their manifestation, might be of a more inherently biological and 
constitutional kind, or at last containing or being dependent of certain 
biological determinants. Some may say that deep within our sub-
conscious we harbour fundamental contingences for such biases, 
making them unavoidable at even a manifest level. Usually and 
consciously most of us don’t like to admit or perhaps being reminded 
that we somehow share attitudes associated with prejudices, hate and 
disgust against people and groups of another kind, perhaps specially 
members of certain ethnic groups. Usually we prefer to associate that 
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kind of believes with associates of say, fascists, the Ku Klux Klan, the 
Nazis and other racist groups and organisations. But given that we all 
to a certain degree are disposed to that kind “ethnic selection” or 
discrimination, what should that significantly mean in accordance to 
the moral demands inherent in every kind hearted culture and 
democratic society, namely to fight and hold campaigns against such 
ideas? Could it be - in spite of all our good intentions, our moral and 
ethical systems and /Christian) demands of “loving our enemies” and 
“doing on to others what we want them to do on to us” - deep within 
we are bearers of some rudimentary and un-socialized drives and 
forces operating beyond the premises of the intentions of a, say moral 
human community? In my opinion, we cannot escape the appraisal or 
even inclusion of such basic forces and conditions.  
 
 
2 
 
Aggression turns out a significant figure in assessing evil and cruelty. 
Surely, aggression itself doesn’t explain evil. Aggression as such 
should be considered a basic human quality or property, meaning it 
should not logically be considered a human deficiency or some 
“problem” from the starting point.  
 However, aggression itself tends to emerge with many faces and 
in different frames, some to be considered abnormal and pathological 
and others not. Aggression may manifest itself verbal and physical, as 
well as administrative, depending on situational circumstances. A 
significant manner in which aggression shows itself is of cause 
through violence of different kinds. However, violence itself is not to 
be equalized with evil, but has to be considered an unavoidable 
component to it. Let’s start then with a closer look at aggression and 
violence itself. Fundamental disagreement exists of cause among both 
scientists and laymen weather aggression and violence should be 
considered a part of our biological equipment, or to what extent it 
could be understood as mainly learned through certain social and 
cultural inclinations. The rather traditional view represented, in 
different variants, was that aggression generally speaking, was 
inherent in man himself. This view has, in recent years got its 
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renaissance, all rough in new and up to date versions, which it will be 
necessary to return to later. However, I don’t here intend to go further 
into theories of aggression itself, but instead look at perhaps the most 
significant and troublesome consequences of aggression, namely 
violence, which bring us closer to the numerous facet problems of 
evil. Let me again make it clear: violence itself is not to be considered 
equal to evil, but will in most cases become an integral part of or 
manifestation of it. 
 One of the most premature efforts to connect human violence of 
a malignant kind, say in criminal behaviour, with biological 
dispositions, was the work of Cecare Lombroso. His approach was 
named the “science” of phrenology, trying to demonstrate how 
different areas of the brain gave rise to different human attributes, 
again showing as certain indentations on the cranium. This again 
opened up for the prediction of a person’s character. Specific features 
in the face as well as the head gave crucial clues about, for example, 
antisocial and criminal behaviour. According to the theory, these 
features or “stigmata” were physical traits reminiscent of earlier stages 
of human development which however could reappear spontaneously 
after many generations of genetic invisibility. Eventually, or after a 
while, Lombroso’s theory fell out of favour. The connection between 
scull/facial features and at tendency towards criminal and antisocial 
behaviour was shown to be entirely spurious.  
However, different views, connecting antisocial and aggressive 
behaviour to biological factors continued mobilizing support. Even 
before Lombroso there was some evidence that certain regions of the 
human brain were intrinsically linked with aggression. The history of 
Phineas Gage, who in 1848, due to an explosion, got his head 
penetrated by a steel bar, is well known. The bar went through the 
frontal part of his brain, destroying most part of the front left side. He 
survived the serious accident, being able to talk and walk, but his 
emotional life seemed dramatically altered or destroyed. From being a 
calm, sensitive and respectful person, he now became aggressive, 
impulsive and rude. Later we learned to know that a region at the front 
of the brain known as the prefrontal cortex was disrupted by Gage’s 
accident. This region plays a key role in our emotional processing and 
appears to have an important part in mediating aggressive reactions. 
83 
 
  Modern research involving scanning brain activity has tried to 
reveal whether there could be a specific physical change or an unusual 
structural feature that causes one person to be more violent and 
aggressive than another. While it doesn’t appear to be a specific 
“violent centre” in the brain, the amygdala, the almond-shaped 
communication centre in the heart of the limbic system, does appear to 
initiate feelings of fear and aggression under certain circumstances. 
The prefrontal cortex on the other hand, is wired directly to the 
amygdala and seems to function as a “brake” in controlling and 
modifying aggressive impulses when mediating the signals from the 
lower brain regions. Specific studies concerning violent criminals, for 
example convicted murderers, have to a certain degree shown 
abnormal functions in both the frontal cortex and deeper brain areas 
such as the amygdala. Some other studies assessed groups of 
individuals known to have violent tendencies and found that their 
prefrontal areas were much smaller when compared to other normal 
“equipped” individuals. However, certain care must be taken 
regarding this kind of evidence. The obvious question is (of course): 
Are these signs and clues biological causes of violence or mere 
consequences of some other unknown factors? For instance, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that other biological factors are at work. 
Hormone levels in the brain appear to affect levels of aggression. High 
levels of testosterone seem to influence the intensity of one’s 
aggressiveness, levels that vary considerably between individuals. 
They also fluctuate significantly depending on the individual’s day-to-
day conditions and circumstances. Generally, testosterone levels vary 
in line with general competitiveness. For example, there is found 
significant variations among persons within different occupations and 
professions, one study reporting the highest testosterone levels in trial 
lawyers in the US. Some studies focusing on prison inmates also 
indicated that men with the highest testosterone concentration were 
more likely to have committed violent crimes. Another suggestion is 
that low levels of, or a limited capacity to absorb serotonin, the 
primary indicator of depression, into the brain cells, correlates with 
increased aggression. Serotonin itself seems to have a calming effect 
on human behaviour, reducing the level of violence. This again leads 
to the focus of positively genes factors that contribute to or control the 
levels of neurotransmitters. However, the research done on these 
84 
 
topics, doesn’t show that the referred biological abnormalities itself 
cause violent aggression. On the other hand, it seems fair to conclude 
that some of these studies at least seem to reveal that biological factors 
play some role in the causalityy of violence, but that that role still is 
very much in doubt. The status concerning biological factors, like 
different significant social factors, seems to be that no single factor 
itself are causing manifest behaviour, but at least serves as an 
important marker of such behaviour. The most common and 
reasonable conclusion appears to be that the link between biology and 
violence is not direct and casual, but indirect and mediated by 
numerous social and psychological factors. An even more significant 
biological correlate linked to antisocial behaviour is low resting heart 
rate. Several studies have clearly indicated that problem children and 
some criminals tend to have significant lower pulses than do well-
behaved and adjusted counterparts. The theory in front here is that a 
slower heartbeat probably reflects more fearlessness and under-
arousal. However, other studies have failed to find abnormal heart 
rates in for example psychopaths. 
 So, despite the efforts to understand the neurological processes 
involved in aggression and violence, none of these projects has led to 
any solid, not say definitive, conclusions. Even if some significant 
differences concerning structural and functional levels of different 
brain processes can be detected, one cannot be sure weather these are 
results of, say an already existing disposition for violence and 
aggression. It is now well known that the development of the brain 
itself proceeds, in part, according to and intervened by the social 
environment the child is a part of and grows up in.  The quality of 
upbringing, relationships and emotional experiences stimulates the 
development of the brain. Important physical changes in the brain can 
depend on external stimuli during crucial periods of development. It is 
not a matter of some automatic and solely inherent process going on 
inside the brain itself.  
 The task of separating environmental and biological factors thus 
becomes notoriously difficult. It becomes rather difficult whether to 
decide, or separate casual from non-casual factors with regard to basic 
biological processes, the latter being of either an effect- or non-related 
kind. However, this shouldn’t prevent us totally from including 
biological processes in our efforts explaining phenomena of 
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aggression and violence. The dimension of biology, as well as that of 
sociology and psychology, will have to, viewed in isolation, be 
understood as abstractions, containing its own logical and casual 
force, but left unexplained regarding how each of  these internal forces 
manage to manifest themselves during real interactional processes, in 
confrontation with the others. That again, leaves us with a certain kind 
of insecurity with regard to causality itself, perhaps opening up for a 
more interactional view.57  
 A perhaps more abstract and theoretical angle of incidence 
regarding the link between biology and say aggression, is the drive or 
instinct hypothesis.58 From animal studies it is possible to identify a 
distinctive drive for aggression necessary for survival, for example the 
struggle for food and space and fights over mates. But what about man 
himself? Surely, it doesn’t seem difficult to identify aggressive 
tendencies and behaviour in humans. The most common matter 
brought into question, is however, how far there exist some specific 
biological drive or instinct for aggression, or to what extent it must be 
considered a product of specific socialization and traumatic 
experiences from life itself. From the starting point, the obvious 
counter-question seems to be: After all, why should man, as creature 
itself, be different from other high ranking creatures? As with our 
instinct for sexual reproduction, competition and survival, a human 
instinct for aggression and violence, maintained and developed 
through generations, seems reasonable to postulate.59 Proponents of 
the instinct hypothesis will stress the point that the existence of an 
instinct for aggression and violence was crucial for our early ancestors 
in order to survive, while hunting for food, combating deadly enemies 
and fighting for the necessary resource of territory. If violence itself 
has always been necessary for our survival and considering the fact 
than man has survived for hundred thousands of years, then violence 
perhaps has to be programmed into our genes. The idea of man as an 
aggressive creature by nature, apt to violent behaviour, is not any 
57 I shall return to this specific and significant matter, in fact already introduced 
in the text, later, by me anticipated as rather two-dimensional.  
58 It seems however, necessary to make a theoretical distinction between “drive” 
and “instinct”. The mix up of these two concepts has been the source of much 
confusion, from the days of Freud up to present. 
59 I shall return to the specific evolutionary aspects of this later. 
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brand new idea conceived by modern science. It also occupied 
medieval philosophy, foe example Thomas Hobbes. In 1651 he 
published his famous work, Leviathan, stressing the problem of 
controlling the natural aggressive drives and impulses in man, 
preventing it, in some State of Nature, from culminating into a 
destructive fight, each singe individuals against the others. Hobbes 
philosophically constructed some sort of a hypothetical agreement 
made up by us out of an interest to make order and cooperation, a 
Social Contract, to prevent this. In replacing the State of Nature with 
this Social Contract, the individuals voluntarily gave up part of their 
freedom for the sake of everybody’s comfort, security and survival. 
Hobbes’ reconstruction of this Social Contract is solely hypothetical 
and abstract and critics has stressed that it could never had taken place 
in real life, because what identifies or characterise humans from the 
very point of departure is that it also is a social creature bound to 
intimate cooperation, making no room for a original stage of pre-
sociality and totally individualistic isolation. Hobbes’ perspective thus 
appears to be too abstract to reveal or cast any significant light on 
human nature itself. The stressing point here, however, should be the 
question whether humans can be said to hold natural aggressive 
impulses or drives, or to what extent the different kinds of violent 
behaviour frequently observed in man, from warfare to criminal acts, 
is mere products of social stimuli and learning. This question, 
however, has not just appeared a scientific matter, but an ideological 
and political as well. If we accept the idea of an original aggressive 
instinct or drive in man, it will put us into a position were it perhaps 
becomes difficult to raise arguments for a more harmonic and peaceful 
society and world as well. The superior work for international peace 
taking place in organisations and nations all over the world may be 
totally in vain, if man’s basic nature after all is to do violence to each 
other. In 1986 a group of scientists gathered in Seville under the 
auspices of UNESCO to mark the International Year of Piece.60 The 
main purpose was to discuss the causes of violence and warfare and 
draw up a manifesto on the subject. The scholars were drawn from a 
numbers of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, neuroscience and zoology. Surprisingly, regarding the 
60 Ref. Winston (2002). 
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rather controversial issue in management and the widely divergent 
background of expertise dealing with the theme, the assembly came 
up with a rather homogenous and clear conclusion, specified into an 
assembly of central statements. Initially, at the end of the discussions, 
it simply made the statement that it was “scientifically incorrect to say 
that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our ancestors”. 
This was surprising, looking like making a rather beforehand 
conclusion. Indeed, the further argumentation concluded that “war is 
biologically possible”, however then stating: “but not inevitable”, the 
argument here being that this is “evidenced by its variation in 
occurrence and nature over time and space”, an additional emphasis 
laid upon the fact that there are cultures which have not engaged in 
war for centuries, contrary to cultures which indeed have frequently 
waged war, at least in periods. Further statements from the 
conferences concluded for example that it was “scientifically 
incorrect” to say: that war or any other violent behaviour is 
“genetically programmed” into the human “nature”, that except for 
rare pathologies the genes do not produce individuals necessarily 
predisposed to violence, that human have a “violent brain”, that in the 
course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive 
behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour – and: “How we act 
is shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized”. 
 No doubt, the Seville meeting was reflecting the political, 
cultural and ideological trends of its time. They consequently staked 
to environmental explanations. The logic, obviously founded in an 
aura of political optimism, seemed clear: Social conditions can be 
dealt with. Biology is more of a natural kind and cannot. The all 
through repeated phrase: “It is scientifically incorrect” can’t be taken 
face value, but is presented in a more suggestible manner with the 
intension of backing up one particularly political message. A problem 
for the Seville arrangement was naturally that the statement: “how we 
act is shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized” appear 
at least to be inaccurate, but probably incorrect. This is primary due to 
the fact that it is solely based on a simple version of empiricism 
(mixed up of cause with political-ideological convictions) were for 
example more holistic theoretical reflections are not included. At 
least, the conclusions should have incorporated some hypothesis 
concerning intervening biological determinants. But this would 
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perhaps intervene with the political aspects of the message. Although 
it seems true that “biology does not condemn us to war” it 
nevertheless seems plausible to imagine that it on specific conditions 
can contribute to it, for example in the brutal ethnic wars that we have 
witnessed the last decade. However, perhaps this do not allow us to 
conclude that there exist some dispositions to violence and war in 
certain groups, nations and the like, but that any such dispositions 
exist as part of human equipment in general, waiting for the proper 
circumstances to manifest itself.61  
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Before turning back to Freud and psychoanalysis, let’s reflect further 
the idea of a disposition to aggression and violence as immanent in the 
human creature. The point of view here is that aggression itself 
constitutes the normal and perhaps necessary equipment in man and 
thus should not be considered pathological in itself. Even violence, 
how negative it might be experienced, could not automatically be 
considered pathological or evil. Rather it is the manner, the meaning 
or context in witch violence itself is carried out that decide how “evil” 
or senseless it should be considered. In this perspective, even non-
violent acts could be considered evil. Violence, for example could be 
understood as a rather spontaneous reaction to frustration, provocation 
and so on. However, aggression should generally be considered a 
necessary, though not sufficient fundament for malice and evilness. 
This should lead us to a better understanding of how, under certain 
psychological and social conditions, aggression and violence itself 
take the forms of sadism and cruelty, true markers of what should be 
considered as evil. Evil, however, seems to have another significant 
source than bare, or even first and foremost aggression and violence, 
namely administration in the heartless and insensitive meaning of the 
word. This of cause was one of the themes in the discussion of 
Eichmann and the Arendt thesis of “the banality of evil”. I don’t 
consider this thesis adequate, mainly because it is not digging deep 
enough concerning the human psyche and motives, so to say, though it 
61 Which bring up some strong associations with for example psychoanalysis.  
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would probably be of significance regarding specific social frames for 
certain human acts itself. The importance here lies in the fact that it 
clearly demonstrates the fatal lack of empathy found in for example 
bureaucratic nazi-officials administrating deportations of Jews and 
running death camps.62 
 In my opinion then, some basic and original human capabilities, 
not to say primary and “unavoidable” qualities, being part of man 
itself and perhaps developed through evolution, must be included in 
the discussion.63 But even the Freudian postulate of drive becomes 
interesting. Freud was dealt with in Part I. It is important to notice that 
the Freudian concept of “drive” covers more than just a biological 
matter. Usually the drive (or “Trieb” in original German language) 
refers to “instinct”, the organism’s urge for specific behaviours, either 
manifested as bare impulses or attached to different situations. While 
these impulses and tendencies seem rather deterministic in lower 
developed creatures, they seem rather absent in humans, meaning 
they, if they exist at all, can be reflected upon, be manipulated and 
perhaps distorted or misrepresented.64 The consequence of this should 
be that drive, as a specific human variable, has to be considered as 
something more than just biology, for example adding a psychological 
component to it. The psychological factor in the evil-dispute thus 
becomes significant. 
 At present, one of the most prominent subjects or themes 
concerning violence and aggression as basically biological variables, 
is the focus upon the so called “mirror neurons”. In the early 1990s, 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues was starting getting some insight 
in some brain mechanisms or neurons perhaps important for feelings 
or attitudes like empathy and what have for example been clinical 
categorized as “Theory of Mind”, referring to our capability to gain 
empathic insight into other humans emotions, motives and way of 
thinking, the possibility of taking the mental perspective of the other. 
Shortly, mirror neurons refer to neurons that respond to, or being able 
to respond directly a particular kind of gesture in, so to say, the same 
62 The significance of empathy will be further considered.  
63 The discussion of biological factors of cause has to include genes and 
evolution, witch will be demonstrated.  
64 Note the Freudian concept of sexual repression. 
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direction. This makes for example the activity of the neurons of the 
self and those of others being directed at the same goal. Biologically it 
was discovered, for example out of experiments with monkeys that 
these specific neurons in the prefrontal cortex responded when the 
creature, say, grasped a peanut, but in the same way when it watched 
another monkey grasping it. The next step after the monkeys was of 
course to discover whether humans possessed similar mechanisms in 
their brains. Subsequently, brain imaging studies showed that mirror 
neurons apparently do exist in the human brain as well. In humans too, 
experiments has shown similar patterns of brain activities between 
“doing” and “watching”. Mirror neurons then seem to allow us to 
recognize and interpret another person’s actions, but perhaps also 
one’s feeling and experiences. A crucial question in line with this is 
whether mirror neurons have a role to play beyond that of just 
mentally imitating and then replicating actions or speech of another 
person. Could they perhaps also play some role in a more “deep” form 
of empathy, which means putting oneself emotionally in the place of 
another? According to the theory of mirror neurons, watching another 
person’s immediate suffer, say, being the witness of him or her having 
a tooth pulled out or having a needle jabbed in his arm, gives us some 
sort of wincing too. Being able to replicate the simple movements of 
another person, it follows that we should also be able to replicate the 
sense of pain, as well a pleasure, in them to. But what happens if a 
person in a way gets so used watching other people’s suffering and 
pain that he gets someway desensitized, or simply lack the equipment 
of mirror neurons from the beginning? Under these circumstances 
some rather terrifying perspectives perhaps become actualized. 
Perhaps such people could easily be recruited for torturing other 
people. Research has revealed that being willing to commit torture 
doesn’t necessary mean that one should be a sadist. Rather, 
“professional” torturer often turn out to be ordinary people willing to 
fulfil the job they are told to do without raising questions. Not to say 
that there should be no cruel sadist among torturers, just that this 
doesn’t seems being a necessary “qualification” for practising this 
profession in a proper way. On the other hand, no clear evidence for 
such clear cut psychological desensitization seems apparent. Of cause, 
you could, for different reasons, try to hide your reactions for some 
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reason, for example from the motivation of not making people close to 
you worried or anxious. 
 However, it has been suggested that mirror neurons might be the 
very key in understanding the emotional state of mind of another 
person. In some sense, this ability plays a crucial role for our 
psychological and social “survival” and our capabilities of taking care 
of other people; qualities that are perhaps taking for granted among 
near related. Martin Hoffmann65 has constructed a theory of the 
human development of empathy, based on four stages. Hoffman 
reports that so-called “global empathy” can be observed in the very 
first stage of development. Observations show that toddlers, even in 
the first year of life, start crying when observing other infants crying 
or apparently feeling bad. Although there are certain difficulties or 
obstacles connected to categorizing this as “empathy” per se, it fits 
well to the very idea, or perhaps more correctly, detection of mirror 
neurons whose functions were exactly getting humans equipped with 
the abilities to detect and respond to reactions and emotions of fellow 
humans, and thus putting oneself emotionally in the place of another.  
 With this in mind, what could be the connection between the 
idea of mirror neurons and evil? Obviously, if our capabilities for 
feelings of empathy itself and our capabilities of giving empathic 
responses are due to certain neurons in our brain, what about the 
situation when these neurons are set out of function, for example are 
not being activated, damaged or simply are nonexistent? Neurologists 
and neuropsychologists point out that the very connection between to 
areas of the brain, the area that directs the capacity for rational 
reflection and control, the frontal lobes and some areas within the 
termed limbic system, connected with our ability to produce feelings, 
more specific the already referred to amygdala, is crucial concerning 
our ability to “mirror” the feelings and emotional state of other people, 
a condition for “turning on” or activate our capacities of say altruism 
and empathy. Or more correctly, the neurological connections referred 
to, constituting the very basis for these conditions (empathy) itself. 
This means, literally speaking, that experiencing another person 
suffering or getting hurt, feels like being hurt ourselves. Seeing other 
people suffer make us suffer too. Where these neural connections, 
65 Hoffman, 1982, 1984. 
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however, being undeveloped, damaged, or absent in the one way or 
another, the mirror neurons are made incapable doing their job 
reflecting other people’s emotions. Now, the story behind these neural 
mechanisms or connections is one of human development, or certain 
aspects of it. Toddlers and newborns, for example, seem incapable to 
mirror other person’s feelings and thus don’t feel like being hurt 
themselves when experiencing their suffering.66 According to plain 
psychology of development, not before the age of three years does the 
child start to experience or show more mature signs of paying 
attention to other individual’s emotional states. Neurologists usually 
assert that not before the age of six are the neural connections needed 
for empathic reflections of other individual’s emotional states fully 
developed.67 This constitutes the foundations of moral and conscience. 
At this phase, the frontal lobe then fully connected with the limbic 
system, the centre or reservoir for feelings. During puberty these 
capabilities are getting even more advanced. Parallel to this, theories 
and research and development have for a long time informed us how 
human egocentrism little by little is being replaced by a more 
decentred, flexible and real perspective of the world and other people 
taking all elements, including the “perspective of others, into account. 
Now, when these processes are denied taking place for different 
reasons, fatal consequences regarding the individual’s moral 
behaviour, leading to what would be characterized as “psychopathic 
behaviour, or like that, becomes threatening. The process of 
connection between the frontal lobe and limbic system has its time, 
meaning, if obstruction of some kind occur during the sensitive period 
for construction, should later make it rather impossible to start and 
develop the process as such. This is plain theory, based on logic of 
development itself, meaning that certain processes can take place 
exclusively through stimulation in sensitive periods or phases. The 
conditions for a healthy “full-grown” socialisation, moral, conscience 
and the capability for taking care of and helping other humans, for 
example, will be absent, due to the fact it never had the change to get 
66 However, Hoffman’s theory, referred, claims that some sort of empathy 
indeed are present in the toddler from the very first year of life.  
67 This of cause may be disputed. 
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into business, meaning getting developed.68 The very product of this 
deficiency, then, should be a human character traditionally 
characterized a “psychopath”. We all know what this means; the 
psychopath doing evil deeds, out of motives like the need for power 
and control over others, personal greed and lust, sadism or lack of 
empathy with victims of mass murder, and so on. All this could be 
concluded out of the possible logic of structural failure within 
neurobiology itself. It also, however, seems necessary to point to the 
fact that biological and social factors to a large extent interact in the 
very process where malformation concerning the mirror neurons and 
its functions is taking place. To conclude: Mirror neurons themselves 
could be absent or non-existent from the start, concerning the 
individual’s neurological equipment, or possibly underdeveloped due 
to specific and fatal circumstances having their background in the 
person’s milieu or/and history. 
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However, biology itself could be the source of further determinants 
leading to different kinds of evil behaviour, say discrimination 
between groups and group members, mass hate, ethnocentrism, racism 
and so on. A key-concept regarding these affairs should be prejudice. 
A more recently introduced term associated with this matter, as 
already dealt with in part II, should be xenophobia.69 Starting with 
focusing on the social itself, or social psychological dimension of the 
case, we seem to have a tendency in dividing the world, meaning other 
people, or strangers into rude categories of “us” and “them”. Recent 
research however, has concluded this tendency not to be solely 
categorized a social matter. Tests and scientific methods measuring 
68 Of cause, these failures may be due to different causes, for example 
socialization itself, conditions of upbringing or other factors in the social 
environment. The point here however, being that neurobiology itself constitutes 
some basic quality in the very process of realization of these psychological 
properties.  
69 Derived from the Greek word for ”stranger”. Here we’ll deal with the 
supposed biological sides or dimensions with it.  
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human attitudes across situations, culture, social status and so on, have 
revealed people generally unwittingly hold an astounding assortment 
of stereotypical beliefs and attitudes about (alien) social groups: black 
and white, female and male, elderly and young, gay and hetero, fat 
and thin, different nationalities, ethnic groups and so on. Although 
these implicit biases seem to inhabit us all, we certainly vary when it 
comes to going into the particulars and matters of degrees, depending 
on a number of factors, for example: our own group membership, the 
contours of our everyday environment, our conscious desire to avoid 
bias and perhaps unconscious biases due to inner unsolved conflicts 
linked to certain drives of say aggression. For example, research tends 
to demonstrate that about two thirds of whites have an implicit 
preference for whites over blacks. Our proclivity too, so to say, form 
“in groups” based on crude markers, ranging from skin colour to 
clothing styles, this also including groups from racist organisations to 
inner city gangs, football hooligans and “cool” groups of stylish 
teenagers.  Now, the worst problem related to this doesn’t seem to be 
certain extremist groups or organisations and their activities, although 
these certainly represent a huge problem for those getting confronted 
by them, but perhaps the more fundamental and underlying problem 
revealed in recent studies, namely man’s rather general or universal 
tendency to discriminate between groups, ruled by the principle “us” 
contra “them”. 
 Surely, this seems to be a matter for social studies and has also, 
from that point of view, been dealt with in part II. At the moment, I 
will go on deepening some significant biological aspects concerning 
this topic, even though, as pointed out, this should as well be 
considered a social and interpersonal matter.70 The biological case for 
analyzing phenomena like discrimination, xenophobia and 
ethnocentrism should in a way move beyond for example Turner and 
Tajfels perspective, having its basis in groups and our urges for social 
identity. But moving “behind” should not mean “replacing”, but rather 
focusing on another source adding to or fitting into a totality or 
network of explanations or causality.  
70 It should, above all, be in accordance with my general and meta-theoretical 
view claiming that the different levels of analyses should be regarded as 
complementing each other.   
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 Regarding the idea or perspective of “in-groups” and “out-
group”, being in accordance with social psychological research, it has 
been pointed out, from the biological camp, that even our basic visual 
perceptions are skewed toward our own in-groups. Many studies seem 
to have confirmed that people more readily remember faces of their 
own “race” or ethnic group71 than those of other groups. In recent 
years scientists have begun to probe the neural basis for this rather 
qualitative phenomenon, often termed “the same-race memory 
advantage”. Neurological experiments using so called functional 
magnetic resonance (fMRI) imaging to track down people’s brain 
activity while they viewed series of white and black faces revealed 
individuals exhibiting greater activity in a brain area involved in face 
recognition when they viewed faces of their own “racial” group than 
when they were gazing at faces of a different “race”. The 
identification with a group on neurological and visual terms appears to 
occur astoundingly quickly. Another, perhaps opposite point 
concerning brain activity and visual recognition is that some implicit 
biases appear to be rooted in strong emotions. Measures of white 
people’s brain activity as they viewed series of white and black faces 
showed that black faces, compared with white ones, triggered greater 
activity in the mentioned amygdala, a brain structure associated with 
vigilance and sometimes fear. The effect was in fact most pronounced 
among people who demonstrated strong implicit racial bias. Studies 
of Elizabeth Phelps have also shown that those individuals whose 
amygdala was most activated also scored highest on standard tests for 
racial prejudice.72 Psychologist Jennifer A. Richeson and colleges 
suggest that for example American historical and cultural stereotypes 
traditionally have been linking specific young black men with crime, 
violence and danger, stereotypes so robust that our brains 
automatically give preferential attention to blacks as category, like 
threatening animals and situations.73 Out of this one should however 
notices that these neural reactions above all should not be considered 
an exclusively biological process. On the contrary, the whole point 
71 Depending of cause of there being clear visual markers dividing the different 
groups, for example skin colour.  
72 Phelps, 2006. 
73 Note for example Richeson & Trawalter, 2008.  
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seems to be that cultural – and therefore potential changeable – 
determinants play the crucial role here, activating some basic 
neurological mechanisms and patterns, originally developed for 
protection.            
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) referred to in part II, points 
in the same direction regarding the rather intrinsic tendency to divide 
people into antagonistic “us” and “them” groups attaching negative 
biases of prejudice and even racism to the “out-group” when skin 
colour or ethnicity is on the agenda. Even adults who claim not to be 
racists and most children down to 3 years old seem to have certain 
inherent preferences for registering skin colour automatically and 
unconsciously.74 Baron and Banaji75 have shown that full-fledged 
implicit racial bias emerges by age of six and - most disturbing - never 
to retreat. Baron concludes that the cognitive and perhaps neurological 
filters by which people perceive the world, are present very early, and 
correspondently consolidated.  
However, these arguments concerning race, skin colour and 
neurological based perception should attract our intention. In the next 
passage I shall deal with the subject of genes and evolution and their 
significance for perhaps both aggression, discrimination, 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia and other related phenomena of what 
could be considered elements concerning our subject in front: evil. Let 
me just anticipate one single matter here. A significant argument 
concerning for example evolution should be that certain traits and 
dispositions and their genes behind, shown to secure the individual’s 
adaption to his or her milieu, will tend to survive through generations. 
The inherent and biological determined tendency to discriminate 
between say white and black faces, supporting for example racism, 
then should be considered a product of such evolution. However, one 
can hardly imagine that our species has evolved to see the world in 
terms or categories of black and white. After all, our ancestors, living 
in small and many ways isolated groups concerning ethnicity and race, 
would normally not have met people whose skin was a different 
colour from their own. This just to note that the argument based on 
74 Notice part II. 
75 Baron & Banaji, 2006. 
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evolution in explaining, say perceptual discrimination has to be of 
another more sophisticated kind, which I shall return to.                                   
                                    
 
 
5  
 
The focus on violence, or the disposition to violence, has been that of 
consider it pathological, meaning it has no positive, rather just 
negative role to play regarding human interplay or the attention to 
human needs. In recent years, however, the subject of genes and 
evolution has become significant, not just connected to the 
violence/aggression question, but to the empathy/moral debate as well. 
Regarding violence, it should also be regarded as an adaptive form of 
behaviour76, which in turn makes it necessary to make nuances 
regarding violence’s connection to evil. Here, the study and 
significance of genes and evolution becomes significant. The question 
however, to what extent violence should be considered adaptive or 
pathological, has to take into consideration the historical and cultural 
milieu in which the violent behaviour or attitude occur. I shall return 
to this in the further.  
 The study of genes itself has gone on for decades, both scientific 
and in more speculative ways, long before the question of evolution 
came on the agenda. First, the idea that a disposition to violence is not 
itself a natural trait in man, but a certain kind of pathology, has been 
around for many years. The inclination of violence beyond that of, say 
proper reasons like self-defence, extreme provocation, and so on, is 
considered a perhaps pathology or psychiatric disease like for example 
schizophrenia and depression.77 In handling violence separated, as a 
76 For example in defending territory, mates and food. 
77 The former diagnosis of  ”psychopathy”, in recent years named “dissocial or 
antisocial personality disorder”, may of course seem relevant or adjacent here, 
but beware that this diagnoses also include traits like, among others: “callous 
unconcern for others”, “attitudes of irresponsibility”, “disregard for social 
norms, rules and obligations”, “incapacity to maintain enduring positive 
relationships”, “incapacity to experience guilt”. However, this clinical and 
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problem itself, isolated from the adaptive-pathology difference, the 
question of the role of chromosomes is a rather traditional one, like the 
matters of brain structures and hormone levels dealt with earlier. Not 
surprisingly, men have been considered more violent than woman, due 
to their specific chromosome equipment. In that case, violence should 
be created in all men, at least existing as some tendency. The fact is 
that two chromosomes determine our sex. All eggs contain just one X 
chromosome, while sperm can carry either an X or a Y chromosome. 
On fertilization, when fusion occur, all normal embryos will receive 
either an XX, and so become female, or an XY, and thus become 
male, as their twenty-third chromosome pair. So everyone has at least 
one X chromosome, and women have one X from each parent. For 
males, the X chromosome has to come from the mother. Now, the 
case is that the X chromosome plays host to genes that have a huge 
effect to one’s behaviour and personality. The so called Turner’s 
Syndrome, a rather uncommon genetic disorder, is caused by a 
missing X chromosome and afflicting only girls. However girls born 
with this syndrome seem often relatively normal, even if some 
significant physical shortcomings are present. Another significant trait 
of character, however, is their inability in learning social skills and 
they tending to be more disruptive, aggressive and generally anti-
social. They often are being characterized as acting like badly behaved 
boys. It has been discovered that this largely depends on that they 
have ended up with one single X chromosome from their mother, 
while missing that from the father. Researchers believe that there are 
genes responsible for modulating behaviour on the X chromosome 
and those genes causing the anti-social behaviour are imprinted and 
thus particularly active on the maternal X chromosome.78 According 
to the researchers, in a girl with a normal complement of X 
chromosomes, any anti-social tendencies would be countered again by 
genes on the paternal X, but girls with Turner’s with just the single 
maternal X are lacking that brake on their behaviour. 
 Then, what should this tells us about the role and significance of 
the X chromosome in normally developed children? One should have 
diagnostic description may seem plausible and relevant for the final discussion 
or conclusion with regard to evil itself.  
78 Referred from Winston, 2002. 
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in mind that most girls have the maternal and the paternal X, whereas 
all boys have just the maternal X. Boys therefore, have the anti-social 
maternal genes without the paternal X “brake”. In other words, this 
makes most girls nicer and less violent than boys, except for example 
those with the Turner’s, and boys should be more programmed to anti-
social behaviour of different kind, for example violence, aggression, 
etc.79, than girls, which makes sense from empirical material and daily 
experiences too.  
 What should this tells us? Surely, not that human of both sexes 
are pre-programmed robots solely ruled by genes. Fortunately humans 
are not just biological determined. They are necessary also social 
creatures, product of their environment, socialization and upbringing. 
It is, however, a fact that boys are many times more likely than girls to 
have learned aggressiveness from their parents and other significant 
people around influencing them. But it also turn out to be the case that 
it is difficult to separate nature and nurture, except in extraordinary 
instances like for example the Turner. Upbringing and socialization 
play a significant part in the construction of the individual’s behaviour 
repertoire. Given this fact, it seems obvious that boys more likely than 
girls, at least due to their expected role, should be exposed to learning 
aggressiveness from say their parents and other influencing people 
around them. Recent perspectives in biological research focusing on 
genes and behaviour stress the point that genes and milieu are 
intertwined in a manner which makes it impossible to contrast 
“nature” with “nurture” the way Sir Francis Galton did in the 1880s. It 
seems for example impossible to conclude that siblings growing up in 
the same family share or are being exposed to identical milieu, 
because, as far as they not being identical twins, their genotypic and 
phenotypic variance is unique, thus evoking different responses from 
the environment. For example aggressive and hyperactive children 
evoke different responses from parents than do a nice, appealing and 
tranquil child, they being boy or child, resulting in qualitatively 
different milieus surrounding the children. With further development, 
the growing youngster seeks out different environment based in part 
on constitutional differences and in part on past experiences. Thus, 
79 Attitudes and matters associated with, and in my opinion making a basis for 
what could or should been given the name of evil.  
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regarding the heredity-environment controversy, rather then a simple 
cause-effect relationship the one way or another, we are confronted 
with an ongoing interaction or reciprocal process between these to 
instances. This however, in my opinion allows us to conclude that 
genes and heredity, by the very force of its own constitutional logic, 
plays a significant part in creating the qualities and characteristics of 
the different individual’s personality, that being of a rather evil kind or 
the opposite, in different cases. 
 Another look at the influence of genes on human violence was 
carried out by the so called “International Ciba Symposium”80 in 
1995, which gathered many leading names within the field, for 
example the distinguished child psychiatrist sir Michael Rutter, 
suggesting that there existed a certain number of genes which may be 
implicated in, say, violent behaviour, but also called for a need to be 
clear about the risks of exaggerating any genetic influences. Of 
specific interest was the evidence of the missing of a particular gene 
on chromosome 6, a gene producing certain brain receptors, in 
particular receptors for serotonin.81 Evidence was presented that these 
changes in genes was associated with anti-social behaviour, a violent 
nature, high levels of aggression and also a tendency to alcoholism. 
The research concerning the significance of this gene, however, carry 
on, for one thing to find out to what degree this gene varies in its 
structure in the general population, and in those with behavioural 
problems.82 
 Another significant or related gene being of importance here is 
one producing the substance of so called monoamine oxidase A 
(MAOA), which affects neurotransmission in the brain. In at least 
some single studied families this seems to affect male members to 
show increased impulsive behaviour, aggressive sexuality and among 
other things, commit arson. However, modifications were made 
80 The International Ciba Symposium on Genetics of  Criminal and Antisocial 
Behaviour. 
81 Research on mice missing the equivalent gene to the chromosome 6 in 
humans, revealed that they acted very aggressively confronted with for example 
new and for them unknown members of their own kind, while in other situations 
behaving normal. Further, note from p. 78, the consequences of the limited 
capacity for absorbing serotonin. 
82 Of cause, causality of socio-psychological factors has to be separated out here. 
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emphasising that it was unlikely the MAOA gene itself could be 
considered an “aggression gene”.83 From the very fact that there exist 
a complexity of variation in behaviour of those observed and the 
reported significant multi-nuanced effects of deficiency of MAOA on 
neurotransmission, undermines any conclusions regarding some direct 
casual link. Perhaps the identification of specific genes, perhaps 
selected through evolution, expected causing or determining 
aggression, lay far off, or at least does not wait in the near future. 
Anyway, this underscores the supposed fact that environment plays a 
crucial role in the manifestation of aggression and violence, not just 
by its own autonomous casual force directly inflicting subjects and 
relations, but also out of qualities affecting the way the genes 
themselves will work. This again underscores the point of mutual 
dependence between genes and environment, making it clear that the 
one cannot exist or operate without the other.84 I other words, the 
specific or autonomous biological determining element seems to be 
absent or undetected.   
 At a superior level however, genes or biological equipment 
seems to play a significant part. For example, as stated above, males 
seem far more violent than women, and have through history been 
demonstrable involved in several times aggressive, violent and evil 
acts.85  
83 From Winston, 2002. 
84 In the final concluding section my theoretical perspective will be emphasized, 
namely that the basic dimensions underlying evil being presented - that of  
individuality, sosial relations and structures and that of biology - all are in the 
position of holdning some causality of its own, but that this is defined on the 
level of abstraction, meaning that for each the effects of the other dimensions 
are not taken  into consideration. At the level of empirically based analyses, 
were real manifest phenomenas are accounted for, the supposed causality of 
each level or dimension has to be integrated in search of an understanding of the 
phenomena in question, giving each of them the status of being perhaps latent 
instead of manifesting itself directly. This again requires an analysis of 
abstraction if revealing their real and universal qualities.    
85 However, there exist historical reports of cultures where women are found to 
be in leading positions regarding both leadership, aggression, and warfare, for 
example some ancient Celtic tribes. But as well as it being significant to search 
for human variation regarding aggression at the individual level, one should 
perhaps account for the same at the level of gender or sex. This should give us 
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More traditional theoretical views have considered aggression and 
violence a solely mal-adaptive matter, bringing trouble for both victim 
and perpetrator. Evolutionary theory, however, stresses that aggressive 
behaviour, perhaps also including what would be considered evil, have 
been selected through history because it has contributed to the survival 
and reproduction of the bearers of the specific genes disposing for 
such qualities. Implicit in this is the assumption that violent behaviour 
from ancient times has been necessary for individuals and groups in 
order to survive regarding competitions with others. Note, however, 
that a distinction between individual and group selection has to be 
made. According to group selection, all individual aggressiveness and 
violence aimed at hurting or destroying members of the same group or 
species would be maladaptive and then be selected out, because any 
step in the direction of impairing one’s own group survival would 
correspondingly weaken one’s own individually (surviving). On the 
other hand, individual aggressiveness seems to secure the person’s 
own survival, perhaps at the cost of other individuals, allowing him to 
spread his genes to secure their existence for the future. However, 
both these strategies could themselves be considered to abstract to fit 
in with every social and historical situation confronting humans. 
Under changing circumstances different strategies concerning use of 
violence and aggressiveness would therefore appear functional. In a 
population of peaceful cooperatives individualistic aggressive 
strategies would often not pay. Instead altruistic behaviour would 
prove better for the purpose of surviving and maximize one’s genetic 
fitness. Aggressive and egoist “free riders” would under these 
circumstances easily bee isolated or excluded from rewarding group 
securing immediate survival. This then serves to explain why humans 
have developed altruistic and pro-social behaviour repertoires along 
plenty of individual examples of women being significant more aggressive than 
many males, not undermining the superior fact that males generally being more 
aggressive than women.    
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with aggressive and antisocial. In a society populated with aggressive 
competitors however aggressive and even violent behaviour seems 
necessary for surviving and securing the success of one’s own genes. 
In other words: Both group and individual selection seems necessary 
or functional under the right circumstances. Besides, altruism inside 
the group and aggression outside, meaning detecting and combating 
strangers and non-members also seems crucial for the individual’s 
survival. 
 All this seem rational, of cause depending on accepting the 
evolutionary theory and logic itself. Though I believe there exists 
strong arguments for evolution theory itself, I shall not bring forth any 
profound discussion on this matter here. Anyway I believe that 
evolutionary arguments have to be considered along with other 
biological in discussing innate or human conditions contributing to 
our understanding of human aggressiveness or aggressive potentials, 
simply because evolution helps explain why aggression exist in 
humans at all. As stated above, aggressiveness and violence cannot 
itself be classified as evilness, but seems to form an important basis 
for it. The most profound sign of evil itself is undoubtedly the amount 
of physical and sometimes psychological pain, violence, brought upon 
innocents.  
 One important part concerning the idea of evolution of group 
violence, that is one group attacking and even trying to destroy other 
groups experienced as threats or competitors, is that these patterns can 
be said to be present up to this day. Anti-Semitism, the Holocaust, the 
recent examples of ethnic cleaning and so on perhaps fully 
demonstrate the significance of the evolution of group violence and 
its, some would say logical consequence: group hatred.86 This turns 
out rather disturbing. Recent observations have revealed organized 
violence groups not just among humans, but for example among 
chimpanzees as well. Until recently, organized violence within one 
specific species was thought to exist as an exclusive phenomenon 
86 Remember the Zimbardo experiment and the way apparently normal or 
average individuals, even in an artificial constructed experiment situation, easily 
turn into sadistic monsters as soon as social norms are altered and a number of 
individuals are divided into two opposite and antagonistic groups. Also note 
”The Wave” experiment and Sherifs ”Robber Cave Experiment”.  
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among humans. However, concerning chimps, except from rivalling 
and battles for supremacy among males which rarely resulted in 
anyone getting injured, there has been strong evidence suggesting that 
they behave violent as groups against other groups of same kind or 
species. As individualistic aggression within the group hardly or never 
is classified as serious or deadly the opposite counts regarding group 
aggression against other groups, meaning alien groups dominating 
within their own separate territory. These attacks can be regarded as 
manoeuvres in the service of survival, namely securing a territory for 
say food supply. The attacks are unconditional brutal, resulting in 
murder of members of the rival group, including the murder of 
females from males of the attacking group. Within a group, a male 
would never hurt a female member. The fact that the same aggressive 
and brutal group behaviour are seen in both humans and other 
primates, stresses and far support the basic evolutionary argument that 
for example group violence through history has been crucial for 
survival among some higher developed mammals and consequently 
has been selected and genetically spread by the individuals and groups 
best fitted. However, changing focus from chimps to humans, some 
important or crucial elements has to be included and counted for. The 
original group repertoire, including brutal murder of members of an 
alien group, could hardly be considered evil in a meaningful way 
object for our present investigation, because it must preferentially be 
considered instrumental, meaning it solely taking place in the service 
of survival, not primarily or with the presence of any primary 
individualistic lust for hurting or killing.87 Focusing on humans seems 
to add a new and dangerous dimension to the problem, namely 
aggression against alien or “out” groups – group hate – serving its 
own purposes. Of cause other factors to have to be included. For 
example group hate itself may serve the function of strengthen one’s 
identity by downgrading the out group88 and thus legitimating 
different harassments and even cruelties upon its members. Group 
hate may also serve the function of projecting the frustrations and 
perhaps inner conflicts and unconscious feelings of inferiority of 
87 However, the possibility that aggressive behavior itself could elicit emotions 
of lust and excitement must be taken into account. 
88 Note here Tajfel & Turner (1986) and section II. 
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members of the in group itself outwards, precisely upon members of 
the other group. Maybe there also exists a strong need or motive for 
creating a concept of a threatening enemy. These tendencies and 
mechanisms, or group hate and fear more generally, have obviously 
served its functions by surviving through evolution. If that should be 
the case, it implies that violence and cruelty, truly evil exist, not as 
much an instrumental manoeuvre in the service of survival, but by 
virtue of its own manifestations. In reality, the transformation of 
instrumental violence inherited through evolution into group hatred, 
culminating with the Holocaust, adds new social and psychological 
dimensions to the matter. Among social factors, the dehumanization 
and demonization of the members of the out group has to be counted 
for. Regarding psychological mechanisms, significant rational-
cognitive and certain emotional factor most be added to the story. A 
general and superior comprehension and concept regarding the 
members of the out group as inferiors, combined with a self image of 
superiority has to been maintained over time, fuelled with emotions of 
unconditional hate against indifferent strangers, their only 
disqualification being their membership of the “wrong” group. 
 So what perhaps finds its origin in the pure drive for survival, 
could become main reasons for cruelty and evil it self. Perhaps this 
should not appear surprising after all. Some cruelty was probably 
present in every fight for territory and against intruders where the 
ultimate purpose must have been causing maximal damage upon the 
enemy in defending oneself. According to Duntley and Buss89, a 
number of factors that would be considered bad and destructive, if not 
evil by itself, like lying, cheating, stealing and other harm-inflicting 
may have been evolved through evolution because it have served 
some vital functions for survival. These adaptations also seem to be 
fundamental and universal components of human nature through 
history and across cultures and cannot according to Duntley and Buss 
be attributed to different cultural factors, that be socio-economic 
circumstances, socialization, upbringing and so on. The actual 
manifestation of these phenomena in different situations may however 
be due to specific cultural and social factors operating under certain 
circumstances, contingencies that are themselves essential 
89 Duntley & Buss, 2004. 
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components of the design of the different kinds of adaptation. Further, 
humans seem, according to evolutionary psychology, to have 
developed special cognitive mechanisms designed for categorizing 
some phenomena as “good” and other as “bad” or “evil” and even 
humans and groups in exclusively white-black categories,  as either 
“good” or “bad”.90  
 As mentioned above, aggression and violence should not be 
regarded evil itself. On the contrary, aggression and violence should 
under certain circumstances be valued important and necessary for the 
individual’s self-assertion and even survival. However, when certain 
aspects of this aggression get perverted, it can be directed into a 
malfunctioned and abnormal direction resulting in gruesome deeds 
against others which could be classified as evilness.91 Aggressiveness 
then, constitutes essential qualifications regarding evilness itself. Note 
however, asserting that aggressiveness and violence should be 
regarding natural and evolutionary necessary, does not imply it should 
be regarded natural and somehow tolerated in modern societies and 
cultures of our time, or to day’s world wide as such. Concerned with 
its “naturalness” should this just points to its origin or sources and not 
to any’ social or normative legitimating.           
 
Back to human groups, a group would benefit having aggressive 
members fighting members of a rival group or inflicting harm upon 
others. On the other hand, this would ultimately show not functional 
for the care and solidarity necessary for a group to exist and maintain 
its strength over a long period. Besides, the conclusions concerning 
the evolution of aggressiveness and violence in humans, groups and 
even civilisations should perhaps not be regarded as universal or 
deterministic. Perhaps one could talk of a human capacity which has 
to be confronted with other capacities and trends in man. Studies have 
revealed peaceful cultures existing for centuries where violence and 
rival for resources are absent. Finally, much violence seen in different 
cultures may have its origin rather in frustration and repression than in 
evolutionary aggressiveness, although some potential or inner sources 
for aggressiveness and violence probably have to exist. As a general 
90 Note the discussion of xenophobia in part II. 
91 Note part I. 
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term associated with human and societal development, the evolution 
hypothesis could yet be defended. It seems clear that our tendency to 
split people into groups of “us” and “them” is universal showing its 
many faces in different aspects of our daily life. Supporting your own 
school or football team is unlikely, say impossible without our deep 
buried instincts for splitting up the world into friends and foes.                                  
As pointed out, especially by evolutionary psychologists 
themselves, evolution does not rule out social influence. On the 
contrary, social milieu and social influence itself must be considered 
part of the adaptation design determining human development and 
thus constitutes a significant part of the evolutionary theory itself.  
Evolutionary psychology itself has pointed out that man has not 
just evolved capacities for aggression, violence and evildoing, but also 
for caring and altruism as well. On the other hand, empathy and pro- 
social behaviour seem under certain conditions to serve egoism and 
selfishness, qualities more often associated with evilness then with 
kindness. In more peaceful cultures, mainly based on cooperation and 
caring, helping and altruistic behaviour will clearly pay. Not to say 
that altruism is exclusively a strategic matter. Usually it will be 
considered having its basis in one’ own personality and nature, 
meaning we act upon altruism for its own sake, because we want to do 
the right and good things and because our conscience tells us so. If 
however survival is the big question, being egoist among altruists may 
often pay, but perhaps just up to the point where you are getting 
excluded from the group and denied access to the group’s or culture’s 
resources.92 In a situation like that, manoeuvres like committing 
altruistic act will surely pay and secure survival.   
 
To conclude: there seems to be certain biological potentials for 
aggression, violence and hostility in man. However this should not 
bring us up in plain conclusions that following from this evildoing by 
itself is biologically based, say determined. It would not even be fair 
or correct to assert that aggression and violence itself is biological  
92 One may assert that some kinds of egoistic acts will always pay, let’s say tax 
evasion in a welfare society, given you don’t get caught. But permanently 
showing egoistic and hostile attitudes against other members of the same group 
will on the other hand seldom pay  
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fixed.  Surely brain conditions, genes and evolution do not explain 
everything. Obviously there exist different or multi-factorial sources 
for evildoing.  
I have focused my investigation on three main sources or 
dimensions which should, I believe, help explain significant causes 
regarding the manifestations of what could be characterized human 
evil, namely psychological, social and biological determinants. As I 
will argue for or at least implicate in the final section or part, it is 
exactly the combinations of these factors, taking them all into account 
that seems able in giving us a correct idea of the matter in question.               
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  PART IV 
Synthesis 
 
 
The preceding sections or parts have presented a rather broad, 
fundamental and perhaps traditional account of some basic and 
fundamental conditions for as well evil deeds, and perhaps most 
important, the evil mind. Although some of the perspectives accounted 
for here doesn’t gain distinction of giving brand new insights 
measures by present standards, they nevertheless represent some 
significant background or basis for present modern scientific 
discussions and research.  Fundamental theories, although traditional 
by nature, doesn’t necessarily get outdated by new empirical facts. 
Instead they sometimes incorporate new data into their established and 
traditional framework. In fact modern philosophy of science often 
point out that “theory is underdetermined by data”93 This final and 
concluding section then gives room to a broader discussion of today’s 
significant questions concerning the matter of human evil.   
 
Psychology, biology and sociology/society/situational forces are 
operating at different levels and thus logically doesn’t have to conflict 
with each other for example regarding theories and explanations of 
human evil. When they do, this seems to stem from some certain 
position or idea of dualism, presupposing an either-or perspective, 
meaning the belief that psychology, biology or social and interactional 
forces may explain the matter, but not within various mutual 
combinations. This focus on operating combinations, however, is in 
my opinion crucial for a clear definition and fully definition of the 
question of evil itself. On the other hand, presupposing one 
determinate factor here seems to bring us into the trap of 
reductionism. Does this imply that for example individualistic 
93  Note for example Lakatos, Laudan, Quine, Toulmin, a.o. 
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perspectives being of a psychological or biological kind doesn’t count 
in understanding real evil? No! Rather, the whole point should be that 
every single factor or dimension is supposed to operate, but in 
different combinations with others, demanding an analysis along two 
levels: a real analysis of the case or matter in manifestation, in 
addition to an analysis of abstraction concerning the inner logic of 
each level or dimension. For example: suppose finding some personal 
and psychological deficit in subjects regarding their social function or 
interaction/communication with others, perhaps in small scale or just 
out of psychological test. Suppose we would label or diagnose this as 
a possible case of “psychopathy”94. Does that alone make the 
character “evil”? At least one has to make an examination or analysis 
under for example which social circumstances he or she is disposed to 
actually act in evil ways, for example under the command of certain 
authorities and in what way he/she in the situation given will differ 
from other subjects being the bearer of other personal qualities. Under 
these circumstances, to attain at an understanding or a concept of evil, 
one has to include at least two levels or dimensions: that of 
psychological (and perhaps also biological) personality and that of the 
social/societal situation. Concerning the social dimension, one also 
has to take into account the social act itself, its quality of badness, 
cruelty and the degree of harm which is inserted upon other innocents. 
This of cause again focuses on the personal and psychological 
dimensions and qualities. Who, given their personal characteristics, 
would inflict radical harm on innocents? Obviously, not everybody 
one should assume (and hope). After all, beating up or cheating 
innocent people contrasted with, say committing mass murder seems 
enormous. It also forces us to make certain assessments concerning 
motives behind different acts and kinds of behaviour. The motives for 
cheating and fighting could be radical different from those making one 
commit mass murder.  
 In addition to the main dimensions dealt with, philosophical and 
normative matters should be included. This of cause also includes the 
matter of morality. Philosophy and related matters operate on abstract 
and reflexive terms, thus, in my opinion makes it an indispensable tool 
94 No longer a legal or operating diagnostic label. Replaced with ”Dissocial 
Personality Disorder”. 
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in analysing and clarification of human/social theoretical matters. 
However, there seems to exist some pitfalls here, namely making the 
philosophical comprehension total, meaning that the question of evil 
becomes solely dependent of some sort of a pure philosophical 
reflection. Not surprisingly, such theoretical constructions often 
conclude that evil itself does not exist, instead having its origin or 
foundations in theological and metaphysical speculations alone.95  
 Given that philosophical reflections and analysis must be 
integrated or related to psychological, sociological and biological 
matters and dimensions then, what could be the relationship between 
them? Some theorists wish to rule out one or more dimensions in 
efforts of asserting some kind of a “mono-causal” explanation. In 
recent years much stress has been laid upon the situation factor. One 
reason for this is obviously the growing reluctance regarding the 
traditional subject perspective. The exclusive focusing on “evil” 
individuals executing evil matters of the world eventually was 
abandoned by a huge crowd of psychologists, social scientists and 
philosophers. The background for this is largely to be found in post 
war experiences, experiments and philosophical reflections. One 
significant traditional perspective presupposed evil just done by “evil” 
individuals, meaning psychopaths and sadists. Theoretical focus was 
on individualistic psychological factors determining or at least laying 
heavy influence on the subject’s behaviour as well as emotions and 
cognition. Logically, exclusive focus on individualistic factors tends 
towards including biological factors. However, this position at least 
the original versions of it, were subjected to heavy critics. In my 
opinion, the greatest dangers following the use of biological 
perspectives should be of two kinds, namely mono-causality and 
determinism. Neither of these positions should be defended, which of 
cause modern research has revealed. But this should, in my opinion, 
not rule out biology as such. After all we are biological creatures, 
which in fact imply that some significant biological needs and motives 
have to be counted for. The “problem” however should be that these 
motives seldom, contrary to living organisms at a lower level, 
manifest themselves directly. Instead they are mixed up with or 
entangled in other more psychological and social motives and needs. 
95 Note for example Cole, 2006.  
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In fact they can hardly be evaluated in isolation or on their own 
logical terms. This of cause is mainly due to the fact that the human, 
in addition to being biological also represent itself as a genuine social 
creature, not to say psychological. The fact should of cause be that 
significant biological drives and structures basically manifest 
themselves as psychological and social processes. The theoretical 
consequences of this should be that factors on different levels, that 
being biological, psychological and social, should and could possibly 
not be separated on the level of manifestation. However, we are in 
need of separating them at the abstract or theoretical level. In 
addition, concerning the matter of evil and evildoing, one has to face 
some certain demands of transformation, that is: under what 
circumstances are biological drives and forces, that being evolution, 
aggression, etc. transformed into different manifestations of evil. 
Surely aggression itself, it being proper or improper, is not or should 
not automatically be considered evil. The significance of 
transformation itself then points to the very fact that more “natural” 
human properties could be exposed to, or vulnerable concerning 
specific forms or sorts of perverting them. There is however some 
different kinds of issues here, namely insights derived from more 
recent evolutionary theory. According to this, for example acts we 
spontaneously would or could consider evil, like mass murder upon 
members of foreign groups, could be derived from basic evolutionary 
inherited psychological mechanisms, for example the urge to attack, 
combat and destroy members of foreign group, interpreted as 
threatening and deadly enemies. This may also be related to the 
phenomena and concept of xenophobia dealt with in section or part II.  
 Since the concept of “evil” is to be considered a social 
construction as such, as immediately given phenomena, some sort of a 
complete system of theory or explanation is needed for the intention 
of giving an account of the matter as such. This should not imply that 
the whole matter is a rather artificial one produced by ideology alone 
and thus not existing by itself, like some philosophers tend to assert. 
The will to cause ultimate pain and cruelty upon innocent people that 
be by intention, from instrumental or aggressive motives itself, or 
even due to thoughtlessness96 or cold carelessness for the victim 
96 An assertion associated with the case of for example Eichmann. 
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seems real enough.97 Nothing logically prevents us for making 
definitions and concepts regarding this as carried through or basic 
evil. The case of cause should be that the explanation needed has to be 
taken from different theoretical territories as well as conceptual and 
logical levels. 
 Let us return to the individualistic concept of evil in the 
traditional fashion. Far the way this presupposed the view of the 
isolated, rather sadistic human doing evil acts for its own sake and 
pleasure. As pointed out, among others by philosophers, this is rather 
insufficient especially in efforts explaining large scale evil, for 
example genocide and ethnic cleaning. Neither should it explain more 
small scale evildoing, exemplified in the Zimbardo experiment. This  
due to the fact that the evildoing in question here is mainly executed 
by so-called normal non-pathological characters living normal lives 
most of their time.                                 
Furthermore, philosophers often state that committing personal 
evil in the more sadistic way by so called evil persons requires the 
personal and direct intention to do precise evil for its own sake if the 
concept of evil should make any sense. As should be experienced, 
however, personal and direct evil, itself being cruel and barbaric, often 
is originated by highly idealistic motives, often seen in for example 
terrorism.98 However, linking evil to individualistic factors and 
conditions in the way philosophers here do, fails, mainly because they 
misinterpret exactly which psychological factor(s) is significantly 
operating in evildoing. In order to make an understanding of  the way 
individualistic and social factors “cooperate” or are integrated within a 
more complete conception of evil and thus get to a more complete 
understanding of the operating phenomenon itself, both dimensions or 
logics have to be taken into account, in addition to biology. To repeat: 
Each of these dimensions – individualistic, social and biological – 
operates according to two distinct logics: their internal logic having to 
do with the laws and causality within their own distinct domain, for 
example basic psychological laws and principles and corresponding 
social and biological, and on the other hand their external logic having 
to do with the relationship between them, how they influence and 
97 Note the definition for the use in this text in the Introduction. 
98 I return to the significant matter of  ”terrorism” later in the conclusion. 
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determine each other. Both kinds of logic are operating, but in 
different way from one case or problem to the other. The point is 
however that they should not logically be separated and made 
independent of each other during the analysis. The consequence of 
this should be that no mono-casual explanation should be tolerated or 
hold true. Ruling out psychology or social determinants, as well as 
biological in favour of one single different factor or determinant, 
should in my opinion have the consequence of ending up with further 
theoretical questions and problems. The same goes for isolated 
philosophical explanations and assertions. Philosophy itself should 
however be considered important, though not conclusive, handling 
with logical definitions.       
But let us first have a closer look at the social factor or 
dimension to see why it becomes insufficient operating with it in 
isolation and more exactly which factors of an individual kind is 
essential in the combination with it in order to make it relevant. The 
most significant comprehension or outcome taking a superior social 
stand regarding perceived evil should be realizing that most evil, and 
especially its most extensive and brutal versions, is not committed by 
sadistic individuals operating in isolation, but by “ordinary men” 
usually living normal lives, however brought into situations, for 
example caused by ethnic conflicts, economic and social crises, 
extreme nationalism, and so on, then revealing  their “dark sides” 
perhaps hidden under normal circumstances. The “Canon” 
experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo highly demonstrate the 
significance of the “ordinary men do evil”, not sadistic individuals in 
the first place. From the Milgram and Zimbardo experiments a direct 
link has been made to the explanation of the Holocaust, the 
concentration camps and more recent examples of ethnic cleaning, not 
to say to Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” referring 
to the Eichmann case. As argued for in part II, the comparison or even 
identification of the Milgram experiment with the Holocaust, seems 
mistaken. Of cause, the very experimental design of that experiment 
seems unable to count for the significant factors operating within the 
Holocaust logic itself. Take for example the rather crucial manoeuvre 
of dehumanising the victims in order to make the executioners more 
willing to commit mass murder. This factor, by many researchers 
considered crucial (among of cause other factors in combination) 
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making “ordinary” people willing to kill innocent people, for example 
also children, on a large scale, is hardly present in the Milgram 
experiment. Still, out of the “Milgram-logic”, it seems important to 
further stress the “situation-factor”, however under different terms 
than his classic experiment. On the other hand, the bare fact of reports 
from these experiments more than indicating heavy elements of stress 
among certain participants being told to give electric shocks, perhaps 
gives us information of personal or individualistic factors playing 
some significant role here. Of cause it should be added that a minor, 
but considerable minority of participants refused to participate in the 
experiment up to “the bitter end”, meaning giving the heaviest shock 
on the scale. With this in mind it also becomes problematic linking the 
Milgram experiment unreserved to the Arendt concept of “The 
banality of evil”, first and foremost referring to the Holocaust 
administrator Adolf Eichmann. The idea, as referred earlier, was 
precisely the picture of Eichmann as an all-through common ordinary 
man, not driven by emotional hate or fanaticism, but rather from a 
normal desire to do a “good job” as some legal employee or official.    
More recent publications regarding psychiatric reports on Eichmann 
however gave indications of a personality far more concerned with 
hate against for example the Jews and Jewish people, bearing on a 
wish to eliminate and killing as many of them as possible. This by 
itself points in the direction of a more pathological personality. 
Besides, it makes associations to a rather significant factor witch will 
be stressed later, namely the phenomenon or quality of empathy. Thus 
it seems important and even crucial to include individualistic 
parameters, even in a basic social perspective. Empathy is to be 
considered a psychological, and thus a personal, quality, found in 
single individuals.99  However, the whole picture perhaps turns out a 
little more complicated. It also seems relevant to include or involve 
biological perspectives and explanations in order to get an even fuller 
understanding of what could be lying behind evil acts of different 
kinds. In part III some biological parameters were accounted for, for 
example the more recent research on mirror neurons. Some typical 
99 Which, of cause, don’t imply that social elements say social norms of specific 
type a. o., should not be involved in the formation and manifestation of empathy 
itself.  
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reactions or symptoms regarding deficits in this neuron system, is 
precisely a lack regarding the ability to recognize the feelings and 
emotional states in other people. Again, the bare presence of some 
shortcomings in the assumed mirror neuron system does not make 
persons evil. Fortunately, such deficits, if present, neither make us 
automatically killers and torturers, nor administrators of death camps. 
However, it should perhaps become rather easy to imagine that 
deficits of this kind under specific conditions at least could constitute 
some basis – among other factors – for later repertoires of behaviour, 
being classified as evil.   
The however most important knowledge derived from this 
should be that say a basically social view on evil, does not rule out 
other perspectives, that being psychological and even biological. On 
the contrary, in my opinion the different views or theoretical domains 
and logics instead are in need of each other in explaining a rather 
extensive phenomenon like human evil and how it manifests itself. It 
seems however easy to mix up ontological explanations with factors, 
often of a more situational kind, triggering what would be perceived 
and categorized as evil acts or even evilness. This kind of 
“situationism” should be well known within social psychology and 
even in sociology. It fits of cause well with the doctrine of “banality of 
evil” presupposing that what we usually label evil occurs when 
ordinary men are put into extraordinary or extreme, however even 
everyday situations.100 In my opinion however, a one-sided 
situational, or for that matter psychological and biological, nor say 
philosophical perspective, inevitably leads us into dualism. 
Of cause, the parameter of empathy would show important 
concerning the Zimbardo-experiment as well. The rather disturbing 
matter here seems observing how easy supposed common human 
empathy is eliminated through an instant constructed situation the 
involved participants know is a rather artificial role play. This of cause 
gives ammunition to arguments in favour of the situation factor. Still, 
we are forced to ask the crucial question: How comes that a rather 
instant constructed situation involving plain ordinary characters can 
turn into serious maltreatment and terror? What should this us of the 
“human nature” as such? Stressing the situation-factor alone just 
100 For example operating as an official or bureaucrat in Nazi Germany. 
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seems telling half the story. The whole point according to this is of 
cause that the situation itself should be unable to reveal something that 
did not exist from the start. Where should the aggression, brutality and 
evilness have its origin? At least one has to presuppose a certain 
potential concerning traits and qualities like these form the start, 
perhaps deep buried in the human psyche as such, only present as 
open characteristics or features in a rather few individuals labelled as 
“psychopaths”, “sadists” and like. The situation factor then, how 
strong and forceful it might be, can not be studied in isolation, simply 
because it does not explain anything “left alone”, or being understood 
as or viewed autonomous. A concept of individuality or personality 
has to be presupposed or counted for. Then, are we back to Freud and 
the dynamic theorists exclusively focusing upon “inner” drives, 
desires, or so on? Not necessary! At least the (in my opinion) 
significant focusing on personal factor should not be exclusive or be 
operating in isolation, but be interpreted in combination with other 
logically associated factors, for example the social parameter of 
“situation”. 101 But perhaps this brings us into a situation were we 
being forced to postulate a general “dark nature” in man as such, 
though activated only under certain circumstances. This certainly 
excludes any imagination concerning evilness as a product of a few 
evil, sadistic individuals. However, as stated before and will be dealt 
with further, this does not rule out psychological, personal or 
individualistic factors and explanations. But they obviously seem to be 
of another kind than the traditional assumed personal sadism.  
Reicher and Haslams conclusions regarding the Zimbardo 
experiment after reconstructing it were that the situation itself is not 
settled and determined from the start in some rather automatic way. 
Expectations of the different social roles one was going to play 
showed significant regarding the way to behave. Ideological demands 
supporting existing or potential prejudices and social biases then 
seemed crucial. As discussed in part II, such biases should not be 
considered exclusively social, although they are manifested that way. 
Research has revealed that basic perceptions regarding phenomena 
like ethnocentrism, prejudices, discrimination, and so forth, seems 
originating and buried deep in man himself, perhaps inherited through 
101 This, of cause, was emphasized in part II, p. 57 – 58. 
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history by evolution.102 This clearly underscores my main point: That 
evilness and evil deeds has to be understood and conceptualized 
through a theoretical reflection of the specific ways of combination of 
subjective and social determinants. Consequently, one has to go 
beyond the position of dualism, meaning operating with one single 
kind of explanation and explicit ruling out explanations and theories 
on different levels, and instead consequently seek and go for 
theoretical and scientific integration dealing with explanations on 
different logical levels. 
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s position is rather interesting. 
Though he seems more concerned with moral than evil itself, the 
connections with evil seems obvious, among other things through his 
references to Milgrams work, by Bauman himself interpreted as an 
indication or symptom of a potential for inhumanity in modernity 
itself, mainly due to its highly rationalized and well organised 
structure. Bauman, like others, operates within the dualistic realm, 
arguing that evil behaviour103 either find its origin in certain social 
situations and conditions itself, inflicting ordinary persons or has to be 
considered a rather marginal phenomenon emanated from certain 
sadistic personalities. For Bauman however, society itself or modern 
social conditions seem unable to counteract evil, thus making room 
for a more moral society. Instead Bauman turns to an understanding of 
a “moral impulse” apparently pre-existing in man from birth. But this 
impulse, giving source to an “ethic of responsibility”, obviously 
demands further investigations concerning its psychological and even 
biological terms. Referring to outstanding philosophers like Levinas 
and Løgstrup however gives no answers since philosophy itself is 
concerned with and conceptual restricted to logical and definitional 
analysis and not operating from investigations of causality and causal 
102 Note reference to the experiments of Greenwald (1998), Hammond & 
Axelrod (2006) and others in part II. 
103  Other authors make some category based distinction between ”evil” or 
”wickedness” and ”evil  acts”, thus denying that evil could hold any substance 
or ontology of its own. We may experience and observe certain kinds of 
behavior we would consider ”evil”, but this gives no rationale for the 
assumption that there should exist some certain ”essence” of evil itself.  
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connections from the very point of departure.104 As already stressed: 
What we are in need of, is a concept or instance which seems fit to 
simultaneously clear up and explain the phenomenon of evil on its 
social, psychological and perhaps as well on its biological terms. 
Concerning the perspective of social psychologist Roy 
Baumeister, his concept of evil seems more differentiated then those 
of say Milgram, Zimbardo and Bauman, mainly because he refer to 
different psychological mechanisms supporting evil behaviour, like 
greed, lust, egotism, revenge, idealism and sadism. Though he stresses 
the significance of the social concerning the manifestation of evil 
itself, asserting that it is committed mostly by ordinary characters 
placed in perhaps extraordinary situations, he never the less gives 
attention to the significance of psychological determinants. I believe 
Baumeister thesis that evil itself exists as a rather many-sided matter 
that should not be understood or interpreted by some single-cause 
theory or domain is correct, however his own position, though 
interesting and useful, is incomplete. First, the very psychological 
parameters he uses have to be further elucidated and explained. 
Second, his concept of social origins to evil seems vague and unclear. 
He talks about social conditions and situations arousing destructive or 
violent impulses in individuals which however are prevented from 
being acted out by mechanisms of self-regulation. But what is to be 
considered the superior factor operating here, or in the different 
situations? Third, we are in need of a more sophisticated or systematic 
analysis of the connections and interactions of the elements and levels, 
that be of a social, psychological and biological kind, operating 
through manifest evildoing. In my opinion, a few significant or central 
psychological factors have to be included in understanding why social 
factors play such a significant role in evil and destructiveness. Human 
empathy should be considered such a factor.       
 
104 On the other hand, postulating a original moral impulse in man brings our 
investigations and argumentations in direction of, at least to a certain extent, to 
the modern philosophical program of ”moral realism”, a position asserting that 
moral and ethics should not be considered normative constructions alone, but 
real phenomena existing in the world as such.  
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What seems obvious then is that the social dimension itself appears 
very significant regarding the present matter, however not without 
including factors and explanations along other dimensions. It is 
precise the combinations of different factors that allow us reaching an 
understanding of the phenomenon as such. But what about the 
psychological dimension in evildoing? Obviously, there should not 
existing evil of any kind without involving the human psyche. After 
all, humans are basically intentional and motivational driven creatures 
that experience certain kinds of meaning executing different acts. It is 
important to keep in mind that the human psyche does not exist 
exclusively as abstractions being excluded by significant social factors 
as soon as man is confronted with environment and milieu. On the 
contrary, psychological forces exist as real phenomena operating in a 
real social world.   
As commonly asserted by a great many authors and theorists, 
pure sadism is a rather unusual motive for what we would consider 
evildoing.105 According to the Freudian concept however, certain 
deficiencies regarding need-fulfilling create the conditions for 
derivatives like say un-integration of aggression, hate and even 
sadism. Regarding Erich Fromm’s concept, aggression is to be 
considered secondary, meaning a mere product of bad or non-
satisfactory external life conditions. This position however, in my 
opinion makes room for some significant shortcomings in 
understanding concerning the matter of both aggression itself, in 
addition to the very concept of evil. When Fromm asserts that 
aggression itself come into being due to the lack of fulfilment of basic 
needs, not existing before, he has, in my opinion, created a rather 
ontological problem for himself. For how exactly, could something be 
made out of nothing identical with it in the first place? Or put it 
another way: What kind of logic supports the assumption that the lack 
of fulfilment of basic needs necessarily leads to precisely aggression, 
hate and defined evil? This seems rather impossible to account for 
within Fromm’s logic. Contrary to this, Freud and among others 
105 This rather popular impression however, may be disputed. On the contrary, 
experiences from brutal wars, incidents of so called ”ethnic cleaning”, defined 
genocide, and so on, seem to demonstrate sadism and brutality for its own sake 
or as basic motive, operating on a large scale.  
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Melanie Klein operate with an original and biological given 
aggressive drive functioning within the individual from the point of 
departure, though dependent upon social and individual experiences 
over periods of the subject’s (early) life. The subject’s social 
experiences with its caregivers determine the content and direction of 
the actual aggression operating, for example through his or hers 
interaction with others. This position then, clearly demonstrate the 
interdependent relationship between the biological, psychological and 
social.106 The theorist that perhaps mot consistently, at least implicitly, 
has called attention to this way of theorizing, is Melanie Klein.107 Her 
position offers a rather fully fledged psychological theory of how 
human aggression come into circulation as say human hate, sadism 
and defined evil. Klein asserts that feelings of aggression and even 
hate, by necessity, are originated in the human psyche as such. 
Further, being tangled up in a rather deterministic process where 
innate aggression automatically turns into hate when the child meets 
natural frustration. However, only under specific negative and 
frustrated circumstances does this (natural) hate become permanent 
and thus destructive. This stresses the point that the social and the 
psychological, and for that matter also the biological, are not to be 
evaluated separated, but as operating under mutual  or identical 
conditions, concerning manifestations of say hate and evil. This 
stresses the point that in order to arrive at a formulation of a coherent 
theory of human activity and attitudes, some basic psychological 
theory has to be included.108 Psychological theory, however, as 
presented in this context and referring to the Freudian-Klein concept 
in order to try to throw light on human evil, may be presented, here 
strict theoretical and abstract, in a rather either-or shape or cut, may 
turn out to be too simplified regarding real life experiences and 
examples. Principally one should imagine or taking into account 
106 On this occasion I shall not consider deficiencies in the biological equipment 
itself, sometimes leading to uncontrolled aggression. 
107 Note Part I.  
108 Of cause this should not imply or itself demonstrate that the Freudian theory, 
or say Kleins version of it is correct or follows logical from the matter in 
question here, human evil. Other theories may be considered, that be as 
supplements or alternatives. The crucial point demonstrated here however, is 
that psychological theory in itself is needed concerning the matter in question.   
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numbers of nuances regarding strains and frustrations placed upon the 
child, of a rather moderate and reasonable kind to the more severe and 
cruel, in the latter instance leading to the fatal permanent hate and 
perhaps even sadism and defined evil. In other words, there seems to 
exist some continuum in psychological influence as well as patterns of 
psychological reactions from one single case to others. This 
assumption or hypothesis should be maintained, without any appraisal 
regarding the validity of the formal theory as such. The theory of 
cause has to be formulated as an abstraction itself, though its 
application of cause will be saddled with instant or accidental factors 
of different kinds necessary operating in the different, that’s to say 
real situations. This point of departure, however, enables us to attain 
some understanding concerning the question or problem often 
formulated by social psychologists studying say the Holocaust, 
destructive obedience demonstrated in the Milgram- and the 
Zimbardo-experiment, and so on; the fact that respected “normal” and 
social well integrated individuals, often deeply devoted and empathic 
family men, seemed able to cause pain and terror upon innocent 
people, men, women and children (for example during the Holocaust), 
to whom they were by no means engaged in any conflict with, out of 
one reason: obedience toward a formal authority. Seemingly normal 
and well integrated individuals could, according to this, in fact have 
developed different personal and psychological “biases” or derivates 
of psychological pathologies, not activated under normal 
circumstances, but becoming operative during specific events, for 
example conditions where submission to external authorities is 
demanded, perhaps in addition to circumstances where frustration 
against or dehumanization of members of other ethnic groups are 
present, and so on. The consequences of this perspective however, 
seem rather horrifying. It could imply or force us to conclude that 
there is a killer or perpetrator inside almost every human, waiting for 
the appropriate moment or situation to manifest itself and turn into 
action. Though this normally should be considered a rather unrealistic 
matter, experiences from history, say the recent tragedy concerning 
elements of ethnic cleaning during the Balkan war, have taught us 
how fragile the boundary line between normalcy/kindness and cruelty 
might be, due to specific factors concerning ideological and national 
conflicts and confrontation.  
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When making evaluations from the biological standpoint, one 
should reveal positions or points of view moving into opposite 
directions considering good versus evil, though not operating on 
contradictory terms. The fact is, as stressed in part III, genetic and 
evolutionary determinants lay the foundations for both aggressive and 
empathic attitudes and behaviours, ontologically existing “side by 
side” as potentials inside the human psyche, each of them taking 
action under appropriate terms. Both aggression and kindness have 
evolved through evolution, simply because it has served some vital 
functions regarding the individual’s survival. For example, aggression 
has sometimes been successful in ousting rivals concerning food, 
territory and say mates. On the other hand, kindness and altruism 
seem necessary in caretaking and upbringing one’s offspring. The 
point stressed here, however, should be that some sort of innate 
potential for aggression, and under specific social and psychological 
conditions for evil itself, seem necessary in producing this evil on 
manifest terms. Operating exclusively under social terms in evaluating 
or the making of concepts of evil should by no means be regarded 
adequate.  
While drawing the conclusions from this, a number of explicit 
models including determinants on different levels contributing to say 
aggressive behaviours, attitudes and so on have been constructed. One 
significant model developed over the last decades by a number of 
scholars, should be the so called GAM- or “General Aggression 
Model.109 The GAM is described as a “dynamic, social-cognitive, 
developmental model that includes situational, individual 
(personological), and biological variables and provides an integrative 
framework for domain-specific theories of aggression.”110 More 
specific, it “is largely based on social learning and social-cognitive 
theories…”111 Note of cause, that this should be an “aggression” 
model, and not a theory or model of “evil”. However, as asserted 
before, aggression itself forms a significant or essential part of evil 
itself, though not being identical to it. The whole point is that these 
overlapping phenomena has to be considered or understood multi-
109 See Anderson & Carnagey (2004). 
110 Anderson & Carnagey, s.173. 
111 Ibid, s. 173. 
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factorial, and not caused by any single-factor. Further, it seems 
essential that the elements or dimensions forming part of such models 
at least includes both personal (psychological) and social factors, and 
perhaps biological as well. 
Focusing exclusively on the social dimension that is, social 
factors present in specific situation thus seems flawed. Why should 
individuals react with evildoing confronted with specific situations? 
The prejudiced social philosopher would answer: thoughtlessness.112 
But what makes the human victim of his own defects concerning 
cognitive reflection in the first place? Basic psychology unequivocal 
teaches us that man is not defined, nor explained by cognition alone. 
On the contrary, it is the combination of cognition, behaviour, not 
least motivation and emotions that possibly gives the best account of 
what man “is”, at least psychologically speaking. Unfortunately, these 
social philosophers hardly should be regarded conscious concerning 
matters that have to do with human psychology. Furthermore, even if 
cognition itself has to be taken into account, the rather autonomic 
logic on which terms it operates is to be found on the abstract level. 
As a rather real phenomenon, operating in the empirical world, so to 
say, the meaning attached to it has to be found through a blend with 
certain behaviours, emotions, motivations and so on, simply because 
humans as such operate as psychological integrated creatures, not as 
either-or cognitive, social, motivational and so on. The social 
philosopher’s one dimensional concept of man then, seems doomed to 
failure. No wonder, this opened up for the (rather peculiar) postulate 
that for example Eichmann’s cruel misdeeds was mainly due to some 
lack of cognitive reflection.113 Svendsens’s formula for avoiding evil 
then, or rather what seems being of vital importance, typically turns 
out to be whatever we choose to do.114 Svendsen stresses his point 
112 Note for example Arendt (1963) and Norwegian philosopher L. Fr. H. 
Svendsen (2010). 
113 Se both Arendt (1963) and Svendsen (2010). 
114 This of cause fits well with humanistic philosophy and even humanistic 
psychology, had it not been for the fact that philosophy just is to be considered a 
matter of meta-theoretical reflection, however important that be, and not a 
science revealing human psychology in itself and in addition, that humanistic 
psychology should be considered more an ideological matter than say scientific 
giving systematic insight.  
126 
 
                                                 
further by asserting that the greatest problem concerning mankind 
should not be the surplus of aggression, rather a deficiency concerning 
reflection.115 I consider Svendsen’s formulation: “Our basic problem 
isn’t a surplus of aggression. Instead it’s a lack of reflection”116 as 
rather absurd, at least it suffers from ”lack of reflection” itself, 
precisely because it presupposes dualism, excluding the emotional 
sphere of human mind, exclusively stressing cognition.    
In my opinion, Svendsen also becomes guilty of a rather 
mistaken use or concept of biology. Quoting Wright who draws a 
direct link between biology and evil, Svendsen (correctly) asserts that 
biology itself should be evaluated as direct inconsistent with moral 
evil. Biology contains no moral values and because of that evil could 
not be founded in biology. However, in asserting this one has to 
presuppose biology defined the empirical way so to say, as a direct 
manifestation of different social and moral issues, here evil, and by 
doing that fails in using the very concept and object of biology 
analytically, defining it on both its abstract and concrete (empirical) 
level. As already stated, in my opinion, biology points to certain 
potentials regarding say human aggression and even violence which 
could been seen as part of the foundation making way for actions, 
behaviour and ideas which could – or should – be characterized as 
precise evil. Another important issue concerning this is of cause the 
case of interpreting evil as an essentially moral matter, which means it 
gets its whole meaning out of some specific values connected to 
certain individuals, groups, interests, cultures, and so on, and therefore 
incapable in giving reference to something objective existing in the 
real world. This however brings us into the domain of moral 
philosophy, specially the dispute between moral emotivism and moral 
realism. Emotivism stating that all moral judgment could be nothing 
but expressions of preferences, of some kind of attitudes or feelings, 
while moral realism asserts that moral issues are real phenomena or 
ingredients of and in the world. All rough I consider evil itself to be 
real, consisting of a sett of specific but conceptual interrelated 
thoughts, attitudes and behaviours existing in a real world which could 
115 For further arguments against Svendsens position here, note Vetlesen (2003). 
This text is being introduced in Norwegian. 
116 Svendsen, p. 232. 
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be defined and justified by the term “evil”, and not just an abstract 
concept based on preferences, arguments in favour of considering 
moral phenomena itself as real, seems possible. Note here the 
mentioned philosophical position of moral realism, which however, I 
shall not stress further here.117  
In asserting evil as something real existing in the world, of cause 
makes it possible, as this text tries to demonstrate, to differentiate and 
again connect it to distinct areas and domains of science, say biology, 
sociology, psychology, and so on. Svendsen tries to rule out 
psychology, for example in asserting that by defining evil by some 
concepts and matters beyond the moral definition itself, say clinical 
psychology, thereby defining it a natural phenomenon, make us 
immune concerning guilt and personal responsibility. I cannot approve 
to this argumentation. Acknowledging that something is real, for 
example as causes and effects, independent of ourselves does not 
excuse us from personal responsibility. The scientist searches for 
external causes and makes no moral judgement, for example in 
revealing how the Holocaust became possible, but this does not acquit 
the executioners of the Holocaust of responsibility. Svendsen’s, in my 
opinion efforts to rule out psychology as well as say biology, then 
hardly succeed. Generally, Svendsen’s position should perhaps be 
characterized by the philosophical concepts of empiricism and 
dualism. Empirical because he exclusively defines say biology as a 
direct manifestation in connection to evil, and not as some potential 
making it possible or manifest on one among different terms. Dualistic 
because he exclusively sticks to this level of empirical manifestation, 
ruling out the abstract status of every concept and matter itself, that 
being psychology, at least the domain of emotions, or biology, a status 
that overall gives information concerning the potentials of the matter 
in question, though perhaps not exactly its status as manifestation in 
different situations. 
Much the same critic could be raised against other scholars 
dealing with the subject of evil, for example Michael Horne.118 Horne 
asserts, among other things, that evil acts begin (!) when people make 
117 For an outline concerning”moral realism” and philosophical objections  to it, 
note for example McNaughton (1988) and Shafer-Landau (2003). 
118 Note M. Horne (2008) 
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rather semiotic assertions concerning the “naturalness” of their own 
acts and the correspondingly “unnaturaless” of the acts of others. The 
whole matter than seems to grow out of a certain semiotic evaluation 
of a situation, making us forced to talk of evil acts, not of evil people. 
The same kind of dualism seems inherent in a variety of 
literature and reports from philosophers and scholars of different kind 
in recent years. For example, Claudia Card119 asserting that one should 
not focus so much on the psychological states of evildoers, but by the 
seriousness of the harm that is done. However, she is right in stating 
that must evildoers are not sadistic characters, rather negligent or 
unscrupulous. The point here, of cause, should be that personal 
qualities like these should be highly associated with precisely 
psychological states, all though not sadism. The problem of cause 
seems to be a failure in integrating psychological and situational 
factors of different kinds. Cards theory of negligent characters perhaps 
may be associated with Arendt’s concept of “banality evil” with the 
case of Eichmann in mind. 
I shall return to that matter later in connecting it to a 
psychological concept, introduced in this text earlier and in my eyes of 
utmost importance for the understanding of evil, namely empathy, or 
rather the very absence of it.      
 
The situation-person controversy however, seems to harbour further 
implications. Recently, the matter of terrorism, supplied with 
psychological explanations, has been of current interest. The very 
phenomenon of terrorism of cause is not of a new kind. It can be 
traced back as far as to the first century. Modern terrorism however, 
should not be considered a homogenous group of characters. On the 
contrary, different background, motives, personalities, political 
sympathies seem involved. This of cause makes it a more difficult 
case to trace it down and explain it, say psychologically. 
 The reason here for dealing with terrorism and the efforts of 
connecting it to evil, is of cause the direct content of the terror act 
itself, namely an urge to kill innocent people in numbers. This of 
cause spontaneously gives associations to unscrupulous even sadistic 
characters whose only mission in life seem to be destroying and 
119 C. Card (2002). 
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killing as many innocents as possible. Or at least, persons who commit 
terror act must be deeply pathological, qualified for serious psychiatric 
diagnoses, say antisocial personality disorder, psychosis, 
schizophrenia, aggressive paranoia, and so on. However, 
investigations regarding terrorists mind and motives reveal a rather 
different picture. The latest research suggests for example that the vast 
majority of terrorists should not be regarded mentally ill, but rather 
essentially rational people who “weight the costs and benefits of 
terrorist acts, concluding that terrorism is profitable”120. The matter 
in question here, however, should be that these calculations have value 
only in particular social contexts. Specific kinds of group dynamics 
play a powerful role in convincing specific individuals in using 
extreme violence in fulfilling their goals according to Schaefer. This 
of cause is often mixed up with personal factors, for example feeling 
of belonging to a powerful group executing empowerment. The 
motive of revenge for past wrongs and unfairness also seems present. 
Note however, that the case here should be that psychological 
explanations seem prominent only that we are not talking of individual 
pathological states but normal social psychological ones. This 
underscores or stresses at least two significant factors or arguments: 1) 
At least a majority of the characters engaged in terror acts show 
mostly normal psychological reactions and motives and 2) the causes 
and explanations of terrorism is mainly to be found in social and 
situational circumstances, rather that in personal deficiencies. But in 
this way making terrorism a rather normal, nor say “ordinary” 
phenomenon, in many respect undermines the idea of terrorism as 
something deeply pathological connected to specific evil characters or 
groups. The motives for being included in a social group supplying its 
members with genuine care and the feeling of belonging to someone, 
something to believe in, authorities as objects of admiration and even 
power, should of cause not necessary be considered pathological, not 
even uncommon.  
 Some empirical research, for example interviews, has been done 
regarding the psychological condition among some potential suicide 
bombers and people who had actually committed terrorist attacks, 
both religious and political extremists. None of these studies has 
120 Schaefer (2007), p. 74. 
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confirmed the hypothesis that terrorists should be mentally disturbed 
and qualified for any psychiatric diagnosis, say antisocial personality 
disorder. According to Schaefer concluded an expert committee on the 
psychological causes of terrorism in 2005 that individual 
psychopathology was insufficient to explain terrorism. In fact, it was 
reported, terrorist leaders typically screen out such people from their 
organisation because their instability would make them unpredictable 
and therefore dangerous or at least difficult to control. The most 
striking feature concerning the terrorists’ character seems to be their 
rationally calculating mind.121 According to these studies, religious or 
political fanaticism here fits well with rational calculating minds and 
the absence of mental disorders. More specific data revealed that a 
great many of this characters came from caring, intact, even 
middleclass families, where well educated and had gone to college. 
Further, mostly were far from poor, socially isolated, unstable and 
brainwashed. What should this tell us? Perhaps nothing else than the 
fact that we will have to look for other explanations. The big question 
is where to find it. As already reflected on throughout the text, this 
makes the most urgent matter in question. I have made a strong case 
for the argument that factors and determinants along different logical 
dimensions should be regarded significant, that be biological, 
psychological and social. However, considering this, my specific point 
of view here is that principally it is exactly the combination of these 
factors or dimensions that offers some basic explanations concerning 
the matter of evil, which I consider terrorism to be a demonstration of. 
 As asserted through the text, the significant factor or dimension 
of biology should not itself be regarded as some direct or potential 
reflections of evil. On the contrary it is precisely the combination of 
biological factors, for example any genetic inclination to aggressive 
reactions and behaviours, and say certain psychological and social 
circumstances that make way for what in certain situations should be 
characterized as evil or evildoing. Resent studies however, has mainly 
focused on two apparently separated factors: The absence of 
individual psychiatric pathology and certain social factors, like the 
121 An interesting question regarding this is of cause to what extent being 
possessed by a rationally calculating mind by any logic should rule out any 
psychiatric diagnosis itself.  
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social milieu, membership in specific radical groups exerting heavy 
influence over its members and so on. Surely this represents no 
mistake or dead end. Social factors seem significant in understanding 
evildoing, not least terrorism. A growing number of researchers seem 
to conclude that terrorism is best understood from the standpoint of 
group psychology. It is exclusively through the membership of a 
social group the rational calculus of terrorist acts makes sense because 
the benefits of it are those of the group, not the individual. The 
rationale of this is of cause a willingness to subordinate an individual 
identity to a collective one. The collective interests, meaning fighting 
for something sacred, are normally placed before individual ones. The 
role of charismatic leaders is of cause significant too. Suffering 
trauma during some occupation should also be considered a 
significant factor. Psychologist John Horgan, an expert on terrorism, 
emphasize the importance of group processes but at the same time 
underscores the seemingly fact that no single factor or cause explains 
terror.122  So being member of a rather fanatic group, with charismatic 
leaders, being possessed with a strong feeling of injustice having been 
done against your people or social group and otherwise felt alone and 
powerless, make way for a possible career as terrorist. However this 
social dynamics is often seen in the recruiting to extreme political 
groups in general who not necessarily are in purpose of doing terror or 
even talk of or consider it. Interview with members and ex-members 
of such groups often reveal reflection and insight of high standard. I 
suppose one could get results like these by doing research on say war 
criminals and executioners through modern history. However, 
focusing on the moral sphere of these characters doings may reveal a 
quite different picture. They may score well on scales measuring 
psychological normalcy, but perhaps make poor on scales measuring 
moral standards. It is precisely this point of view I wish to focus in the 
text, namely some significant psychological parameters underlying 
moral consciousness and manners. I shall return to that matter in the 
final conclusion. However, when confronting terrorists or defenders of 
terrorism with the moral matter, they will probably assert that they are 
acting out of highest moral principles. There is no reason for call such 
confessions in question. They surly believe they are acting morally, 
122 Horgan, 2005. 
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referring to some higher order truth, liberation of the repressed, the 
hope for a better world, and so on. In my opinion, however, this is 
well on the way in confusing moral with idealism. For example, 
referring to some truths of higher order, that be religious or political, 
says nothing concerning the specific moral in these truths. In fact they 
could turn out deeply immoral in merely attending to the interest of a 
specific group. They may say they act out of moral, but just on the 
behalf of their own group. Perhaps the demand for justice for one’s 
own group goes hand in hand with injustice regarding members of 
other groups. In fact this seems to be quite the case with terrorism 
aimed at pursuing the interest of some repressed group, their tool in 
restoring justice consisting of killing innocent people. Identifying this 
as proper moral is of cause confusing revenge with moral. However, it 
is possible to go on asserting that this is truly moral, more specially 
following the rule “purpose justifies the means”, being interpreted as 
some sort of an utilitarian principle or ethics. But this principle should 
just make valid within a group, counting costs and benefit, not through 
the relationship between say two different groups, cultures, nations, 
etc. In that case a proper description perhaps instead should be 
chauvinism. The problem then with doing terrorism, regarding moral, 
even when we acknowledge the terrorist good unselfish intentions is, 
in my opinion, that moral  is mixed up with idealism. A moral that just 
account within and for the benefit of one’s own group, should hardly 
be considered moral, simply because of the lack of being universal. A 
moral law saying you should not kill is moral by virtue of being 
universal, not by solely referring to your own social or ethnic group, 
family, etc. 
 
The problem with or case for moral is, however, not just some 
cognitive-philosophical formulations or principles, but a whole range 
of specific attitudes coming into work through different situations 
humans are confronted with, that being of a small- as well as large 
scale, from daily meetings to cultural conflicts. Moral appears when 
subjects seem capable of consistently follow say ethic and moral 
paroles of kindness, respect and consideration against others without 
regard to specific interests and consequences, that being of a personal, 
cultural, ethnic or say political kind. Considering evil, it is precisely 
the absence of such consistency that makes way for immorality, and 
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perhaps ultimately in large scale evil like genocide and the Holocaust. 
The problem thus, as earlier asserted, is not sadistic individuals doing 
evil all day long, but that certain individuals don’t possess the human 
(and perhaps psychological) qualities for consequently acting out 
morally, no matter the consequences, interests or social pressure of 
different kind. It is precisely that kind of personal and psychological 
capabilities that are in question in regarding the matter of respectively 
doing or dissociating oneself from different kink of evil, that being 
terrorism, genocide and so on. The point here is that we should not 
look for psychiatric pathology in revealing motives for terrorism and 
other evil doing that modern research to a great extent has focused on 
and subsequently turned down. It may well be the case that, say 
terrorists generally are not qualified for any psychiatric diagnosis. But 
what kind of character would blow up totally innocent people, even 
children, with whom they have no conflict or controversies. Surely 
distorted idealism, repression and social pressure explain a lot, but in 
my opinion, by far everything. Because, besides from focusing on 
external factors and kind of pressure, one will have to consider what’s 
going on in one’s mind, one’s conscience, inhibitions, and so on, 
against harming and destroying innocent people not unlike one’s own 
dear ones, relatives and family members. The significant 
psychological factor in question is of cause the mechanism of 
empathy. What is it then with empathy, making it such a crucial 
factor?  Remember the reference to empathy in part III regarding for 
example the Holocaust and the Eichmann case. There seem to be a 
significant parallel here to the subject of terrorism, where the asserted 
absence of say sadism and psychiatric pathology in executing evil 
appeared significant. Note further the reference to biological factors, 
special regarding the hyper-actual research on the so called “mirror 
neurons”. The very point, as already asserted, seems to be that 
biological mechanisms, like these neurons, probably form some sort 
of basis for an empathic mind being able to act out of sympathy and 
for the benefit of fellow human beings. Note however that mirror 
neurons should not be considered empathy itself, though recent 
research indicate or has in some cases revealed a rather immediate 
connection between perceptual stimuli and even strong and direct 
symptoms of empathy. The point regarding humans is however that 
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the overt manifestation of empathy grows out of our development and 
experiences as psychological and social creatures.123  
 Besides mirror neurons then, there exist other rather natural 
mechanisms operating upon and within the human. Of cause, 
evolutionary psychology appears significant. Another more specific 
matter or explanation grows out of developmental psychology. 
Different scholars have stressed the existence of an original and 
autonomous developmental line of empathy. Of special relevance here 
is the theory of Martin Hoffman.124 The theory is biological based, 
asserting that humans are born with the capacity for affective reactions 
to other living creatures’ emotional condition.  He has proposed a 
model of age related changes in empathy running through four basic 
stages, the first stage starting even during the first year of life.125 
Hoffman names this stage “global empathy” and its characteristics 
appear to be the baby’s reaction of stress when being witness to for 
example another baby’s crying. However, what remains a bit unclear 
here, is weather the baby’s reaction is of one’s own stress or of real 
empathy for the others discomfort. Maybe this remains a matter of 
interpretation. Anyway it seems complicated to conclude or reveal that 
the toddler should be capable of showing real empathy for another 
person at this stage since it seems obvious that he or she is not capable 
of differencing between oneself and other persons and conceptualizing 
them as autonomous. In other words, the baby has not yet reached the 
stadium of person- or object-permanence. The next stage, appearing 
round the age of 12 months, the child now seems able in 
differentiating itself and others, but where reactions of strong 
discomfort or distaste by others stress reactions is followed by efforts 
to assist and comfort them in different ways, for example by offering 
the other one’s own toy, etc. The helping behaviour, however, seems 
egocentric in that children seem to help in ways that are likely to 
diminish their own distress. In the next stage, from 2 – 3 years and 
through the early years in school, the child develops the ability to take 
123 Note here of cause the close relationship between the concept of empathy and 
those of  “sympathy”, “altruism” and “prosocial behavior”, though not 
describing exactly  identical phenomena.  
124 Se Hoffman (1982), (1984). (1985). Note also Eisenberg & Fabes (1991).  
125 The assertion, that children show empathy during the first year of life, may 
however be disputed. 
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others perspectives, leaving behind its egocentricity. The reactions to 
others distress now seem determined by the others condition and 
internal states and not one’s own reactions to it. These reactions now 
are more appropriate and responsive to others particular needs. 
Finally, in late childhood, children develop a more mature 
comprehension of the others condition as such, beyond the immediate 
stress and discomfort it may suffer in the situation and realize that the 
general condition of others, beyond occasional incidentally distress is 
of a more serious kind. This in fact might be seen as parallel to the 
final stage in Piaget’s theory regarding the cognitive development, the 
“formal operational stage” where thoughts and reflection are made 
general and hypothetical, not restricted to concrete situations. The 
consequence of this should be that the individual now are able to 
experience empathy in its most complete form, as general affective 
reactions to poorness, illness and other more chronic phenomena and 
conditions.  
 In addition to this, recent research of cause has focused on 
evolutionary explanations regarding aggression and violence as well 
as empathy. In part III the importance of genes and evolution in 
association to aggression and violence was stressed. The importance 
of such explanations regarding behaviour antagonistic to this, like 
empathy, caring and activities of helping fellow humans, however, 
also seem prominent. There should not exists any contradiction in 
realizing that humans may – simultaneously and even connected to the 
same individuals – harbour the whole spectre of these qualities, from 
aggression to empathy, though not equally distributed in every single 
human. Connected to this, two main factors seem obvious. In the first 
place, humanity itself could not possibly survived through history 
without empathic capabilities and capacities in humans, for example 
regarding care for newborn members of any society or group. The 
issue here of cause is of cause that caring and upbringing should not 
be regarded exclusively instrumental, but as their own emotional 
objective. Second, it seems plausible that mankind, from prehistoric 
times had to posit both the capabilities of doing aggressive warfare 
and being able to show empathic emotions towards their relatives, 
offspring and the neighbor next door for the sake of survival. Without 
being able to fight for food, supply and territory and without 
establishing tight and strong positive emotions between members of 
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your own group, no individual could positively have survived the very 
realities confronting primitive man.  
 
It seems then we are controlled by antagonistic mental capabilities, 
perhaps each often and metaphorically formulated, fighting to get the 
upper hand of the other. Objectively then, one should assume that 
normally both instances are operating within the human psyche, but 
perhaps on different terms. There are however, certain complications 
concerning the concept and object of empathy itself. First, we took for 
granted the prevailing positive emotional definition of it, pointing at 
the affective concern for the personal condition of others. However, 
the point here should be that this constitutes precisely the emotional 
defined part of it. In addition to this, some have stressed that empathy 
should not be consider an exclusively positive matter. If some 
definition of empathy might be getting into the mind and feelings of 
the other person, in other words a matter of attaining insight, then it 
seems obvious that it could be used as a tool for misuse, for example 
in manipulating the other. Anyway, having this sensitive information 
put you in a position where you can use it for good or bad. Heinz 
Kohut, for example has asserted that many of the Nazi interrogators 
were indeed highly empathic, out of being experts in reading mind and 
feelings of their victims, then of cause using it for bad purposes.126 
One should note here that this perspective on empathy sticks more or 
less to a cognitive definition of the concept. A cognitive view 
regarding empathy has been stressed in connection to different 
traditions within psychology, for example within the field of social 
psychology dealing with role theory and the abilities to identify with 
others by entering into their feelings and thoughts. This opens op for 
the subjects ability to show respect to other persons and in accordance 
with this to regulate ones’ own behavior. In other words, it seems a 
matter of realizing or acknowledgement out of cognitive capacities. 
The concept of “social intelligence” should be proper here. In recent 
years, however, the emotional side of empathy has caught attention, 
largely due to a growing interest in and focus on ethics and morality. 
Empathy based on readings in ethics and moral, where scholars for 
example are trying to explain man’s capabilities for moral reflection 
126 Se Restak (2006). 
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and acting as based on empathic responses, surely focus on, not just 
the attention to others needs, stresses and suffering, but combined with 
a concern for the aiming at easing the other’s suffering. Surely, this 
complicates the matter of empathy a bit and in turn contributes to 
confusions regarding the very essence of the concept. However, when 
reflecting on some assumed ancient origins concerning the concept’s 
subject matter, one will find there existing a strong case for the 
emotional interpretation itself. The evolutionary hypothesis, 
presupposing that the capacities for empathy are built-in in the genes 
and contribute to the survival of the species, points directly to the fact 
that it is precisely the empathic caring for other humans, based on 
precisely an emotional sensitivity of that other’s needs, possible 
suffering and distress, that constitute the very essence of empathy. 
Reflections on for example the developmental concept of empathy, 
exemplified by Hoffman’s theory, point in the same direction. The 
child’s growing capacity for empathic attitudes and behavior, states 
clearly that what is in business is an emotional care for other person’s 
needs and condition. One significant question should for example be 
weather the hypothesis regarding genes and evolution could be 
combined or at least be consistent with the developmental perspective. 
Of cause, one could assert that questions and perspectives concerning 
development could be turned into the direction of culture, milieu, 
learning and social ideology. In my opinion, learning and social 
reinforcement becomes significant, but not as manifestations of purely 
isolated or autonomous processes or logics. Being able to social 
reinforce or cultivate some specific qualities in man should logically 
imply an existing potential inside man from the point of departure, 
simply because you cannot reinforce something non-existence from 
the very start. 
 Another significant matter regarding the cognitive and emotional 
side of empathy is the related concepts of altruism and pro-social 
behavior. These concepts refer mainly to behavioral dimensions or 
consequences of empathic feelings and attitudes. Usually they have 
been interpreted as by far identical. However, there exists a certain 
nuance here. Altruism means something like “love thy neighbor” 
principle carried out in practice, meaning helping others without the 
benefit for oneself. In other words: out of (empathic) concern for the 
other. It looks as if there exists some guarantee here that altruism not 
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exclusively refers to a certain kind of behavior, leaving the very 
(psychological) motive out. Pro-social behavior on the other hand, 
refers exclusively to behavior. The point should be that identical 
behavior may grow out of different motives. Engaging in pro-social 
activities then, doesn’t mean that one’s motives are altruistic, say 
empathic. On the contrary, they could be largely selfish. Precisely this 
has been stressed by evolutionary psychology. In their concept, 
empathy and altruism, in turn are leading to variants of pro-social 
behavior in the service of survival. To mechanisms guarantees this, 
namely kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Kin selection refers to 
altruism as a strategy in securing our genes will survive in the future, 
through our successors, making us disposed to help relatives close to 
us bearing the same genes. Reciprocal altruism on the other hand 
states that people seems more likely to help each other when frequent 
contact is expected in the future, simply because one then should 
expect this generosity will later be repayed. A third hypothesis, 
however, could be added, namely so called reputation theory, saying 
that it generally should turn out advantageous and to one’s own 
benefit to establish a reputation for benevolence through the 
systematic use of good altruistic deeds, the aim being to enhance one’s 
own image and status among significant people on whom one depend 
on and whose help and support one probably will need in the future. 
However, this reference to evolution and genes, by far deals with 
processes and qualities behind our conscious control. Besides this one 
can image a multitude of selfish motives and interests underlying 
overt pro-social and helpful behavior, some of them may even turn out 
to be of a rather dubious and in the long run even destructive kind.127   
 Pro-social behavior too, precisely as empathy, has been 
explained out of developmental psychology. Nancy Eisenberg128 has 
constructed a stage model concerning the development of the pro-
social mind. Here it becomes obvious how a rather mature attitude 
concerning pro-sociality grows out of rather selfish motives or 
127 Imagine for example systematic helpful behavior in the purpose of making 
the recipient helpless and totally dependent of the helper, out of a motive to 
control and manipulate him/her, a behavior one will positively associate with the 
personality of psychopaths. This possibly brings us to some kind of doctrine like 
“helping in the service of evil”.  
128 Eisenberg, 1982, 1986. Eisenberg et al., 1983. Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991. 
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concepts. According to Eisenberg, just gradually and later through 
development the child becomes capable of mature pro-social behavior, 
that is, behavior basically aimed at helping and supporting other 
individuals and not motivated  by selfish interests. In other words: 
when pro-social behavior matches real empathic attitudes and 
emotions.  According to Eisenberg, this stage does not occur or 
becomes dominant before the age of approximately thirteen/fourteen. 
Before that, the child’s perspective regarding pro-social acts are by 
nature restricted within the frames of its own egocentric perspective, 
meaning no being capable of consequently taking the perspective of 
others. Mature pro-social capabilities imply the power of orientation 
towards the needs and conditions of precisely others and besides, the 
internalization of universal norms and ideals expressing respect for 
other individual’s rights, dignity and equality of status. One should 
note here that Eisenberg’s concept of pro-sociality shows as not 
identical to empathy, thus underscoring my point regarding the 
possibility of pro-social acts containing quite different and perhaps 
also antagonistic motives. According to Eisenberg, “real” empathy 
occurs not before teenage, while Hoffman’s theory regarding the 
development of empathy operates with a concept of empathy 
occurring during the first year of life. This discrepancy however is due 
to the fact that they operate with different and even logically distinct 
conceptions of empathy, where Hoffman is dealing with the very 
development of it from rudimentary to more mature forms while 
Eisenberg exclusively operates with or presupposes it a rather mature 
stage itself.  
 Anyway, this should tell us that phenomena like altruism, pro-
sociality and empathy represent certain capacities in man, 
irrespectively of if they being regarded as originated in say biology or 
psychology. However, in my opinion biology generally has to be 
included or taken for granted, simply because we from the beginning 
or at the moment of birth so to say are or exist as biological creatures. 
From birth and hereafter it is the interaction between biology and 
milieu that becomes significant. As already asserted, man inherits 
capacities for both empathic and evil or destructive manners and 
impulses, but it is each individual’s unique experiences through 
socialization that by far determines what kind of person one becomes, 
that be of the more altruistic/empathic or evil kind. Of cause, 
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generally most individuals fortunately come down on the empathic 
side. There exists however, certain complications to this, precisely 
growing out of the fact that neither empathy nor evil turn out plain and 
unequivocal in certain individuals. In fact, analysis and observations 
often reveal that both empathic and more suspicious properties seem 
able to manifest itself, precisely not out of variations regarding person 
to person, but out of variations in the very social situation, that be of a 
group-dynamic or broader cultural, political or ideological kind. Still 
we will have to keep in mind the significance of personal matter, they 
being psychological or/and biological.                           
According to this there appears to be certain significant problems 
concerning the presence empathic capacities in man, having to do with 
its co-existence with other more destructive tendencies and forces 
operating within the psyche. A rather disturbing fact associated with 
this is the earlier observation of how individuals who apparently 
seemed capable of committing the worst misdeeds and atrocities 
against complete innocent and defenseless humans, at the same time 
could show warm, empathic traits of genuinely caring for others, for 
example family members, friends, colleges, and so on. How should 
this be explained? It is of cause important to have in mind that evil 
manifests itself in a number of different ways. Of cause one can find 
the bare sadist finding pleasure in hurting and torturing innocent 
people. However, more common is the torturer who just does his work 
and in the evening returns to his family and into the role as say 
empathic father and husband. Another and more important category is 
the mere bureaucrat who exclusively unfold himself as, say an 
administrator of a death camp or the whole “solution” of eliminating 
certain ethnic groups. Here we are dealing with problems like the 
Eichmann case.129 Surely philosophers who make efforts to interpret 
or analyze Eichmann on exclusively philosophical grounds fail. As 
asserted in part III, it was mainly the lack of including psychological 
and motivational parameters in the analysis that led to, at best, an 
incomplete understanding. By sticking to definitions or 
characterizations of Eichmann’s conduct as “banality” or 
“thoughtlessness”, the whole matter in my opinion, became shrouded. 
But how should “thoughtlessness” be understood here? What does it 
129 Note the earlier discussion of the Eichmann case in part II and III. 
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mean being thoughtless in a situation when you willingly, by 
administrative procedures send millions of people to a certain death?  
Perhaps, in everyday speech one would say Eichmann lacked 
conscience. This in my opinion, in spite of everything, gets closer to 
the matter. Talking of “thoughtlessness” focuses exclusively on the 
cognitive side of human psychology. It seems obvious that this rather 
narrow focus should be wrong concerning the matter in question. 
What if Eichmann had not been thoughtlessness, but, on the contrary, 
most reflected? What difference would that had done? Surely you can 
reflect upon something being wrong, but still commit it. Research in 
social psychology has revealed that knowing what is wrong, and even 
teaching others, say your own children, what is wrong, doesn’t 
automatic lead to evading wrongdoing. Different motivations 
operating within different social contexts of cause contribute in 
determining the manifest conduct appearing. Furthermore, and this in 
fact turns out even more disturbing: The very perception or 
interpretation of what is right and what is wrong sometimes change 
dramatically from one single situation or context to another. Let’s first 
start with a rather unimportant example. Usually we react with greater 
affection and a conviction that injustice has been made when someone 
close related to us are affected. Anyway, witnessing a conflict 
between say acquaintances and a complete stranger to us all but 
automatically do justice to the former. This follows from the fact that 
we simply don’t exist as exclusively cognitive creatures, but 
emotional too, which in turn leads to the consequence that our 
emotional attachment to those closely related to us to a great extent 
determines our cognitive perception of what (and who) is right and 
respectively wrong. This asymmetry regarding the perception of right 
and wrong, of what is to be considered moral and not, however gets 
problematic when, say, questions of life and death are inflicted. A 
rather basic assumption regarding moral or moral principles is that 
they define themselves universal, meaning they are or must be valid 
behind or across circumstances, interests, political and historical 
changes, and so on. Recall Kant’s categorical imperative. ”Thou shall 
not kill” existing as a moral law precisely out of its universality, 
meaning that it has to be considered binding and guiding for every 
significant situation where killing other people in one way or another 
becomes current or pushing.  
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 The matter in question now is precisely the opposite of some 
variant of a black and white or either-or approach. Concerning evil, 
the focus should not be on sadistic individuals finding pleasure in 
torturing others, contrasted with a huge majority of normal people 
exclusively preoccupied with altruism and empathy. Instead the focus 
should be that of a totality, meaning that all relevant parameters and 
nuances becomes relevant regarding the analysis and evaluation of 
evil. As already asserted, generally each individual should be 
considered the bearer of both altruistic/empathic and more destructive 
properties, though rough distributed on individual basis. Most people, 
if not everybody, perhaps hold the capacity of both right and wrong, to 
a certain extent dependent of the social contexts they take part in. It 
seems like this factor itself contributes to the complexity when say 
evil itself enters the arena or comes into question. There are further 
complicating factors working within such a scenario. Have in mind 
the more recent definition of xenophobia accounted for in part II and 
III, defined as our perhaps inborn tendency in roughly dividing people 
into to broad categories of “us” and “them”.130 Furthermore, social, 
cultural, political and ideological issues of cause also come into 
account. Not surprisingly, these factors or parameters of cause are 
operating on moral terms or at least holds moral and ethic 
complications. Social contingences then, become significant as some 
sort of a framework so to say for both psychological and biological 
parameters. Or more specific: social contingences together with 
psychological and biological ones make a specific kind of 
constellation explaining the manifestation of both historical and recent 
properties of the matter in question, evil. So far so good, but this 
further confronts us with huge difficulties. The multi-factorial 
accounts regarding the very matter of evil bring us into a position 
where plain definitions and questions regarding causes apparently 
become unclear and diffuse. This however is due to the very fact that 
no single determining factor is operating autonomously within the 
context of matter. We are, as asserted through the text, faced with a 
multi-causality forcing us to make analysis on different conceptual 
grounds or levels, abstract as well as manifest ones. This ends up in 
130 For the empirical testing of this hypothesis, note the IAT test accounted for in 
part III.  
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some kind of a two-piece form: an analysis of the very substances in 
question, psychology, biology, social factors and mete-theoretical 
definitions and, second, their very reciprocal manifestations, through 
different combinations due to the situation in question. In my opinion, 
this makes a starting point in understanding the many rather confusing 
faces of both moral, empathy, altruism and evil, and not at least: why 
these apparently contradictory matters often seem to appear 
simultaneously, even inside the same person or individual. 
 Finally, this brings us back to the Eichmann case. My assertion 
was that the “thoughtlessness” hypothesis failed, mainly because it 
solely sticks to the cognitive dimension in man. Dealing with moral 
and evil, however could positively not have been done without 
considering emotional aspects. Note here for example that postulating 
a “lack of emotional feelings”, say human conscience, implies 
precisely that emotional parameters are taken into account, not the 
opposite. That’s why I would assert that the rather everyday doctrine 
of “lack of conscience is more precise than the philosophical doctrine 
of “non-reflection”. Perhaps Eichmann, behind his desk, did not 
reflect on the thousands by thousands of individuals he sent to death. 
But even if he had, it is not obvious that this would have made him act 
or feel quite different regarding innocent people’s death, not say his 
own responsibility in it. The lack of mobilizing emotional feelings 
concerning the case may not qualify for a psychiatric diagnosis, but 
surely, in my opinion, involves an (emotional) flaw in the character. 
Besides, the idea or statement that Eichmann was considered rather 
normal according to psychiatric logic, must be considered a myth. 
More recent research has revealed that the results of psychological 
tests of Eichmann demonstrated emotional instability, strong and 
pathological aggressive impulses, even sadism, and rather instability 
in close relations. 131 Furthermore, it also seems to be something of a 
myth that Eichmann himself was not an anti-Semite. On the contrary it 
has been documented that he held some rather aggressive attitudes 
against the Jews. 
 Then, are we forced back to the perspective of the isolated 
psychopath doing evil for the sake of his own pleasure? Not 
necessarily. The point here is precisely to demonstrate that evil, 
131 Vetlesen, 2003. 
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especially in its most extensive and grotesque forms and variants, is to 
be found in conditions somewhere between the normal and 
pathological individual. Of cause, that does not constitute the whole 
story. One may argument that the most insane sadist will do evil on 
every occasion. According to my arguments however, that’s not the 
real problem. What is the big problem is, as indicated by different 
scholars, precisely ordinary people doing evil. I would consider this a 
syndrome itself. What history has told us is that large scale evilness 
has been executed by large groups of ordinary men or people 
operating precisely on group basis. Note here the explanation of the 
dynamic forces rooted in especially two districts factors or 
parameters: The logic of group identity and xenophobia, or established 
fear for strangers or strange groups. These factors mixed together in 
situations where role expectations are settled or work in the direction 
of reinforcing these basic forces may then be fatal. Another significant 
factor here appears to be the ideological leadership dictating the norms 
and moral operating under the specific prevailing political 
circumstances. Note that this may be valid for examples like both 
Zimbardo’s prison experiment and say totalitarian systems like the 
Nazi as well as the Stalin regime, both built on among other things, 
mass murder. Some substantial factor however comes significant. 
Frequently a comparison has been made between the Zimbardo and 
the Milgram experiment. In my opinion however, this should be 
considered a mistake and built on a misinterpretation of the logic 
behind and the results of the two studies. Note here the ingredients of 
the model outlined through this text. First, it is necessary to bring in 
individualistic perspectives based on as well biology as psychology. 
Concerning psychology, it is possible to consider more 
psychodynamic factors like drives and conflicts, say following the 
logic of Klein and other theorists of object relations. Second, several 
biological parameters have to be considered, for example dispositions 
for aggression and anti social behavior associated with brain 
structures, hormones and genes. Regarding genes, recent research has 
put stress on evolution, and specifically factors like altruism and 
empathy, but also qualities of the quite different kind, say aggression, 
egoism and dominance, all in their own way working in the service of 
survival regarding the individual, the group and/or one’s own genes. 
Additionally, one has to include specific biological, perhaps 
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evolutionary developed mechanisms like mirror neurons and inborn 
xenophobia. Finally, factors like group identity, group selection and 
group chauvinism often seem crucial, specially under conditions were 
evil at large scale are current, say ethnic cleaning, Holocaust, and so 
on. The same goes for political and ideological terms systematically 
pursuing anti-moral and barbaric ideas and demands, for example 
dehumanizing members of other ethnic groups. The point here, in my 
opinion, is precisely that these factors or parameters are operating on 
different terms and specially concerning their presence or not in 
different settings, say in the Zimbardo contra the Milgram study. 
Apparently, a majority of the participants in the Milgram study felt 
uncomfortable and showed stress symptoms when being forced to 
give electric shock, yet doing it just under the influence of a scientific 
and not ideological authority. On the other hand, the Zimbardo study 
took place under conditions were  participants were expected to play 
out particular roles based on authority, repression and even brutality, 
revealing certain brutal, even sadistic traits of characters in each or 
many of them. Of significant importance is of cause also the presence 
of group mentality and group anonymity in this setting. Regarding the 
Milgram study, the symptoms of stress may indirectly indicate basic 
empathic feelings concerning the expected suffering of the 
participants. However, it may also be interpreted as a result of anxiety 
for breaking fundamental rules of a humanistic and democratic 
society, namely hurting or bringing discomfort upon innocent people. 
In the Zimbardo study, on the contrary, no such signs of at least some 
hypothetical empathy seem apparent. Some interesting element her 
should be that the personal status of the participants in the Zimbardo 
experiment, given the role of prison guards and often exhibiting 
significant brutality and even sadism, was that of a normal, 
harmonious, peaceful, kind person. Persons with possible psychiatric 
deviations had been screened out before the experiment started. Then 
one has to assume that this was characters capable of empathy and 
altruism in advance. This of cause underscores the argument that both 
empathic structures as more aggressive ones are to be found within the 
(same individual) human psyche, stressing the fact that the human 
mind may seems ambiguous and equivocal.  
 This of cause leads to the conclusion that at least the Milgram 
study should not be turned to account for explaining say the Holocaust 
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or “ordinary men” doing evil, for example ethnic cleaning, genocide, 
etc. There is however another message existing here, that makes way 
for some further interpretations regarding a comparison with the 
Holocaust. A rather significant ingredient connected to the Holocaust, 
perhaps crucial for the very accomplishment of the whole grotesque 
project, is the process of de-humanizing of the victims, in this case the 
Jews as an ethnic group. Mechanisms like this seem absent in the 
Milgram study. In the Zimbardo study however, such elements should 
be considered part of the case, at least to some extent. Making a 
design with one group positioned superior to another, probably make 
room for it, though of cause not to be compared with the Holocaust or 
incidents of ethnic cleaning. Another factor implicated in the 
Zimbardo study, at least more obvious in regard to Milgram, is the 
apparently move toward hiding in the anonymity of the crowd, 
probably making more room for breaking rules and norms regarding 
decency and respect towards fellow humans. Besides, both the 
Milgram study and other field studies revealed that nearness to the 
(individual) victim is of significant importance in regards to treating 
them on human or decent terms. This also reveals that empathy and 
altruism by itself in most cases has to be considered present in most 
humans, at least as inborn capacities. Note for example genetic 
capacities and the development of mirror neurons reported in the text. 
 The focus, then, still rests on empathy and up to a point on 
altruism. How come that well established capacities for empathy don’t 
manifest themselves during some decisive situations and 
circumstances were such qualities and properties seem essential? 
Instead precisely opposite attitudes is demonstrated, with of cause 
fatal consequences. The answer is apparently to be found when further 
analyzing two significant operating factors. First of cause, the fact that 
aggressive and egoistic factors are operating or at least existing as 
potentials, side by side by the more benign. Next, the social, cultural 
and ideological circumstances and power relations largely determine 
or apply pressure to which human qualities will manifest themselves 
in the different individuals involved. This became evident even 
through the Zimbardo study were the participants playing guards were 
instructed to behave “threateningly”.132 No wonder then, these 
132 Note Part II. 
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mechanisms frequently manifest themselves in real situations where 
group hate and even ethnic cleaning is on the agenda. It is however, of 
importance to note that there of cause exist individual differences, as 
well in psychological profile as distinct patterns of behavior or 
conduct when confronted with different situations and contexts. There 
seem to be no logic of strict determinism present, however 
circumstances that for the most part, as earlier stated, bring pressure 
on the participants in question. 
 Regarding Eichmann as well as other characters placed in more 
or less identical roles, as administrators of mass murder, death camps 
and often torturers and executioners too, one significant feature 
reported concerning their personality and way of behaving outside 
their context of death and murder but within their sphere of family, 
children, friends and so on, is that empathy, altruism and pro-social 
behavior is often reported. How could this come? The answer to this 
may perhaps come rather simple. Empathy clearly exists in these 
characters. However, it typical exists exclusively within the named 
spheres, towards their love ones, friends, etc., which implies, when 
restricted to these human categories, that empathy is not made 
universal or global, rather restricted and “local”. Psychology of 
development may inform us that this fact in the next round may 
indicate a fixation at some premature stage in the natural line of 
development regarding the very capability of empathy.133 The same 
goes for the development of explicit moral performance, moving in 
stages from the more restricted and selfish perspective and motives to 
universal principles of general validity and obligations, for and to 
everybody.134 Social circumstances, as already stated, of cause are of 
most important significance here. The most crucial factor operating 
here, as already stated, is probably the de-humanizing of members of 
other ethnic or social groups. Being systematically told to believe that 
these individuals should not be considered proper humans concerning 
status, personality, feelings, needs and elementary rights, frequently 
becomes extreme efficient in switching of so to say natural empathic 
feelings and attitudes. This phenomenon, however, may be 
experienced under normal circumstances, even serving positive 
133 Hoffman, op. cit. 
134 Kohlberg, 1984. 
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functions. Imagine the world news bringing tragedies and catastrophes 
constantly into everybody’s home. What if each single case of human 
suffering experienced through television should trigger the same 
amount and intensity of empathy as say the suffering of a close 
relative or friend? That would sooner or later drive us into insanity, or 
at least serious psychological trouble. Keeping emotional distance to 
human suffering regarding at least extreme and continual disasters, 
may be seen as something of a mental defense mechanism in the 
service of the psyche. However, the drawback concerning this also 
seems obvious. A more or less totally denial of getting emotionally 
involved in other humans suffering, how enormous that might be, may 
create some agenda for not assisting those who are in need of our help 
and assistance. True altruism involves precisely the motive and will to 
help, not just those nearest to us, but the complete stranger, without 
the expectations of getting something back or being repayed later. The 
very mechanism of not getting involved in human suffering, injustice 
and harassment however, assumes rather pathological forms when it 
comes to accepting them as soon as they are being committed against 
innocent members of say different ethnic group or indeed worse, more 
or less the very participating in the cruelties itself, while reserving 
one’s empathic and altruistic qualities and attitudes for members of 
one’s own clan.  
 So that appears to be the very problem concerning evil and 
human agency operating within, not just an objective, but also a 
normative social context, namely the deficiencies in manifesting or 
make real one owns empathic or altruistic capacities and potentials. 
Note here that the problem is not that of a more pathological absence 
of empathic or altruistic properties as such. Neither is the case that 
isolated social and situational factors are autonomously operating on 
their own terms. It is precisely the combination of empathic capacities 
not being allowed to operate on global terms under critical 
circumstances and confrontations, making way for more destructive 
capacities and potentials in man that makes the problem come real.  
 
The very subject of empathy then becomes crucial. Empathy itself 
appears significant in explaining say sadistic as well as non-sadistic, 
rather bureaucratic forms of evil, for example affectless administrating 
genocide and mass-murder/murder in concentration camps, what 
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Hannah Arendt in some respect characterized as “the banality of evil”. 
It also explains the assertions that apparently few or none pathological 
and psychiatric symptoms seem present in perpetrators doing evil that 
be terrorists, guards of concentration camps, administrators of 
genocide, and so on. Certainly, the absence of identified psychiatric 
pathology does not rule out psychology.                
On the contrary, we finally realize that ruling out psychology 
and individuality becomes fatal regarding the understanding of evil. 
Psychology itself thus stands as fundamental concerning an 
understanding of the sometimes deep senseless cruelties humans are 
capable of inserting upon each other. However, not a psychology 
operating solely on its own terms, but rather out of social 
circumstances and contexts and through interactions where 
psychology really manifests itself.                             
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